审计合谋的预警与防治对策的有效性研究

发布时间：2018-01-07 22:30

本文关键词：审计合谋的预警与防治对策的有效性研究　出处：《湖南大学》2009年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：审计合谋严重损害了证券市场的基本秩序与声誉。严惩合谋者虽然给受害者带来心理安慰但补偿效果甚微,投资者、债权人等利益相关者更加关注如何尽早发现审计合谋并及时予以制止,并且希望有效惩治以防止类似事件的重复发生。审计合谋的预警和防治仍是重要的研究课题。本文首先运用经济学、管理学、法学、博弈论等多学科的基本理论工具分析审计合谋的形成机理,然后从上市公司的财务状况、股权结构和治理结构、审计师特征、审计收费等视角获取审计合谋的特征指标,再以这些特征指标为变量采用多种方法构建审计合谋预警模型。最后,对防治审计合谋的奖惩对策的有效性进行理论分析和实证测度。本文共安排六章从三个大的方面研究审计合谋的预警与防治问题。第一,运用经济人假设、信息不对称理论、声誉理论、博弈论等基本理论,规范研究制度安排缺陷、声誉机制作用微弱情况下合谋者机会主义动机如何向机会主义行为转化,通过建立多方博弈模型研究合谋各方的行为特点和制度在防范审计合谋中的作用,为后续审计合谋预警与防治的数理论证、实证检验提供理论基础;第二,采用实证的方法研究上市公司的异常财务状况、特殊的股权结构和治理结构、审计师特征、异常审计收费等与审计合谋之间的关系,通过多元回归分析获取构建审计合谋预警模型的特征变量。然后,在此基础上,分别运用单变量判定、主成分分析、线性概率回归、LOGIT回归和PROBIT回归等方法建立了预警效果较好的审计合谋预警模型。经验检验发现,在预警效果上,多变量预警模型大大优于单变量判定模型,且Logistic模型依次优于PROBIT模型和LPM模型;第三,拓展Tirole(1986)、Kofman和Lawarree(1993)、Fahad(2006)等审计合谋研究模型,对奖、惩审计师以防范审计合谋的有效性问题进行博弈分析和数理论证。进一步运用实证方法从股票市场的异常反应、上市公司的市场价值、审计师声誉、审计质量和审计独立性等方面测度惩罚机制对防治审计合谋的效果。研究结果表明上市公司的市场价值和会计师事务所声誉未受到实质影响,但惩罚措施在一定程度上促进了审计质量和审计独立性的提高。论文的主要创新在于:(1)从制度安排、治理结构、法律责任压力和声誉机制等方面系统研究审计师合谋动机向合谋行为转化的作用机制,为审计合谋的研究提供理论基础平台。(2)在财务报告舞弊预警研究的基础上,充分考虑审计合谋的特点,从不同视角进行实证分析获取审计合谋的特征变量,构建了效果较好的审计合谋预警模型,弥补了审计合谋预警缺乏实证模型的缺陷,为我国的监管机构预警审计合谋提供操作性更强的方法;(3)理论论证奖惩措施对于防治审计合谋的效果问题,并采用实证的方法测度惩罚对策对于防治审计合谋的有效性,为较科学地评价和改进现有防范审计合谋制度提供科学的理论支持和经验证据。
[Abstract]:Audit collusion seriously damage the basic order of the securities market and reputation. Although severely conspire to bring psychological comfort to victims compensation but had little effect, investors, creditors and other stakeholders to pay more attention to how to detect early audit collusion and stop it timely, and hope the effective punishment to prevent similar incidents from recurring. The important research topic of early warning control and audit collusion is still.
Firstly, using economics, management, law, analysis of the basic theory of game theory and other disciplines of the formation mechanism of audit collusion. Then from the financial situation of listed companies, ownership structure and governance structure, auditor characteristics, characteristics of audit fees perspective for audit collusion, then these indicators as variables using a variety of methods the construction of audit collusion model. Finally, theoretical analysis and empirical validity measure incentive countermeasure against audit collusion.
This paper includes six chapters from the problem of early warning and prevention of three aspects of audit collusion. First, using the economic man hypothesis, information asymmetry theory, reputation theory, game theory, normative research system defects, how to transform the role of reputation mechanism under the condition of weak opportunism motivation to seek unity through opportunistic behavior. The behavior characteristics and establish a system of multi Game Research on Collusion model parties in the prevention of audit collusion in the role for demonstrating follow-up audit collusion and prevention, provide a theoretical basis for the empirical test; second, the abnormal financial status of empirical research methods of listed companies, ownership structure and governance structure, the special characteristics of auditor, audit the relationship between fees and audit collusion, through multiple regression analysis to obtain the feature construction of audit collusion model variables. Then, in On this basis, using single variable model, principal component analysis, linear regression, LOGIT regression and PROBIT regression method to establish the audit collusion effect of the early warning model better. Empirical research show that in the early warning effect, multi variable prediction model is superior to single variable decision model, and Logistic model are better than the PROBIT model and the LPM model; third, Tirole (1986), Kofman and Lawarree (1993), Fahad (2006) and other audit collusion model award, game analysis and demonstrating the effectiveness of punishing the auditor to prevent audit collusion. Further the use of empirical methods from the abnormal reaction of the stock market, the market value of listed companies the effect of auditor reputation, audit quality and audit independence measure of punishment mechanism for the prevention of audit collusion. The results show that the market value of listed companies and accounting firms The reputation has not been substantially affected, but the punishment measures have contributed to the improvement of audit quality and audit independence to a certain extent.
The main innovation of the thesis is: (1) from the institutional arrangements, governance structure, mechanism transformation of legal responsibility and reputation stress system of auditor collusion motivation to collusion behavior, and provide a theoretical basis for the research platform of audit collusion. (2) based on the study of financial reporting fraud warning, fully consider the characteristics of the audit collusion, empirical analysis of characteristic variables to obtain audit collusion from different perspectives, construct the audit collusion model better, to make up for the defects of audit collusion lack of empirical model, provides a method of operating more for the early warning of audit collusion China's regulatory agencies; (3) the effect of incentive measures for the prevention and treatment of theory audit collusion, and the effectiveness of the method to measure the punishment countermeasure for the prevention of audit collusion, to scientifically evaluate and improve the prevention of audit collusion The system provides scientific theoretical support and empirical evidence.

【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2009
【分类号】：F239.4

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