审计任期与上市公司投资效率研究

发布时间：2018-02-04 17:54

本文关键词： 审计任期审计质量投资不足投资过度投资效率　出处：《杭州电子科技大学》2009年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：二十一世纪初,美国等国家先后爆发的一系列财务舞弊丑闻引发了人们对审计任期与审计质量之间关系的普遍关注。一般认为,过短的审计任期会影响审计师对客户的熟练程度,而过长的审计任期又会影响审计师的独立性,因而审计任期与审计质量处于一种微妙的关系之中。审计任期成为学术界讨论的热点问题。然而,尽管这一讨论异常激烈,但从国内外来看,鲜有学者从投资效率的角度对审计任期的合理性进行系统研究。投资效率问题是当今许多国家所面临的问题,我国也不列外。投资过度将导致大量原本稀缺的资本沉积在生产过剩的领域,浪费了资源,增加了坏账,引发了金融风险;投资不足则使大量原本稀缺的资本闲置,造成上市公司缓慢成长,投资者利益受损严重。因此,上市公司的投资效率问题是关系公司、国家、社会的重大问题。研究审计任期与投资效率的关系可以直接突出审计任期研究对于改善我国上市公司投资决策、优化我国资本配置效率的重要理论价值和实践意义。正是在这一研究背景下,本文对审计任期与上市公司投资效率之间的关系进行了系统的理论分析和严谨的实证检验,并得出结论:审计任期与上市公司投资效率之间存在倒U型关系,即与上市公司的非效率部分(投资不足和投资过度)存在正U型关系。文章的假设是通过理论分析中三个步骤来提出的,首先,通过综述现有有关研究审计任期与审计质量关系的文献,从专业胜任能力和审计师独立性两个方面考察,提出了审计任期与审计质量存在非线性关系;然后,从委托代理理论和信息不对称理论两个方面分析了财务报表、信息披露对上市公司投资效率的影响;最后,本文认为高审计质量必然能够提高上市公司的财务报表披露质量,进而有利于公司内外部对公司内部管理层实施有效监督并解决公司内部管理层与公司外部投资者之间的信息不对称程度,降低“道德风险”、降低“逆向选择”,提高投资效率。在理论分析和实证检验中,投资效率问题被划分为投资不足和投资过度两个部分来讨论。在实证中,本文采用Richardson(2006)模型求得残值作为各个公司的非效率投资部分,并将残值小于0的部分作为投资不足组,同时取残值的绝对值;将残值大于0的公司组作为投资过度组。审计任期在文中定义为会计师事务所连续地为同一机构提供审计服务的年限而不是审计人员连续地为同一机构提供审计服务的年限。随后,研究以上述残值作为因变量,审计任期、审计任期中心化处理的平方作为自变量,同时引入相关控制变量进行线性回归。实证发现,审计任期进行中心化处理后的平方与投资不足和投资过度存在正相关系,这初步说明审计任期与投资不足和投资过度存在正U型关系。为了进一步说明问题,本文将审计任期分为小于5和大于5的两组分别按上述模型回归,结果发现在审计任期小于5组,随着审计任期的延长,投资不足和投资过度得到降低,投资效率提高。在审计任期大于5组,随着审计任期的延长,投资不足和投资过度升高,投资效率降低。总体上,本文的研究发现,审计任期会对审计质量产生影响,从而对上市公司的投资效率产生影响。这一影响不是简单的线性影响,而是U型的。当审计任期过短时,审计师对上市公司不熟悉,因此专业胜任能力有限,从而影响审计师提供高质量的审计服务,不能有效提高上市公司的报表披露质量,导致严重的委托代理问题和信息不对称问题,产生投资不足和投资过度;当审计任期过长时,审计师与上市公司的关系更加密切,因此审计师独立性受到挑战,从而影响审计师提供高质量的审计服务,不能有效提高上市公司的报表披露质量,导致严重的委托代理问题和信息不对称问题,产生投资不足和投资过度是不确定的。因此,审计任期理论上存在一个临界点,在这个临界点上投资效率达到最高,本文通过实验得出我国上市公司审计任期的这一临界点大致为5年。相关政策建议,包括制定长审计任期会计师事务所强制轮换政策和短审计任期会计师事务所强制留任制度,完善公司内部治理,实施合理的会计师事务所聘用制度,推行注册会计师行业同业互查制度以在最大程度上有效地保证审计任期长度的合理性,发挥该政策应有的实施效果。无疑,这些研究将促使理论界和实务界更理性地从审计质量的角度看待审计任期与投资效率问题。
[Abstract]:At the beginning of twenty-first Century, a series of financial scandals in the United States and other countries has caused the outbreak of widespread concern about the relationship between audit tenure and audit quality. It is generally considered that short audit tenure will affect the auditor to customer's proficiency, and long term audit will affect the independence of auditors, audit tenure and so the audit quality in a delicate relationship. Audit tenure becomes a hot issue in academic circles. However, despite this intense discussion, but from domestic and international perspective, few scholars from the angle of the system of investment efficiency rationality of the audit tenure. The investment efficiency is the problem faced by many countries. Our country is no exception. Excessive investment will result in a large number of scarce capital deposited in the area of excess production, waste of resources, increased bad debts, triggered a financial risk Insurance; insufficient investment is scarce so that a large number of idle capital, resulting in slow growth of listed companies, serious damage to the interests of investors. Therefore, the investment efficiency of listed companies is the relationship between companies, countries, major social issues. Research on the relationship between audit tenure and the efficiency of investment can be directly outstanding audit tenure to improve research investment in Chinas listed companies the decision, optimize the allocation of capital in China is an important theoretical value and practical significance. It is in the context of this study, this paper made a systematic theoretical analysis and empirical test on the relationship between audit tenure and investment efficiency of listed companies, and the conclusion is that there is inverted U relationship between audit tenure and investment efficiency the listed company, which listed companies and non efficiency part (underinvestment and overinvestment) there is a positive U type relationship. The hypothesis is three by theoretical analysis Step forward, first of all, through the review of current research on the relationship between audit tenure and audit quality literature from two aspects of professional competence and ability of auditor independence study, proposed a nonlinear relationship between audit tenure and audit quality; then, from the two aspects of the principal-agent theory and asymmetric information theory analysis of the financial statements. Impact of information disclosure on the investment efficiency of listed companies; finally, the high audit quality will improve the financial statements of listed companies disclosure quality, which is conducive to both internal and external to the internal management of the company to implement effective supervision and solve the information asymmetry between the company's internal management and external investors, reduce the "moral risk". To reduce the "adverse selection", improve the efficiency of investment.
In the theoretical analysis and empirical test, the investment efficiency is divided into underinvestment and overinvestment in two parts to discuss. In the empirical research, this paper uses Richardson (2006) model to obtain the residuals as the company's non efficiency investment, and the residual value of less than 0 as part of the lack of investment group, at the same time, the absolute value of residuals the residual value is greater than 0; the company group as excessive investment group. In this paper the definition of audit tenure for the accounting firm to provide audit services continuously for the same period the mechanism not the auditor continuously to provide audit services to an institution of life. Then, the above research value as the dependent variable, audit tenure, square audit tenure treatment center as independent variables, while introducing relevant control variables by linear regression. The empirical study indicates that the audit term treatment center after the square and inadequate investment and There is positive correlation between excessive investment, which indicated that the existence of excessive investment and insufficient investment audit tenure and U relations. In order to further illustrate the problem, this paper will be divided into two groups of audit tenure is less than 5 and greater than 5 respectively according to the regression model, the results found in the audit tenure is less than 5, with long auditor tenure, underinvestment and overinvestment has been reduced and the investment efficiency. The audit tenure is greater than 5, with long auditor tenure, excessive increase in investment and insufficient investment, investment efficiency is reduced. On the whole, this study found that the audit tenure will influence the audit quality, which affects the investment efficiency of listed companies. This effect is not a simple linear effect, but U type. When the audit tenure is too short, the auditors of listed companies are not familiar with, so the professional competence is limited, thus affecting the auditors to provide high The quality of the audit services, can not effectively improve the disclosure quality of listed companies report, leads to the principal-agent problem and information asymmetry problem is serious, resulting underinvestment and overinvestment; when the audit tenure is too long, the relationship between the auditors and the listed companies more closely, so the auditor independence is challenged, thus affecting the auditors to provide high quality audit services that can not effectively improve the listed companies report disclosure quality, leads to the principal-agent problem and information asymmetry problem is serious, resulting underinvestment and overinvestment is uncertain. Because of this, there is a critical point of auditing theory, at the critical point on the investment efficiency to the highest level, through the experiment of audit tenure in China the listed company of this point is approximately 5 years.
The relevant policy recommendations, including the development of long auditor tenure and short term audit mandatory rotation policy mandatory auditor retention system, improve the internal governance of accounting firms, the implementation of reasonable employment system, the implementation of the CPA industry peer review system to the maximum extent effectively ensure the rationality of audit tenure length, to play its due effect the policy. Undoubtedly, these studies will promote the theory and practice more rational investment efficiency of audit tenure and audit quality from the point of view.

【学位授予单位】：杭州电子科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2009
【分类号】：F239.4;F276.6;F224

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