审计师辞聘问题研究

发布时间：2018-04-26 06:37

本文选题：审计师辞聘 + 审计师解聘　；参考：《湖南大学》2005年硕士论文

【摘要】：在西方国家,审计师辞聘是一种相当普遍的市场现象,是会计师事务所应对诉讼风险的理性行为。但是,在国外市场相当兴盛的审计师辞聘现象在我国审计市场却鲜有所闻。本文在约定审计师是有限理性且具有机会主义倾向的经济人假设下,结合相关理论与实证研究的结论,采用逻辑推理、数据图表的方式,研究审计师辞聘的相关问题,试图对这一疑惑进行解答。本文主要是从狭义的角度来讨论审计师辞聘问题,即诉讼风险引起的审计师辞聘。然后,本文讨论了审计师辞聘与审计师声誉的关系,以及审计师辞聘与审计师法律责任安排的关系。最后本文回到中国市场,针对我国目前存在的审计师辞聘的制度障碍,提出了相应的政策改进。本文的主要观点包括:(1) 审计师辞聘具有明显的经济后果。审计师辞聘行为向市场传递了关于自己与客户的信息,投资者、辞聘客户、继任审计师以及继任客户等利益相关者做出不同的反应,进而对整个市场造成影响;(2) 审计师辞聘是审计师建立与维护声誉的重要成本,审计师辞聘看重的是声誉资本的长期超额收益;(3) 法律责任的有限安排和无限安排对于审计师执业行为的监督程度是不同的。然而,责任安排的不同形式并不是审计师辞聘的直接诱因,审计师在两种责任安排下都有可能辞聘;(4) 改善上市公司股权结构,推进事务所合伙制的改革,保护审计师产权以及增强信息的透明度,可以为审计师辞聘提供足够的制度条件。
[Abstract]:In western countries, auditor resignation is a very common market phenomenon and a rational behavior for accounting firms to deal with litigation risks. However, the phenomenon of auditor resignation in foreign markets is seldom heard in our country. Under the assumption that auditor is a limited rational and opportunistic economic man and combining the conclusions of relevant theoretical and empirical studies, this paper studies the relevant problems of auditor resignation by means of logical reasoning and data chart. Try to answer this doubt. This paper mainly discusses auditor resignation from a narrow point of view, that is, auditor resignation caused by litigation risk. Then, this paper discusses the relationship between auditor's resignation and auditor's reputation, and the relationship between auditor's resignation and auditor's legal liability arrangement. Finally, this article returns to the Chinese market, and puts forward the corresponding policy improvement in view of the existing institutional obstacles of auditor resignation in China. The main points of this paper include: (1) auditor resignation has obvious economic consequences. Auditor resignation conveys information to the market about themselves and their clients, with different responses from stakeholders, such as investors, clients, successors, and successors. (2) auditor resignation is an important cost for auditors to build and maintain their reputation. Auditor resignation emphasizes on the limited arrangement and unlimited arrangement of legal liability of reputation capital for long term excess return. The degree of supervision of auditor's practice behavior is different. However, different forms of liability arrangements are not a direct incentive for auditors to resign. Auditors may resign under both liability arrangements) to improve the ownership structure of listed companies and to promote the reform of the partnership system. The protection of auditor property rights and the transparency of information can provide sufficient institutional conditions for auditor resignation.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2005
【分类号】：F239.4

【参考文献】