法律制度变迁、审计师选择与企业价值——基于实际控制人掏空行为视角的实证研究

发布时间：2018-05-05 00:04

本文选题：实际控制人“掏空” + 法律制度变迁　；参考：《经济评论》2012年03期

【摘要】：本文利用2004-2009年民营上市公司的数据,首次对2006年我国将实际控制人掏空行为列入刑法这一事件对上市公司的审计师选择和企业价值所产生的影响进行了实证研究。研究发现在加大对实际控制人掏空行为的处罚力度后,掏空风险较高的公司更倾向于聘请小型会计师事务所,而且实际控制人的掏空行为有所减少。刑法调整后,由于实际控制人与中小股东的代理问题得到了有效的缓解,存在掏空风险的公司的企业价值有了显著提升,且掏空风险高的公司企业价值提升得更为显著。进一步研究还发现:在抑制实际控制人掏空行为、提升企业价值方面,法律治理能替代独立审计治理的作用,降低企业的监督成本。
[Abstract]:Based on the data of private listed companies from 2004 to 2009, this paper makes the first empirical study on the influence of the fact that the actual controller tunneling behavior was included in the criminal law of the listed companies in 2006 on the choice of auditors and the value of the listed companies. The study found that the companies with higher tunneling risk were more likely to employ small accounting firms and the actual controls' tunneling behavior was reduced after the punishment of actual tunneling was increased. After the adjustment of the criminal law, the agency problem between the actual controller and the minority shareholders has been effectively alleviated, and the corporate value of the company with the risk of tunneling has been significantly improved, and the value of the company with the high risk of tunneling has been enhanced more significantly. It is also found that legal governance can replace the role of independent audit governance and reduce the cost of supervision.
【作者单位】：武汉大学经济与管理学院会计系;
【基金】：教育部人文社科规划基金项目“国有控股上市公司管理层关联方持股的隧道效应研究”(项目编号:10YJA790236) 国家自然科学基金项目“人力投入与风险溢价决定的我国上市公司审计定价模型研究”(项目编号:70572063) “基于DEA方法的相对审计效率测度与审计竞争战略选择研究”(项目编号:70702018)的资助
【分类号】：F239.4;D924.3

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