大股东控制下的代理冲突与审计师选择

发布时间：2018-05-15 07:09

本文选题：审计师选择 + 代理冲突　；参考：《石河子大学》2011年硕士论文

【摘要】：由于我国的上市公司多为国有企业改制而成,“一股独大”的现象普遍存在,股权的高度集中使得大股东有足够的激励对管理者进行监督,这在一定程度上避免了股东“搭便车”的行为；另一方面,在股权集中的情况下,大股东取得了对公司的控制权,难免会利用公司控制权谋夺控制权的私有收益,从而损害中小股东的利益。根据代理理论,独立审计是一种有效降低代理成本的公司治理机制,而独立审计能否有效发挥作用则取决于审计质量的高低。由于国际“四大”会计师事务所具有良好的国际声誉,加之其全球的巨大的客户数量和客户规模,使得他们在全球的分支机构和实体紧密联系在一起,某个市场上的审计失败可能会导致整个公司的毁灭。因此,通常认为国际“四大”事务所比国内的事务所更独立,审计质量也更高。回顾现有的国内外文献,学者们的研究结果显示,大股东控制下的代理冲突与审计师选择正相关,本文以2006年--2009年间上海和深圳证券交易所A股上市公司为研究样本,以我国特有的制度为背景,考虑到上市公司控制人不同的类型,对大股东控制下的代理冲突与审计师选择之间的关系进行实证研究。本文着重研究以下问题：(1)大股东与管理者的代理冲突与审计师选择之间是否存在关系?(2)大股东与中小股东代理冲突严重的上市公司是否存在高质量审计师选择的需求?(3)不同性质的控股股东,大股东控制下的代理冲突与审计师选择的关系是否有所不同?(4)在不同法治水平下,大股东控制下的代理冲突与审计师选择之间的关系是否存在差异? 根据实证检验结果的分析,结合当前我国大股东控制下代理冲突的现状与法制环境,提出相关的政策建议。
[Abstract]:As most of the listed companies in our country are state-owned enterprises, the phenomenon of "one share dominating" exists widely, and the high concentration of stock right makes the large shareholders have enough incentive to supervise the managers. To some extent, this avoids the "hitchhiker" behavior of shareholders; on the other hand, in the case of concentrated shares, the majority shareholders gain control of the company, and they inevitably use the control of the company to seek private profits from the control. So as to damage the interests of small and medium shareholders. According to agency theory, independent audit is a kind of corporate governance mechanism that can effectively reduce agency cost, and whether independent audit can play an effective role depends on the quality of audit. Due to the international "four" accounting firms have a good international reputation, coupled with its large number of customers and customer size in the world, they are closely linked with their branches and entities around the world. The failure of an audit in one market could lead to the destruction of the company as a whole. Therefore, the international "big four" firms are generally considered to be more independent and of higher audit quality than domestic firms. Reviewing the existing literature at home and abroad, the research results of scholars show that the agency conflict under the control of large shareholders is positively related to the choice of auditors. This paper takes A-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock exchanges from 2006 to 2009 as the research samples. Based on the unique system of our country and considering the different types of controllers in listed companies, this paper makes an empirical study on the relationship between agency conflict and auditor selection under the control of large shareholders. This paper focuses on the following questions: 1) whether there is a relationship between the agency conflict between major shareholders and managers and the choice of auditors. 2) whether there is a high quality auditor selection in listed companies with serious agency conflicts between large shareholders and small and medium-sized shareholders. (3) controlling shareholders of different natures, Is the relationship between agency conflict under the control of large shareholders and auditor selection different? are there differences in the relationship between agency conflict and auditor selection under the control of large shareholders at different levels of the rule of law? Based on the analysis of the empirical results and the current situation and legal environment of agency conflict under the control of large shareholders in China, the relevant policy suggestions are put forward.
【学位授予单位】：石河子大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：F239.6;F276.6;F224

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