外部审计质量与大股东“掏空”行为的实证研究

发布时间：2018-03-21 22:01

本文选题：外部审计质量　切入点：大股东“掏空”　出处：《内蒙古财经大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在当前我国证券市场的发展过程中，由于法律和公司制度的缺陷以及股权分置的特殊结构，证券市场上出现了很多舞弊现象，如内幕交易、欺诈客户等。其中讨论最集中的是大股东的“掏空”行为。“掏空”又称为“隧道效应（Tunneling）”，是指作为管理者的大股东通过地下通道转移资产行为，既大股东利用自己的控制权，通过多种隐蔽手段如内部关联交易、证券回购等，从企业转移资产和利润到自己手中的各种合法或者非法的行为。这种行为已经导致不容忽视的后果，如操纵了企业的财务信息，侵占了中小股东的利益，影响上市公司的自身发展以及证券市场的健康发展。大股东的“掏空”行为已经成为制约我国证券市场持续健康快速发展的关键问题。审计师审计作为一种重要的公司外部监督机制，应该有效的识别大股东的“掏空”行为，根据大股东“掏空”的严重程度出具恰当的审计意见。那么对我国这样一个处于逐步发展阶段的资本市场而言，审计师能否如预期那样能够识别大股东的“掏空”行为？针对不同“掏空”程度的上市公司，审计师出具何种审计意见类型？审计费用和审计师变更与大股东的“掏空”行为是否有关系呢？这样的问题需要进一步的研究。本文首先根据我国沪两深市上市公司2008-2010年连续3年年报披露的财务数据，综合了影响外部审计质量的三个主要方面：审计意见、审计费用和审计师变更，采用多元Logistic回归的实证方法和建立对照组进行对照分析，研究这三者对大股东“掏空”行为所产生的影响；其次研究这三者与大股东“掏空”之间的关系；最后站在公司治理的视角，主要是外部审计监督的角度，对遏制大股东“掏空”行为提出具有指导性和现实性的建议。根据实证得出的结果，本文得出如下主要结论：（1）2008-2010这3年中，，我国沪深两市上市公司收到的审计意见与大股东担保“掏空”均在1%的置信水平上显著正相关。大股东通过担保方式“掏空”上市公司，收到非标准审计意见的可能性更大。（2）2008-2010这3年中，大股东通过资金占用“掏空”的上市公司，收到非标准审计意见的可能性较小。（3）在这3年中，审计意见与总资产的自然对数均在1%的置信水平上显著负相关。即上市公司的规模越大，就越不容易得到非标准审计意见。（4）实证结果得出的结论：审计费用和审计师的变更与大股东担保“掏空”和大股东资金占用“掏空”不存在任何相关性。
[Abstract]:In the course of the development of the securities market in our country, because of the defects of the law and the company system and the special structure of the split share structure, there are many phenomena of fraud in the securities market, such as insider trading. "tunneling", also known as "tunneling", refers to the behavior of large shareholders who, as managers, transfer their assets through underground channels, in which the majority shareholders use their control rights, "tunneling" or "tunneling", or "tunneling," or "tunneling," or "tunneling," or "tunneling," or "tunneling," or "tunneling," or "tunneling." Through a variety of covert means, such as internal related party transactions, securities repurchase, and so on, all kinds of legal or illegal actions from enterprises to transfer assets and profits to their own hands. This kind of behavior has already led to consequences that cannot be ignored. Such as manipulating the financial information of the enterprise, encroaching on the interests of the minority shareholders, Affecting the development of listed companies and the healthy development of the securities market, the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders has become the key problem that restricts the sustained, healthy and rapid development of China's securities market. As an important external supervision mechanism, auditor audit should effectively identify the "tunneling" behavior of major shareholders. According to the severity of "tunneling" of major shareholders, we can issue an appropriate audit opinion. Can auditors identify the "tunneling" behavior of major shareholders as expected for China's capital market, which is in the stage of gradual development? What types of audit opinions are issued by auditors for listed companies with different "hollowing" levels? Is there any relationship between audit fees and auditor changes and the "hollowing" behavior of major shareholders? Such problems require further study. Based on the financial data disclosed by the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets for three consecutive years from 2008 to 2010, this paper synthesizes three main aspects that affect the quality of external audit: audit opinion, audit cost and auditor change. The empirical method of multiple Logistic regression and the control group were used to study the influence of these three factors on the "tunneling" behavior of the major shareholders, secondly, the relationship between the three factors and the "tunneling" behavior of the major shareholders was studied. Finally, from the perspective of corporate governance, mainly from the perspective of external audit and supervision, the author puts forward some instructive and realistic suggestions to curb the "tunneling" behavior of major shareholders. Based on the empirical results, this paper draws the following main conclusions:. During the three years from 2008 to 2010, the audit opinions received by the listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets were significantly positively correlated with the "tunneling" guarantee of the major shareholders at the confidence level of 1%. The majority shareholders "hollowed out" the listed companies by way of guarantee. The possibility of receiving a non-standard audit opinion is higher. In the three years from 2008 to 2010, major shareholders are less likely to receive non-standard audit opinions through "hollowed" listed companies. 3) in these three years, the audit opinion is negatively correlated with the natural logarithm of the total assets at the confidence level of 1%, that is, the larger the scale of the listed company, the less easy it is to obtain the non-standard audit opinion. 4) the conclusion of the empirical results is that there is no correlation between the audit fees and the change of auditors with the guarantee of "tunneling" and the "tunneling" of the capital occupied by the majority shareholders.
【学位授予单位】：内蒙古财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F239.4;F832.51;F224

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