我国上市公司盈余操纵与独立审计对策

发布时间：2018-03-21 20:54

本文选题：盈余操纵　切入点：成因　出处：《武汉大学》2005年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在我国,随着资本市场的日渐发展和上市公司的大量涌现,上市公司的盈余操纵问题逐渐凸现,成为我国会计理论与实务界的新课题。盈余操纵使公司盈余信息背离公司实际,没有真实的反映公司的财务状况与经营业绩,不利于广大会计报表使用者正确决策。盈余操纵在上市公司中泛滥,严重损害了广大投资者的利益,极大地阻碍了我国证券市场的规范运作,不利于国民经济的持续健康发展。要解决我国目前的会计信息失真并促进资本市场的发展,就必须对上市公司的盈余操纵行为进行研究。有鉴于此,本文对我国上市公司盈余操纵的成因、手段进行系统分析,并立足于独立审计,提出了相关对策。全文共分四个部分: 第一部分,绪论。首先,提出研究背景和选题意义,并对国内外的研究成果进行总结;其次,指出本文的研究思路与可能的创意;最后,对盈余操纵这一基本概念进行界定。第二部分,分析我国盈余操纵产生的原因。首先,上市公司在相关利益的驱使下,具备盈余操纵的种种动机;其次,会计准则本身的不完善为其提供可乘之机;再者,公司治理结构的不健全,不能形成良好的内部制约机制;最后,证券监管的不完善更助长了上市公司盈余操纵的气焰。第三部分,归纳总结上市公司盈余操纵的各种手段。包括利用会计政策选择与变更、滥用会计估计、利用关联方交易、收入与费用的确认等手段。第四部分,从独立审计视角,提出盈余操纵的治理对策。首先,要提高独立审计权威,保持注册会计师独立性;其次,加强注册会计师行业职业道德与执业水平建设;再次,明确审计法律责任,建立民事赔偿机制;最后,指出审计实务中,注册会计师识别盈余操纵的常用方法。盈余操纵不仅是一个会计问题,而且是一个复杂的社会问题,不能依靠注册会计师行业一方面的改进来达到治理的目的,需要社会各个相关部门联合起来综合治理,才能从根本上抑制上市公司的盈余操纵行为,保证我国证券市场和国民经济的健康有序发展。
[Abstract]:In our country, with the development of the capital market and the emergence of a large number of listed companies, the problem of earnings manipulation of listed companies has gradually emerged, which has become a new topic in the field of accounting theory and practice in China. Earnings manipulation makes the earnings information of companies deviate from the actual situation of the company. The lack of a true reflection of the financial situation and operating performance of the company is not conducive to the correct decision of the majority of the users of the accounting statements. Earnings manipulation is rampant in the listed companies, which seriously damages the interests of the majority of investors. It greatly hinders the normal operation of China's securities market, and is not conducive to the sustained and healthy development of the national economy. It is necessary to solve the current distortion of accounting information in China and promote the development of the capital market. It is necessary to study the earnings manipulation behavior of listed companies. In view of this, this paper systematically analyzes the causes and means of earnings manipulation of listed companies in China, and puts forward relevant countermeasures based on independent audit. The full text is divided into four parts:. The first part is introduction. Firstly, the research background and the significance of the topic are put forward, and the research results at home and abroad are summarized. Secondly, the research ideas and possible ideas are pointed out. Finally, the basic concept of earnings manipulation is defined. The second part analyzes the reasons of earnings manipulation in China. Firstly, listed companies have a variety of motives for earnings manipulation driven by relevant interests; secondly, the imperfections of accounting standards provide opportunities for them to take advantage of. The imperfect corporate governance structure can not form a good internal restraint mechanism; finally, the imperfect securities supervision encourages the arrogance of earnings manipulation of listed companies. The third part summarizes the various methods of earnings manipulation of listed companies, including the use of accounting policy selection and change, misuse of accounting estimates, use of related party transactions, revenue and expense recognition and other means. The fourth part, from the perspective of independent audit, put forward the governance countermeasures of earnings manipulation. First, to improve the independent audit authority, to maintain the independence of certified public accountants; secondly, to strengthen the professional ethics and professional standards of certified public accountants; third, Finally, it points out the common methods for CPA to identify surplus manipulation in audit practice. Earnings manipulation is not only an accounting problem, but also a complex social problem. We cannot rely on the improvement of the CPA industry to achieve the goal of governance. In order to restrain the earnings manipulation of listed companies fundamentally and ensure the healthy and orderly development of China's securities market and national economy.
【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2005
【分类号】：F239.4

【引证文献】