中国上市公司审计合谋的成因及治理：晋升博弈视角的研究

发布时间：2018-04-22 23:00

本文选题：上市公司 + 审计合谋　；参考：《大连理工大学》2009年硕士论文

【摘要】： 近年来,国内外上市公司审计合谋案件不断出现,而在我国,上市公司审计合谋这一问题则更为突出。自我国证券市场诞生以来,审计机构与上市公司合谋欺骗审计委托人和社会公众的案件就一直层出不穷,不论是数量,还是频率,都较其他国家严重得多。关于上市公司审计合谋现象为何在我国更为普遍这一问题,现有研究大多从审计活动本身入手来解释我国的审计合谋问题,将原因归结为委托人扭曲、审计市场结构不合理、审计制度安排不当等方面,而很少考虑我国转轨阶段特殊的体制背景对上市公司审计合谋的影响。然而,事实上,在现有研究基础上提出的治理措施在实际实施过程中效果并不理想,远未达到治理我国上市公司审计合谋的目的。因此,从新的研究视角重新审视我国上市公司合谋问题,探索我国上市公司审计合谋行为盛行的内在原因以及影响传统治理措施治理效果的体制因素,就显得十分有必要。本文通过构建包含上市公司、审计机构和监管机构的博弈模型,分析了由晋升博弈导致的地方政府官员激励扭曲对我国上市公司审计合谋的影响。结果表明,当前的上市公司审计合谋博弈实际嵌套在地方政府官员的晋升博弈之中。这是导致我国审计合谋问题屡禁不止,以至成为业内普遍现象的一个重要原因。要从根本上治理上市公司审计合谋问题,必需结合这种体制背景进行政策上的创新。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the audit collusion cases of listed companies at home and abroad appear constantly, but in our country, the problem of audit collusion of listed companies is more prominent. Since the birth of China's securities market, the cases of audit institutions and listed companies conspiring to deceive audit clients and the public have been emerging in endlessly, both in terms of quantity and frequency, which are much more serious than those in other countries. As to why the audit collusion of listed companies is more common in our country, most of the existing researches explain the audit collusion from the audit activity itself, which can be attributed to the distortion of the principal and the unreasonable structure of the audit market. However, the influence of the special institutional background on the audit collusion of listed companies is seldom considered. However, in fact, the governance measures put forward on the basis of the existing research are not ideal in the actual implementation process, and far from achieving the purpose of controlling the audit collusion of listed companies in our country. Therefore, it is necessary to re-examine the collusion of listed companies from a new perspective, explore the internal causes of the prevalence of audit collusion of listed companies in China and the institutional factors that affect the governance effect of traditional governance measures. By constructing a game model involving listed companies, audit agencies and regulators, this paper analyzes the influence of local government officials' incentive distortion on the audit collusion of listed companies in China, which is caused by the promotion game. The results show that the current audit collusion game of listed companies is actually nested in the promotion game of local government officials. This is an important reason that leads to the repeated prohibition of audit collusion in our country and even becomes a common phenomenon in the industry. In order to fundamentally control the audit collusion of listed companies, it is necessary to carry out policy innovation in combination with this institutional background.
【学位授予单位】：大连理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2009
【分类号】：F239.4

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