会计师事务所报告竞争行为研究

发布时间：2018-06-05 20:50

本文选题：会计师事务所 + 报告竞争　；参考：《华东交通大学》2009年硕士论文

【摘要】： 在现代社会,由于资本的所有者和经营者的高度分离,使得外部审计师作为监督者被引入。这种所有者与审计师的委托——代理关系令审计师拥有了更多的私人信息。由于审计师的这些私人信息的存在,某些客户出于自身利益总是贿赂一些独立性更差的审计师提供对其更为有利的审计报告,于是“报告竞争”就不可避免的出现了。这种“报告竞争”对于财务报表使用者的利益以及资本市场的配置效率造成了直接的威胁,所以对于因客户贿赂而导致的审计师与管理层的合谋行为问题的研究具有较高的理论价值与实践意义。本文认为“非审计服务”是客户贿赂审计师的最隐蔽的合法手段,它作为注册会计师的传统服务项目,在审计服务蓬勃发展时期已经存在。近几年来,非审计服务收入占事务所总收入的比重与日俱增,并逐步取代审计服务成为注册会计师业务体系中的“主角”。伴随着非审计服务的迅猛发展,执业界对非审计服务是否影响独立性的争论,社会公众的质疑不断高涨,2001年末,安然事件的爆发,直接导致了原“五大”会计公司之一的安达信分崩离析。面对安然大厦的倒塌,面对安达信的出局,面对“四大”非审计服务的拆分,面对全球的“禁非”热潮,在我国非审计服务是否真的影响独立性从而导致“报告竞争”行为的产生呢? 本文将从理论与实证两个方面来证实我国是否存在“报告竞争”行为。首先,本文运用委托—代理理论与博弈论的分析方法,证实了目前非审计服务是实现“报告竞争”的唯一手段。并且通过借鉴国外对非审计服务的分类,提出了我国对非审计服务的分类。其次,从非审计服务对审计独立性影响的研究、非标准审计意见的影响因素分析这两个方面对国内外学者的研究进行综述,为后文的实证研究打下了坚实的理论基础。然后通过Logistic回归模型的构建,运用我国审计市场的数据来证实我国是否存在“报告竞争”行为。最后,根据实证结果的分析,本文提出了规范事务所提供非审计服务的建议,从而希望能进一步规范我国的非审计服务,科学拓宽注册会计师业务的领域,促进整个行业的发展。
[Abstract]:In modern society, due to the separation of owners and managers of capital, external auditors are introduced as supervisors. This principal-agent relationship between the owner and the auditor gives the auditor more private information. Due to the existence of auditors' private information, some clients always bribe some less independent auditors to provide more favorable audit reports for their own benefit, so "report competition" inevitably appears. This "reporting competition" poses a direct threat to the interests of users of financial statements and to the efficiency of the allocation of capital markets, Therefore, the research on the collusion behavior between auditor and management caused by customer bribery has high theoretical value and practical significance. This paper holds that "non-audit service" is the most hidden legal means for clients to bribe auditors. As a traditional service item of CPA, it already exists in the period of vigorous development of audit service. In recent years, the proportion of non-audit service income in the total income of the firm is increasing, and gradually replace the audit service to become the "protagonist" in the CPA business system. With the rapid development of non-audit services, the debate on whether non-audit services affect the independence of the professional community, the public doubt is rising, the end of 2001, Enron incident broke out, It directly led to the collapse of Andersen, one of the original "five" accounting firms. Faced with the collapse of the Enron Building, the exit of Andersen, the split of the "four" non-audit services, and the global "forbidden" boom, Does the non-audit service in our country really affect the independence and lead to the "report competition" behavior? This paper will verify the existence of "report competition" in China from both theoretical and empirical aspects. Firstly, this paper uses the principal-agent theory and game theory to prove that non-audit service is the only way to realize "report competition". And by referring to the classification of non-audit services abroad, this paper puts forward the classification of non-audit services in China. Secondly, the research on the impact of non-audit services on audit independence and the analysis of the influencing factors of non-standard audit opinions are summarized, which lays a solid theoretical foundation for the empirical research later. Then, through the construction of Logistic regression model, using the data of audit market in our country to confirm the existence of "report competition" behavior in our country. Finally, according to the analysis of the empirical results, this paper puts forward the suggestion of standardizing the non-audit service provided by the firm, so as to further standardize the non-audit service in our country, and expand the field of CPA business scientifically. Promote the development of the whole industry.
【学位授予单位】：华东交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2009
【分类号】：F239.4;F233

【引证文献】