独立审计合约研究

发布时间：2018-04-09 13:56

本文选题：独立审计　切入点：合约　出处：《江西财经大学》2003年硕士论文

【摘要】： 独立审计合约是规范独立审计活动各参与方相互之间关系的合约，各参与人利用独立审计工作活动的目的，在于通过独立审计人员对企业会计信息真实、公允性鉴证，以确认及解除受托经济责任或消除投资者与经营者之间的信息不对称，这两种目的都使独立审计涉及到委托人与经营者及前两者与独立审计人员之间利益协调关系，因此，产生了规范三者间围绕独立审计活动而引发的利益冲突的协调需求，具体表现为审计目标的界定与实现和由此引发的责任界定与划分、审计质量的衡量及标准问题、各方对审计人员素质的要求等。独立审计合约的意义在于为协调及规范上述矛盾或利益冲突提供一个双方可自由谈判、协商的博弈平台，各方对审计活动诸多利益关系的主张或妥协都通过审计合约反映出来。独立审计合约集中体现了各方对独立审计活动的要求和为实现要求而进行的合约内容安排。我们认为开展独立审计合约研究可以使我们结合实际经济活动，探索审计活动的内在规律，帮助我们跳出传统审计理论研究的就审计而谈审计的缺陷，这是本文写作的本意。独立审计合约作为一种协调、解决审计活动中产生的利益冲突的合约安排，各方通过合约安排，将这种要求以合约内容形式予以明确和反映，因此审计合约的内容安排表现为合约剩余分享安排、合约规则安排、合约的独立性安排、合约中诚信安排、对合约管制的安排。独立审计合约研究就立足于独立审计合约具体内容安排上。本文的研究逻辑以独立审计合约规范的本质要素——剩余分享出发，进而探讨在这基础上衍生出的规则安排、独立性安排、审计诚信安排、管制安排，，最后结合我国资本市场审计合约的特点进行经济实证，提出个人政策建议为收尾。本文第一章导论。主要阐述独立审计合约研究的意义和当前理论界忽视的现状，为本文深入研究提供一个引子。本文第二章独立审计合约的理论解读。主要阐述独立审计合约建立背后的一些基本概念：独立审计合约建立的基础，独立审计合约的性质与功能，独立审计合约的目标等，力图构建一个独立审计合约研究的理论指导框架，为进一步开展独立审计合约具体内容研究提供一个理论基础，通过将独立审计活动放在现实经济运行环境中研究，本文认为，经济生活中广泛存在的受托经济责任是独立审计合约建立的基础。独立审计合约的性质是消除经营者剩余索取权外部性的合约安排。独立审计合约的功能表现为减少企业代理成本。独立审计合约目标定位于以一定可信度评价会计信息风险。第三章独立审计合约剩余分享安排。独立审计合约剩余分享是独立审计活动各方利益主张与冲突的直接体现。独立审计合约剩余来源于企业代理成本的节约额，各方对独立审计合约剩余的安排实质是对收益的分享及对风险的分摊，这一结论为下文提供了研究的基点。第四章独立审计合约规则安排。独立审计合约规则是将独立审计合约剩余分享安排予以明确界定的条款形式，独立审计合约的不完备又使得双方难以就合约规则达成详尽条款，出现了剩余规则。因此独立审计合约的合约规则安排表现形式分为可以被详细规定的一般合约规则——独立审计准则；不能被明确规定而留有“空白”的剩余规则——审计假设。本文就两种合约规则的性质、内容进行讨论。第五章独立审计合约的独立性安排。独立性是独立审计合约区别于内部审计，政府审计的最大特征，也是审计合约发挥其功能，实现其目标的本质要求，审计合约独立性是独立审计合约各方安排的结果，因此本章着重分析独立性的合约安排。第六章独立审计合约中的诚信安排。本章论述审计诚信的性质、内涵与发展，审计诚信对独立审计合约的功能与其实现机制，并分析了审计诚信在独立审计合约安排中的表现形式：程序型审计诚信，结果型审计诚信。第七章管制与独立审计合约。独立审计合约中存在的信息不对称与独立审计人员外部性是管制独立审计合约的根本原因，管制效率建立在良好的管制模式基础上。管制模式的选择是管制者加入独立审计合约后合约安排的结果，本文随后对管制模式的合约安排进行博奕分析。第八章我国独立审计合约自由度问题研究。我国独立审计合约存在自由度缺陷集中表现为我国当前资本市场上具有上市公司审计资格的会计师事务所垄断上市公司审计业务。在市场准入制度下的，我国独立审计合约安排导致的经济后果直接体现为三种社会成本损失：垄断社会成本、寻租社会成本、租值耗散社会成本。本文对当前我国独立审计合约自由度缺乏进行经济实证分析，并提出个人政策建议
[Abstract]:An independent audit contract is a kind of contract that regulates the relationship between the parties of the independent auditing activities . The purpose of the independent audit is to confirm and relieve the financial responsibility of the enterprise or to eliminate the information asymmetry between the investor and the operator .

As a kind of coordination and settlement of conflict of interest arising from audit activities , the independent audit contract is made clear and reflected in the form of contract content through contract arrangement . Therefore , the content arrangement of the audit contract is the arrangement of contract residual sharing arrangement , contract rules arrangement , the independence arrangement of the contract , the arrangement of good faith in the contract and the arrangement of contract control . The independent audit contract research is based on the specific content arrangement of the independent audit contract .

The research logic of this paper starts with the essential elements of the independent auditing contract specification , and then discusses the rules arrangement , independence arrangement , audit integrity arrangement and control arrangement derived from this foundation . Finally , the economic demonstration is carried out based on the characteristics of our capital market audit contract , and the personal policy suggestion is put forward .

The first chapter introduces the significance of independent audit contract research and the current situation of neglect in theory circle , and provides a guide for the study of this paper .

In the second chapter , the theory of independent audit contract is explained . The basic concepts behind the establishment of independent audit contract are expounded : the basis of independent audit contract establishment , the nature and function of independent audit contract , the objective of independent audit contract , etc .

Chapter III The remaining sharing arrangements for the independent audit contracts . The remaining shares of the independent audit contract are independent audit activities

The interests of the parties are directly reflected in the conflict . The balance of the independent audit contract comes from the savings of the agency cost of the enterprise .

The remaining arrangements for the independent audit contract are essentially the sharing of benefits and the sharing of risks , which

The conclusions provide basis points for the study below .

Chapter IV Rules of Independent Audit Contract Arrangement . The Independent Audit Contract Rule is the remaining part of the independent audit contract

Incompleteness of independent audit contracts makes it difficult for both parties to agree on contracts in the form of terms clearly defined by the arrangements

The rules reach a detailed clause with the remaining rules . Therefore , the contract rules of the independent audit contract are arranged in the form of a presentation

The formula is divided into general contract rules and independent auditing standards which can be specified in detail ;
can ' t be explicitly reserved

There are " blank " rules _ audit assumptions . This article deals with the nature and content of the two contract rules .

On .

The independence of the independent audit contract is that the independent audit contract is distinguished from the internal audit ,

The most characteristic of government audit is that the audit contract plays its function and realizes the essential requirement and audit of its objectives .

The independence of the contract is the result of the arrangement of the parties to the independent audit contract , so this chapter focuses on the analysis of the independence of the contract .

Row .

Chapter VI Good faith arrangement in the independent audit contract . This chapter discusses the nature , connotation and development of audit integrity .

The function of independent audit contract and its realization mechanism are analyzed , and the audit integrity is analyzed independently .

Form of the arrangement : procedural audit integrity , result type audit integrity .

Chapter VII Control and Independent Audit Contract . Information asymmetry and independent audit in independent audit contract

The external nature of personnel is the root cause of the regulation of the independent audit contract , and the control efficiency is established in a good control mode .

The choice of regulatory model is the result of the contract arrangement after the controller joins the independent audit contract , and this article then

Game analysis of the contractual arrangements for the regulatory model .

Chapter 8 : Research on Freedom of Independent Audit Contract in China ;

The sag is the monopoly of the accounting firm with the listed company ' s audit qualification on the current capital market of China

The audit business of the city company . Under the market access system , the economic consequences caused by the arrangement of independent audit contracts in China

Three kinds of social cost losses are directly reflected : monopoly social cost , rent - seeking social cost , and rent - valued dissipation .

This paper makes an empirical analysis of the lack of freedom of contract of independent audit in China , and puts forward personal administration

policy suggestion

【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2003
【分类号】：F239

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