特许权价值、公司治理和银行稳健性——基于特许权价值和公司治理交互作用的视角
发布时间：2019-08-14 08:36
【摘要】：以2000—2012年沪深股市16家上市银行为样本,实证分析特许权价值、公司治理及其交互作用对银行稳健性的影响。结果表明:特许权价值的自律效应能够提高银行稳健性;第一大股东持股比例和股东性质无法显著影响银行稳健性,而前十大股东的持股比例却显著影响银行稳健性;完善的董事会制度能够提高银行稳健性,而独立董事制度却无法提高银行稳健性;高管持股能够提高银行稳健性,而高管薪酬激励效果则不明显;商业银行存在"大而不倒"的规律,而杠杆效应则不明显;前十大股东的持股比例、高管持股与特许权价值对银行稳健性的影响相互替代。
[Abstract]:Taking 16 listed banks in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2000 to 2012 as samples, this paper empirically analyzes the impact of concession value, corporate governance and its interaction on bank conservatism. The results show that the self-discipline effect of concession value can improve the robustness of banks, the proportion of the first largest shareholders and the nature of shareholders can not significantly affect the robustness of banks, while the proportion of the top 10 shareholders can significantly affect the robustness of banks, while the perfect board of directors system can improve the robustness of banks, while the independent director system can not improve the robustness of banks. Executive shareholding can improve bank conservatism, but executive compensation incentive effect is not obvious; commercial banks have the law of "big but not falling", but leverage effect is not obvious; the proportion of the top ten shareholders, the influence of executive shareholding and concession value on bank conservatism is replaced by each other.
【作者单位】： 上海工程技术大学;东华大学;北京大学;威海商业银行;
【基金】：教育部人文社科青年基金项目“特许权价值、公司治理机制和银行稳健性——中美商业银行的比较研究”(12YJC630157) 上海工程技术大学高水平培育项目“‘三位一体制度’对银行稳健性的影响研究——中国上市银行的理论与实证研究”(2012pg33) 山东省博士后创新项目专项资金资助项目“后危机时代山东省城商行现代风险管理体系再造研究——基于巴塞尔新资本协议ⅱ和ⅲ的视角”(201103017)资助
【分类号】：F832.2;F832.51
[Abstract]:Taking 16 listed banks in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2000 to 2012 as samples, this paper empirically analyzes the impact of concession value, corporate governance and its interaction on bank conservatism. The results show that the self-discipline effect of concession value can improve the robustness of banks, the proportion of the first largest shareholders and the nature of shareholders can not significantly affect the robustness of banks, while the proportion of the top 10 shareholders can significantly affect the robustness of banks, while the perfect board of directors system can improve the robustness of banks, while the independent director system can not improve the robustness of banks. Executive shareholding can improve bank conservatism, but executive compensation incentive effect is not obvious; commercial banks have the law of "big but not falling", but leverage effect is not obvious; the proportion of the top ten shareholders, the influence of executive shareholding and concession value on bank conservatism is replaced by each other.
【作者单位】： 上海工程技术大学;东华大学;北京大学;威海商业银行;
【基金】：教育部人文社科青年基金项目“特许权价值、公司治理机制和银行稳健性——中美商业银行的比较研究”(12YJC630157) 上海工程技术大学高水平培育项目“‘三位一体制度’对银行稳健性的影响研究——中国上市银行的理论与实证研究”(2012pg33) 山东省博士后创新项目专项资金资助项目“后危机时代山东省城商行现代风险管理体系再造研究——基于巴塞尔新资本协议ⅱ和ⅲ的视角”(201103017)资助
【分类号】：F832.2;F832.51
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