基于信息不对称的政府审计风险的控制研究

发布时间：2018-06-06 18:31

本文选题：政府审计 + 信息不对称　；参考：《四川大学》2005年硕士论文

【摘要】：信息经济时代,信息作为一种重要生产力资源影响着社会生活的方方面面。充分占有信息的优势方,在竞争日趋激烈的今天,往往能把握全局,规避风险,最终获得成功;而处于信息弱势的一方,在市场经济中举步为艰,随时面临着遭遇损失和失败的风险。因此,研究在信息不对称条件下,采用何种手段,运用何种方法将由于信息不对称带来的风险降到承受范围之内,对增强市场经济参与者把握全局和参与市场竞争的能力,有着重要而深远的意义。政府审计作为受托经济的产物,代表政府行使监督审查职能,在保障社会主义市场经济健康有序地运行上发挥着越来越重要的作用。由于审计是受托经济的产物,所以审计与被审计之间天然存在着信息不对称,这种不对称直接影响审计监督的质量,引发审计风险。要树立政府审计的权威,做好社会主义市场经济的“守夜人”,政府审计必须研究和掌握信息不对称状况下,审计风险产生的机制,并有针对性地研究和制定缓解审计风险的方法、措施和手段。本文试图在信息不对称的大前提下,结合作者在政府审计部门多年的工作经验,运用乔治·阿克洛夫和迈克尔·斯彭斯的信息不对称理论,分析阐述审计风险产生机制,并从实用的角度提出缓解审计风险的对策和建议。本文的第一部分首先介绍政府审计的基本概念;其次介绍政府审计风险的概念、特征和具体表现以及传统审计风险模型和现代审计风险模型的区别和影响;最后介绍目前审计风险的一些控制机制。第二部分首先介绍了“逆向选择”、“混同均衡”和“信号”等相关的信息不对称概念,再阐述了信息不对称条件下政府审计风险产生的机理。第三部分引入两个案例,详细的讲述信息不对称条件下的政府
[Abstract]:In the age of information economy, information, as an important productive resource, affects all aspects of social life. Today, when the competition is becoming increasingly fierce, the party that fully occupies the advantage of information is often able to grasp the overall situation, avoid risks, and finally achieve success, while the party in the information weak position is struggling in the market economy. Risk of loss and failure at any time. Therefore, under the condition of asymmetric information, what means and methods should be used to reduce the risk brought by asymmetric information to the range to enhance the ability of market economy participants to grasp the overall situation and to participate in market competition, so as to improve the ability of market economy participants to grasp the overall situation and participate in market competition. As the product of entrusted economy, government audit, acting on behalf of the government, plays a more and more important role in ensuring the healthy and orderly operation of socialist market economy. Because audit is the product of entrusted economy, there is a natural information asymmetry between audit and audit, which directly affects the quality of audit supervision and leads to audit risk. In order to establish the authority of the government audit and be the "night-watchman" of the socialist market economy, the government audit must study and master the mechanism of audit risk under the condition of asymmetric information. This paper attempts to combine the author's many years of experience in the government audit department under the premise of asymmetric information, and formulate the methods, measures and means to mitigate the audit risk. Based on the information asymmetry theory of George 路Akerlof and Michael Spence, this paper analyzes the mechanism of audit risk, and puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to mitigate audit risk from a practical point of view. The first part of this paper first introduces the basic concept of government audit, then introduces the concept of government audit risk, characteristics and specific performance, as well as the traditional audit risk model and modern audit risk model difference and influence. At last, some control mechanisms of audit risk are introduced. The second part first introduces the concepts of "reverse selection", "mixed equilibrium" and "signal", and then expounds the mechanism of government audit risk under the condition of asymmetric information. The third part introduces two cases about the government under the condition of asymmetric information.
【学位授予单位】：四川大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2005
【分类号】：F239.6

【引证文献】