基于信息不对称理论的政府投资建设项目审计风险研究

发布时间：2018-01-16 09:21

本文关键词：基于信息不对称理论的政府投资建设项目审计风险研究　出处：《江西理工大学》2010年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】： 信息经济时代,信息作为一种重要生产力资源影响着社会生活的方方面面。充分占有信息的优势方,在竞争日趋激烈的今天,往往能把握全局,规避风险,最终获得成功;而处于信息弱势的一方,在市场经济中举步为艰,随时面临着遭遇损失和失败的风险。因此,研究在信息不对称条件下,采用什么样的手段,运用何种方法将由于信息不对称带来的风险降到承受范围之内,对增强市场经济参与者把握全局和参与市场竞争的能力,有着重要而深远的意义。政府审计作为受托经济产物,代表政府行使监督审查职能,在保障社会主义市场经济健康有序地运行上发挥着越来越重要的作用。由于审计是受托经济的产物,所以审计与被审计之间天然存在着信息不对称,这种不对称直接影响审计监督的质量,引发审计风险。要树立好政府审计的权威,做好社会主义市场经济的“守夜人”,政府审计必须研究和掌握信息不对称状况下,审计风险产生的机制,并有针对性地研究和制定缓解审计风险的方法、措施和手段。本文试图在信息不对称的大前提下,结合作者在政府审计部门的工作经验,运用乔治·阿克洛夫和迈克尔·斯彭斯的信息不对称理论,分析阐述审计风险产生机制,并从实用的角度提出缓解审计风险的对策和建议。本文首先介绍政府审计的基本概念和现状;其次介绍了信息不对称下政府审计风险的特征和具体表现以及审计风险形成的原因;再次引用案例具体详细的分析了在信息不对称下政府投资项目的审计风险并进行了评价,同时运用信息不对称理论深入分析了审计各参与方的博弈行为并建立了博弈模型;最后,结合前面的分析和案例,以及作者从事审计工作的经验,突出实用性,有针对性地提出信息不对称条件下控制政府审计风险的一些对策和建议。
[Abstract]:In the age of information economy, information, as an important productive resource, affects all aspects of social life. To succeed in the end; In the information weak side, in the market economy is difficult, at any time facing the risk of loss and failure. Therefore, under the information asymmetry conditions, what kind of means to use. How to reduce the risk caused by asymmetric information to the range of bearing is of great significance to enhance the ability of market economy participants to grasp the overall situation and participate in market competition. As the entrusted economic product, the government audit performs the function of supervision and examination on behalf of the government. It plays a more and more important role in ensuring the healthy and orderly operation of socialist market economy. Because audit is the product of entrusted economy, there is a natural information asymmetry between audit and being audited. This asymmetry directly affects the quality of audit supervision and causes audit risk. It is necessary to establish the authority of government audit and be the "nightly watchman" of socialist market economy. Government audit must study and master the mechanism of audit risk under the condition of asymmetric information, and study and formulate the methods, measures and means to mitigate audit risk. This paper attempts to apply George Akrov and Michael Spence's theory of asymmetric information in the context of information asymmetry and the author's experience in government auditing. This paper analyzes and expounds the mechanism of audit risk, and puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions to mitigate audit risk from a practical point of view. Firstly, this paper introduces the basic concepts and present situation of government audit; Secondly, it introduces the characteristics and concrete performance of government audit risk under asymmetric information and the reasons for the formation of audit risk. The case is cited to analyze the audit risk of government investment projects under asymmetric information and the evaluation is carried out. At the same time, the theory of information asymmetry is used to deeply analyze the game behavior of audit participants and establish a game model. Finally, combined with the previous analysis and cases, as well as the author's experience in auditing work, the author puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to control the government audit risk under the condition of asymmetric information.
【学位授予单位】：江西理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：F239.4

【参考文献】