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独立审计行为研究

发布时间:2018-05-26 22:18

  本文选题:独立审计 + 独立审计行为 ; 参考:《西南财经大学》2003年硕士论文


【摘要】: 市场经济的最大优点就是通过资源的自由流动,实现合理、高效的资源配置。证券市场是市场经济发展到一定阶段的产物,它是优化资源配置,推动经济发展的重要力量。影响证券市场规范运作及其作用有效发挥的核心是证券市场上普遍存在的信息不对称问题。在解决信息不对称的问题上,独立审计行为起着至关重要的作用。合理、高效的独立审计行为成为维护广大中小投资者利益的重要措施,为社会稀缺资源实现有效配置提供了重要的制度保证。 然而,我国目前的独立审计行为存在的主要问题是审计主体没能保持客观、公正的独立地位,导致审计质量降低,社会公信力下降,这一问题已经严重威胁到了整个注册会计师行业的生存与发展。因此,消除不良独立审计行为,提高注册会计师的独立性和执业质量,从而实现独立审计行为的优化是当前审计理论和实务都迫切需要解决的难题,也是一个重要的课题。 本文的研究重点是:1、对于独立审计行为主体在执业过程中出现的单纯追求经济利益而忽视社会效益的行为,目前相应的激励与约束机制存在哪些不足之处。2、为了使得审计主体将追求经济利益的动机与实现社会效益的动机在执业过程中相互统一起来,目前应该怎样强化对审计主体因单纯追求经济利益而出现的违法行为的约束,同时有效激励审计主体的规范执业行为,,最终达到治理和优化不良独立审计行为的目的,促进注册会计师行业的健康发展。以上两个问题的逻辑关系是:问题1是不良独立审计行为产生的原因分析,只有较好的解决这个问题,才能使得下文提出的政策建议做到有的放矢。问题2是治理不良独立审计行为的对策研究,剖析了强化激励与约束机制的重点与难点。 本文的研究思路是:首先通过对我国目前独立审计行为现状的分析,指出目前不良的独立审计行为必须进行治理和优化。然后从独立审计主体的需求和动机,以及相应的激励与约束机制这个角度,分析 WP=3 了不良独立审计行为产生的原因。最后在此基础上,尝试着探索并提出了一些优化我国独立审计行为的可行性建议。 本文的主要内容和观点如下:从动态的角度看,独立审计行为作为一项社会活动,是在外部环境和内部机制共同作用下产生的,其行为过程是一个“需求——动机——目标”循环。从静态的角度看,独立审计行为由审计主体、审计客体和审计环境三要素构成。审计主体是指审计人员和组织,主要是注册会计师以及由注册会计师组成的会计师事务所。审计客体是被审计人,即客户管理层或管理当局。审计环境不仅包括政治、经济、文化和法律等宏观环境因素,还包括审计委托人这一要素。审计主体的行为动机分为两个层次,一是谋求自身经济利益的动机,一是实现社会效益的动机,二者是个有机统一的整体。我们既不能要求审计主体在“饿肚子”的情况下来实现社会效益,也不能让审计主体一味地追求经济利益而放弃实现社会效益。审计主体必须将实现社会效益的行为统一于谋求自身经济利益的行为之中。实现两个层次的动机相互协调有赖于有效的激励和约束机制的建立,激励与约束的弱化必然导致审计主体只顾追求经济利益而忽视社会效益。 现阶段我国独立审计行为主要存在的问题是:审计主体没有协调好追求经济利益动机与实现社会效益动机之间的关系,为了追求自身经济利益而没能保持客观、公正的独立地位,造成审计质量降低、社会公信力下降。其主要原因包括两个方面: 1、注册会计师的违法行为缺乏约束。由于外部约束的弱化,注册会计师在利益的驱动下,很容易出现丧失独立性的违法行为。导致外部约束弱化的主要原因有(1)我国法律制度弱化对出现审计失败的注册会计师的事后追究。首先是法律允许会计师事务所采用有限责任的组织形式,弱化了注册会计师在审计失败中的个人责任,再加上追究注册会计师的民事责任的相关法律规定不完善,使得注册会计师一旦出现审计失败,所遭受的经济损失与所获得的收益严重的不对称。(2)审计的“实际委托人”虚位,实际由被审计单位管理当局担任审计委托人,这种审计委托关系破坏了注册会计师在审计三方关系 WP=4 中的独立性,给被审单位管理当局干预注册会计师行为以及与注册会计师“合谋”损害社会公众利益提供了可能。(3)广大中小投资者的自我保护意识薄弱,让不规范执业的注册会计师心存“违法也不究”的侥幸心理。(4)中国传统的“人治”观念和中庸思想导致社会降低对注册会计师执业行为的要求,只要可以满足领导的需要,只要有关系,不管执业质量高低,注册会计师都可以生存下去。 2、注册会计师的规范执业行为缺乏激励。由于目前的审计收费严重不足,审计收费与注册会计师的职业道德、声誉没有相应配比,所以缺乏注册会计师执业质量与收益挂钩的激励机制。导致激励弱化的原因主要有:(1)会计师事务所不能自主定价,不利于激励注册会计师通过提高审计质量来提高审计收费。(2)现行的审计收费标准没有考虑预期风险损失准备,不能满足注册会计师抗御职业风险的需要。(3)会计师事务所之间的低价竞争、以及市场需求者压低价格的行为都造成审计收费严重不足,进而影响到注册会计师的独立性和审计质量。 为了治理和优化我国
[Abstract]:The biggest advantage of the market economy is to realize the rational and efficient allocation of resources through the free flow of resources. The securities market is the product of the development of the market economy to a certain stage. It is an important force to optimize the allocation of resources and promote the economic development. The core of the securities market regulation operation and its effective play is the general stock market. In order to solve the problem of information asymmetry, independent audit behavior plays an important role in solving the problem of information asymmetry. Reasonable and efficient independent audit behavior has become an important measure to safeguard the interests of small and medium investors. It provides an important system guarantee for the effective allocation of social scarce resources.
However, the main problem in our current independent audit behavior is that the audit subject has not been able to maintain an objective and impartial status, which leads to the decrease of audit quality and the decline of social credibility. This problem has seriously threatened the survival and development of the whole CPA industry. Therefore, to eliminate the bad independent audit behavior and improve the registration society. It is an urgent problem that the current audit theory and practice need to be solved, as well as an important subject, to optimize the independence and practice quality of the planner, thus realizing the optimization of the independent audit behavior.
The main points of this study are as follows: 1, in order to make the auditing body pursue the motive of economic benefit and the motive of realizing the social benefit, there are some inadequacies in the corresponding incentive and restraint mechanism for the behavior of the independent audit actor in the process of pursuing economic benefits and ignoring social benefits in the process of practice. 1 In the process of unification, how should we strengthen the restriction on the illegal behavior of the audit subject because of the simple pursuit of economic interests, at the same time, effectively motivate the audit subject to standardize the practice behavior, finally achieve the purpose of controlling and optimizing the bad independent audit behavior, and promote the healthy development of the CPA industry. The above two questions are discussed. The logical relationship of the question is: Question 1 is the cause analysis of the bad independent audit behavior. Only a better solution to this problem can make the policy proposals put forward in the following way. Problem 2 is the countermeasure study of the bad independent audit behavior, and the key and difficult points of strengthening the incentive and restraint mechanism are analyzed.
The research ideas of this paper are as follows: first, through the analysis of the current status of independent audit behavior in China, it is pointed out that the present bad independent audit behavior must be governed and optimized. Then, from the perspective of the demand and motivation of the independent audit subject, and the corresponding incentive and constraint mechanism, it is analyzed.
WP=3
Finally, on the basis of this, we try to explore and put forward some feasible suggestions to optimize our independent auditing behavior.
The main contents and views of this paper are as follows: from a dynamic point of view, independent audit behavior, as a social activity, is produced under the joint action of the external environment and internal mechanism. Its behavior process is a "demand motivation - target" cycle. From a static point of view, the independent audit behavior is the subject of audit and the object of audit. The audit subject refers to the three elements of the audit environment. The audit subject refers to the auditors and organizations, mainly certified public accountants and accounting firms composed of certified public accountants. The audit object is the auditor, that is, the customer management or management. The audit environment includes not only macro environmental factors, such as political, economic, cultural and legal, but also the audit. The behavior motivation of the principal is divided into two levels, one is to seek the motive of its own economic benefit, the other is to realize the motive of social benefit, and the two is an organic unity. To seek economic benefits and give up social benefits. The audit subject must unite the behavior of realizing social benefits in the pursuit of their own economic interests. The coordination of two levels of motivation depends on the establishment of effective incentive and restraint mechanisms. The weakening of incentives and constraints will inevitably lead to the audit subject to pursue economic benefits only. It is beneficial to ignore social benefits.
At the present stage, the main problems of independent audit behavior in China are: the audit subject does not harmonize the relationship between the pursuit of economic interest motivation and the realization of social benefit motivation. In order to pursue its own economic interests, the audit quality can not maintain objective and impartial status, resulting in the lower quality of audit and the decline of social credibility. The main reasons include two. On the other hand:
1, the illegal acts of CPA are lack of restraint. Due to the weakening of the external constraints, the CPA is prone to the loss of independence. The main reasons for the weakening of the external constraints are (1) the weakening of the legal system in our country is the hindsight of the certified public accountants who have lost the audit. The first is the legal consent. By adopting the limited liability organization form, the accounting firm weakens the personal responsibility of the certified public accountant in the audit failure, and the relevant legal provisions on the civil liability of the certified public accountants are not perfect, which makes the economic loss and the income obtained when the certified public accountant fails. (2) the false position of the "actual client" of the audit is actually the audit client of the audited unit management authority, which destroys the three party relations of the certified public accountant in the audit.
WP=4
The independence of the government provides the possibility of interfering with the behavior of CPA and conspiring with CPA to damage the public interests. (3) the lack of self-protection consciousness of the majority of small and medium-sized investors, and the fluke psychology of the certified public accountants who are not in standard practice. (4) Chinese traditional " The concept of "rule of man" and the mean thought lead to the demand of the society to reduce the practice of certified public accountants, as long as it can meet the needs of the leadership, as long as it is related, no matter the quality of the practice, the CPA can survive.
2, the standard practice behavior of CPA lacks incentive. Due to the shortage of current audit fees, there is no corresponding ratio of audit fees to certified public accountants' professional ethics and reputation, so there is a lack of incentive mechanism linked to the quality of certified public accountants. The main reasons are as follows: (1) the accounting firms can not. Independent pricing is not conducive to encouraging CPA to raise the audit fees by improving the audit quality. (2) the current audit fee standards do not take into account the expected risk loss preparation, and can not meet the needs of the certified public accountants to resist the occupational risk. (3) the low price competition among the accounting firms and the behavior of the market demand holders to lower the price. Resulting in serious shortage of audit fees, thereby affecting the independence and audit quality of certified public accountants.
In order to govern and optimize our country
【学位授予单位】:西南财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2003
【分类号】:F239

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