论独立审计诚信建设的制度安排

发布时间：2018-06-07 07:51

本文选题：独立审计诚信 + 制度安排　；参考：《西南财经大学》2003年硕士论文

【摘要】： 2001年，随着银广夏等一系列财务造假案件的曝光,注册会计师一时间备受质疑，中国注册会计师行业遭遇了前所未有的诚信危机，重树审计诚信成为全行业面临的首要任务。但是，我们应该看到，诚信缺失并不是注册会计师行业特有的问题。整个社会普遍存在信用观念淡薄，不讲诚信的现象比比皆是。如果撇开现实环境谈诚信原则，孤立地讨论诚信缺失事件是缺乏现实意义的。在我国转轨经济的背景下，诚信并不是一个抽象的道德问题，而有其十分复杂的社会经济文化甚至政治背景。仅仅靠倡导和教育注册会计师讲诚信是不够的，，必须从道义的批判和制度的匡正两方面对审计失信行为进行治理。基于上述考虑，本文以制度经济学的基本观点为分析的理论起点，对独立审计诚信建设问题进行了研究。本文按照提出问题－分析问题－解决问题的步骤来组织和构建，全文共分为四部分。文章的第一部分，对我国传统文化中的诚信和市场经济所要求的诚信进行分析，得出诚信建设应该以一定的制度安排为基础的结论。作为我国传统文化中重要的道德规范，诚信的影响是深远的，审计诚信建设有着深厚的思想基础。但是传统文化中的诚信仅仅强调个人道德上的修养，强调单方实践诚信，对于失信者缺乏普遍的制度约束。而市场经济下不仅要求当事人讲诚信，更重要的是，使诚信行为得到补偿和鼓励，使不诚信行为受到惩罚，迫使当事人讲诚信。制度经济学认为制度（即各种正式的和非正式的规则或规章）是通过利益诱导或禁例的方式来影响个体行为的。市场经济下经济个体决定采取或不采取某项行为主要考虑的就是经济上是否有效，他们的行为离不开相应制度安排的诱导。因此，注册会计师作为“逐利的理性经济人”，诚信是长期利益和短期利益权衡的结果，其行为在相当程度上受制度安排的有效性和可预期的稳定性所决定。文章的第二部分，从三个方面分析了我国审计诚信严重缺失的制度背景。 WP=3 第一，由于在现有的制度安排下没有对高质量审计的需求，审计人员就没有讲诚信的积极性。我国股票市场受政府政策影响较大,企业的财务信息与股票价格相关性不高，以散户为主的投资者对企业的财务信息也不重视。在政府行政干预下的资本市场中，寻求上市的公司或已上市公司只需要满足取得政府管制机构认可的审计意见即可。同时，上市公司治理结构不合理及由此产生的审计关系失衡，也严重制约了注册会计师诚信水准。由于企业需要的是能够“配合”的事务所，对高质量审计的需求不足甚至排斥，使得“规范执业找死”成为注册会计师行业所面临的市场写照。屈从于压力，甚至与各方合谋，成为注册会计师的理性选择。其次，我国的事务所的组建、脱钩改制、兼并、整合，无不是以行政命令进行的强制性制度变迁。频繁的产权变动，使得合伙人对自己在事务所中的产权份额没有安全感，对未来难以形成稳定的预期，合伙人没有讲诚信的积极性。第二，现有的制度安排下审计诚信缺乏外在的压力。本文以《1.9规定》公布前的情况为分析背景，具体对诉讼资格、诉讼成本与诉讼收益进行分析，说明我国审计人员失信的法律风险不大。此外，我国事务所目前大多是有限责任制，几十万元的注册资本承担了涉及几个亿、数十亿金额的业务，使得事务所的败德成本很低，潜在收益却很高。在法律风险低，败德成本小的制度安排下，审计人员没有压力讲诚信。第三，注册会计师行业的监管尚未理顺，不利于审计诚信的建设。我国基本上是半政府半民间的行业协会监管与自律机制。政府监督的弊端主要表现为多头管理、多头监管。既容易出现监督空白，又人为加大了监督成本。如果政府进行不当管制，权力机构过多地涉及职业管理，反而会造成注册会计师职业服务质量低劣，公众利益得不到保护，容易造成部门分割。同时，中注协定位模糊，协会的职能定位为"服务、监督、管理、协调"，在政府利益与行业利益不一致时，协会的作用难以发挥。协会自律作用不到位，使得对失信的审计行为难以及时发现。 WP=4 文章的第三部分，以制度经济学中信誉机制的实现条件为理论起点，以独立审计诚信机制的作用条件为指导，尝试着构建独立审计诚信建设的制度体系框架。三者关系如下图所示：文章的第四部分，是在构建的制度体系框架下对独立审计诚信建设作出具体的政策建议。第一，完善公司治理结构是解决审计诚信问题的治本之策，有利于抑制企业造假和培育对高质量审计的需求。本文以建立健全独立董事制度为切入点，探讨公司治理结构问题。独立董事制度在我国已经初步建立，目前制度建设的重点是如何让其真正发挥作用。可以考虑通过对独立董事的报酬制度进行改革，建立有效的激励与约束机制，充分调动积极性；通过各项资格规定保证独立董事的质量和独立性，建立独立董事的生成、评价、退出制度，运用退出机制淘汰那些不称职的独立董事，使独立董事的选择走上市场化的轨道；通过对表决权比例的规定，使独立董事的投票真正具有含金量，建立独立董事作用的保障制度。 WP=5 第二，事务所采取合伙制或有限合伙制是建立审计诚信的体制基础?
[Abstract]:In 2001, with the exposure of a series of financial fraud cases such as silver and Guangxia, CPA has been questioned for a time. The Chinese certified public accountant industry has encountered an unprecedented credit crisis. It has become the primary task facing the whole industry.
However, we should see that lack of good faith is not a special problem in the CPA industry. There is a common phenomenon of weak credit in the whole society, and the phenomenon of honesty is abound. It is not an abstract moral problem, but it has its very complicated social, economic, cultural and even political background. It is not enough only to advocate and educate CPA to speak good faith. It must be dealt with in the face of the two sides of the moral criticism and the rectification of the system.
Based on the above considerations, this paper, taking the basic point of view of institutional economics as the theoretical starting point, studies the problem of the construction of independent audit integrity. This paper is organized and constructed in accordance with the steps of putting forward questions - analysis problems - solving problems. The full text is divided into four parts.
The first part of the article is to analyze the honesty and credibility required by the market economy in Chinese traditional culture, and draw the conclusion that the construction of honesty and credit should be based on a certain institutional arrangement. As an important moral norm in our traditional culture, the influence of honesty is profound, but the construction of audit integrity has a profound ideological basis. The integrity of the traditional culture only emphasizes the moral cultivation of the individual, emphasizes the practice of honesty and integrity, and lacks universal institutional constraints for the dishonest person. In the market economy, the parties not only require the parties to speak good faith, but also, more importantly, make the integrity behavior be compensated and encouraged, and the dishonesty is punished, and the parties are forced to speak good faith.
Institutional economics believes that institutions (i.e. various formal and informal rules or regulations) affect individual behavior by means of benefit induction or prohibition. In the market economy, economic individuals decide whether to take or not take a certain act mainly in terms of whether they are economically effective, and their behavior is inseparable from the induction of the corresponding institutional arrangements. As a result, CPA is the result of the balance between long-term interests and short-term interests, and its behavior is determined by the effectiveness and expected stability of institutional arrangements to a certain extent.
The second part of the article analyzes the institutional background of the serious lack of audit credibility from three aspects.
WP=3
First, because there is no demand for high quality audit under the existing institutional arrangements, the auditors have no enthusiasm for honesty. China's stock market is greatly influenced by the government policy, the financial information of the enterprise is not highly correlated with the stock price, and the investors based on the retail account do not pay much attention to the financial information of the enterprise. In the pre capital market, the listed companies or listed companies only need to meet the audit opinions approved by the government regulatory agencies. At the same time, the irrational governance structure of the listed companies and the resulting imbalance in the audit relationship also seriously restrict the quality of certified public accountants. Because the enterprises need to be able to "cooperate" The firm's demand for high quality audit is insufficient or even excluded, which makes "standardized practice finding death" as a market portrayal for CPA industry.
Secondly, the establishment of China's firms, decoupling and restructuring, merger and integration, is not a mandatory system change with administrative orders. Frequent changes in property rights make the partners have no sense of security for their share in the firm's property rights. It is difficult to form a stable expectation for the future, and the partners do not speak the enthusiasm of good faith.
Second, under the existing system arrangement, the audit honesty is lack of external pressure. In this paper, the situation of the <1.9 regulation before the publication is analyzed, and the litigation eligibility, the cost of litigation and the benefit of litigation are analyzed, which shows that the legal risk of the auditors in our country is not very risky. In addition, most of our firms are currently limited liability system and hundreds of thousands of yuan. The registered capital has undertaken a business involving billions of dollars and billions of dollars. The cost of the firm's failure is very low and the potential income is very high. Under the system of low legal risk and low cost, the auditors have no pressure to speak good faith.
Third, the regulation of the CPA industry has not yet been straightened out, which is not conducive to the construction of audit integrity.
Our country is basically the supervision and self-discipline mechanism of the semi government and half folk Industry Association. The malpractice of the government supervision is mainly the multi head management and the multi head supervision. It is easy to appear the supervision blank and increase the supervision cost. If the government conducts the improper control, the authority is too much involved in the occupation management, but will cause the CPA job instead. The quality of the service is low, the public interest is not protected and the Department is easily divided. At the same time, the location of the association is ambiguous. The function of the association is "service, supervision, management and coordination". The function of the association is difficult to play when the interests of the government are not consistent with the interests of the industry. Find out.
WP=4
The third part of the article, taking the conditions of the realization of credit mechanism in institutional economics as the theoretical starting point and guided by the conditions of the independent audit credit mechanism, tries to build a system framework for the construction of independent audit integrity. The relationship between the three is as shown in the following chart.
The fourth part of the article is to make specific policy recommendations for the construction of independent auditing Credibility under the framework of the institutional framework.
First, improving the corporate governance structure is the basic policy to solve the problem of audit honesty and credibility. It is beneficial to restrain the counterfeiting of enterprises and cultivate the demand for high quality audit. This paper, based on the establishment and improvement of the independent director system, discusses the problem of corporate governance. The independent director system has been initially established in China and the focus of the present system construction is How to let it really play its role, we can consider the reform of the remuneration system of independent directors, establish effective incentive and restraint mechanisms, fully mobilize the enthusiasm, guarantee the quality and independence of independent directors through various qualifications, establish the generation of independent directors, evaluate, withdraw system, and use exit mechanism to eliminate those who do not. Competent independent directors make the choice of independent directors on the track of marketization; through the regulation of the proportion of voting rights, the vote of independent directors really has gold content and establishes the guarantee system of the role of independent directors.
WP=5
Second, partnership or limited partnership is the institutional foundation for establishing audit integrity.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2003
【分类号】：F239

【引证文献】