当前位置:主页 > 管理论文 > 审计管理论文 >

股权结构与审计费用相关性实证研究

发布时间:2018-01-01 03:35

  本文关键词:股权结构与审计费用相关性实证研究 出处:《南京理工大学》2009年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


  更多相关文章: 审计费用 影响因素 机构投资者 机构和非机构股东 管理层持股


【摘要】: 审计质量一直是监管者和社会公众关注的焦点。近几年来国内外不断曝光会计造假案件,使得审计职业的公信力和独立性受到了社会各界的广泛关注。人们纷纷把矛头指向注册会计师,提高审计质量的呼声日益强烈。在此背景下,国内外不少学者从注册会计师和事务所自身的角度探讨了解决方案,要求加强审计职业道德建设和法律管制,提高注册会计师的自身素质。从近年来发生的一系列审计失败案例来看,注册会计师职业规范体系不完善及审计技术相对落后固然是导致审计质量低下的因素之一,然而,我们更应从制约审计师行为的制度环境中去探索其根源,完善公司治理,才能从根本上解决问题。而股权结构作为公司治理机制的基本组成部分,对审计质量具有重要影响。 审计质量的衡量指标很多,审计费用就有是其中之一。审计费用可以直观的表示出审计质量的高低。本文从审计费用的角度对股权结构与审计质量之间的关系进行实证研究,以期为政府有关政策的制定以及审计质量的改善提供一定的参考依据。为了便于找到不同股权结构影响审计质量的经验证据,本文从审计费用入手,以上海证券交易所、深圳证券交易所的733家A股上市公司2007年公开披露的年度报告中的数据为样本,以分散机构投资者持股比率(机构持股比率少于3%的上市流通股)、集中的机构投资者持股比率(机构持股比率大于或等于3%的上市流通股)、集中的非机构投资者持股比率(非机构持股比率大于等于3%的上市流通股)、管理层持股比率这四个主要解释变量对审计费用的影响进行实证分析。实证研究结果表明:分散机构投资持股比率对审计费用产生显著正向影响;集中的机构投资者持股比率对审计费用产生显著负向影响;集中的非机构投资者持股比率不对审计费用产生显著影响;管理层持股比率对审计费用产生负向影响。 研究结论证明股权结构与审计费用具有相关性。考虑到股权结构对审计费用影响较大,从而审计质量影响较大,我们应该从完善治理结构、完善股权结构等方面来提高审计质量。本文建议增强机构投资者与上市公司会计信息披露真实性之间的契合,从法律法规方面规范机构投资者参与股东会会议的合法性,并能够保障其权力的正常行使,完善股东会制度,学习吸收国外先进股东会制度,制定适合我国市场经济的股东会制度。
[Abstract]:Audit quality is always the focus of attention of regulators and the public at home and abroad in recent years. The constant exposure of accounting fraud cases, the audit occupation and the independence of trust has been widespread concern in the community. People have to spearhead the CPA audit, improve the quality of the increasingly strong voice. In this context, many domestic and overseas certified public accountants and the scholars from the perspective of their own solutions, calling for the strengthening of audit occupation ethics and legal control, improve the quality of CPA. A series of audit failure cases in recent years, the system of occupation standard chartered accountant is not perfect and relatively backward technology audit is one of the leading factors, low audit quality however, the institutional environment we restrict that auditors should act in to explore its roots, improve corporate governance, can from The equity structure, as the basic component of the corporate governance mechanism, has an important impact on the quality of the audit.
To measure audit quality, audit fees there is one of them. The audit fees can directly show the level of audit quality. This paper carries on the empirical research on the relationship between ownership structure and audit quality from the perspective of audit fees, in order to provide some reference for the formulation of government policy and the improvement of audit quality in order to find the different ownership structure. Empirical evidence on the impact of audit quality, audit fees from the start, the Shanghai stock exchange, the annual report disclosure of the Shenzhen stock exchange 733 A shares in 2007 data as the sample, in order to disperse the shareholding ratio of institutional investors (institutional shareholding ratio less than 3% of the listed shares), concentrated institutional ownership (institutional shareholding ratio greater than or equal to 3% of the listing of shares), the concentration of non institutional investors than Rate (non institutional shareholding ratio is greater than or equal to 3% of the listed shares), empirical analysis of the impact of managerial ownership ratio of the four main explanatory variables on audit fees. The empirical results show that: the dispersion mechanism of investment shareholding ratio have a significant positive effect on audit fees; focus on Institutional Investors shareholding ratio have a significant negative impact on audit fees have a significant impact; non institutional investors shareholding ratio not centralized audit fees; managerial ownership has a negative effect on audit fees.
The conclusion of the study has proved the relationship between ownership structure and audit fees. Considering that equity structure has great impact on audit fees, audit quality and influence, we should from the improvement of corporate governance structure, perfecting the ownership structure so as to improve the audit quality. This paper suggests that the enhanced fit between authenticity of accounting information disclosure of listed companies and institutional investors, from legitimacy legal norms of institutional investors to participate in the meeting of shareholders, and can guarantee the normal exercise of their powers, perfect the system of shareholders' meeting, the shareholders will learn and absorb foreign advanced system, for the development of China's market economy system for shareholders.

【学位授予单位】:南京理工大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2009
【分类号】:F271;F239.4

【引证文献】

相关硕士学位论文 前1条

1 吴曼;机构投资者参与公司治理法律问题研究[D];华中科技大学;2010年



本文编号:1362783

资料下载
论文发表

本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/guanlilunwen/shenjigli/1362783.html


Copyright(c)文论论文网All Rights Reserved | 网站地图 |

版权申明:资料由用户7e558***提供,本站仅收录摘要或目录,作者需要删除请E-mail邮箱bigeng88@qq.com