审计师变更、盈余操纵与审计师独立性——来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据

发布时间：2018-03-13 19:28

本文选题：审计师变更　切入点：盈余操纵　出处：《管理世界》2007年09期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：以1999~2004年间我国A股上市公司为样本,对审计师变更、盈余操纵与审计师独立性之间的关系进行实证检验,结果发现:(1)上市公司能够通过更换审计师达到操纵盈余的目的,同时后任审计师对此并未保持应有的谨慎;(2)变更审计师当年报告盈利的公司,其操控性应计利润在变更前相对较低,而变更后得以显著增长,且增长主要来自于对资产减值准备、非经常性损益项目的利润调节;(3)与此相反,变更审计师当年报告亏损的公司,在变更当年存在调低收益的"清洗"活动。这些研究结果表明:审计师变更与前任审计师的稳健性有关,且这种变更行为损害了后任审计师的独立性。
[Abstract]:Taking A share listed companies in China from 1999 to 2004 as samples, the paper makes an empirical test on the relationship between auditor change, earnings manipulation and auditor independence. The results show that the listed companies can manipulate earnings by changing auditors. At the same time, the subsequent auditor did not maintain the due care to change the auditor's profits in the current year, and the operating accrued profit was relatively low before the change and increased significantly after the change. And the increase is mainly due to the reserve for impairment of assets, the profit adjustment for non-recurring profit and loss items. In contrast, companies that changed auditors to report losses in the year, These results show that the change of auditors is related to the robustness of the former auditor, and the change behavior damages the independence of the subsequent auditor.
【作者单位】：重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;
【分类号】：F832.51;F239.4

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