独立审计制度安排与注册会计师行为问题研究

发布时间：2018-06-17 03:51

本文选题：独立审计 + 制度安排　；参考：《厦门大学》2003年博士论文

【摘要】： 本文以新制度经济学为主要理论基础，详细分析了美国和我国独立审计制度变迁与注册会计师行为之间的互动关系。本文共分六章，第一章力图构建本文的分析框架，第二至第五章以美国为背景阐述独立审计制度变迁与注册会计师行为之间的互动关系，第六章则结合我国实际情况探讨这一互动关系，各章分析思路和主要内容如下：第一章本章力图构建全文分析的理论框架。在简述新制度经济学发展之后，本章通过对人类行为基本假设、制度起源与制度构成、博弈论与新制度经济学、制度安排与制度变迁、制度与组织的关系这些基本概念的阐述和梳理，给出了制度分析的基本框架。结合独立审计制度安排，笔者认为，在制度纵向变迁中，国家与注册会计师职业之间围绕着独立审计制度的成本效益不断进行的博弈是推动独立审计制度变迁的最主要原因，博弈各方力量对比是独立审计制度变迁成败的最关键因素；在横向制度安排中，有限理性经济人与机会主义行为倾向是注册会计师行为选择的基本价值标准，博弈和制度的成本效益衡量则是分析注册会计师行为的基本方法，制度安排的意图是否与注册会计师行为选择一致是判断独立审计制度绩效的标准。第二章本章主要阐述美国独立审计制度安排的起源。独立审计制度出台的过程经历了自愿安排和强制安排两个阶段的博弈。股份公司的出现是第一阶段博弈的基础，随着股份公司大规模出现，针对如何降低股份公司所有者与管理者之间的代理成本，所有者与管理者开始展开博弈，通过不断博弈发现，独立审计能够降低所有者与管理者之间的代理成本，这样，独立审计作为一种有效的制度安排首先在一些公司自愿形成；在第二阶段的博弈中，会计信息使用者集团、会计信息提供者集团、会计职业界和政府基于各自利益进行博弈，在社会意识形态和博弈各方力量对比不断发生变化的情况下，这种博弈过程一波三折，及至1929至1933年经济大危机的爆发才使得会计信息的价值被社会充分认可，独立审计终于成为美国证券市场法定制度安排。第三章本章主要阐述美国独立审计监管制度安排与变迁。国家提供的基本服务是博弈的基本规则，政府监管部门对会计职业的监管构成独立审计制度的最基本制度安排。美国独立审计监管制度的纵向变迁过程就是政府监管部门与会计职业围绕着各自成本效益不断博弈的过程，20世纪30年代《证券法》出台之后，美国独立审计一直奉行“行业自律为主、政府监管为辅”的监管模式；20世纪70年代和90年代，随着审计质量的下降，政府两度干预会计职业，但终未引起监管模式的变化；2001年安然事件及其系列财务丑闻爆发后，政府再度干预会计职业，会计职业的监管模式从行业自律为主转变为独立监管为主。对美国行业容摘 H内餐摘登一~~~~-~~~~~-~~-~ 自律为主的监管制度横向分析表明，行业自律的成功导致了会计职业势力日益增强，政府监管势力越来越弱，二者力量对比发生严重失衡是导致美国行业自律为主的监管模式失败的主要原因。第四章本章主要阐述美国独立审计的独立性制度安排与变迁。独立性是会计职业与政府监管部门博弈的焦点，是独立审计制度安排中最重要的制度安排。本章首先回顾独立性的学术研究成果，希冀通过独立性的学术探讨为下文分析提供理论基础，接着笔者开始描述独立性安排的变迁，独立性安排的纵向变迁就是政府监管部门与会计职业围绕着对独立性的不同认识所展开的博弈过程。在此基础上，笔者转向对独立性的横向分析，在横向分析中，笔者提出，独立性程度是由注册会计师通过对独立性机制的利益取舍来决定，在分析中，笔者也发现目前独立性机制存在重大缺陷，为了解决这一缺陷，必须把独立性置于更广泛的范围加以分析和思考，重新构建独立性模式，独立性棋式的更新也要求对现行独立性安排进行改进。只有重新认识独立性，并以此为基础对现行独立性安排进行改进，才能从根本上解决独立性问题。第五章本章主要阐述美国独立审计的法律责任和会计师事务所组织形式制度安排与变迁。美国独立审计法律责任制度安排是攀响审计独立性重要的制度安排，而会计师事务所的组织形式则是独立审几计的法律责任制度安排在会计师事务所层次的重要体现。美国独立审计的法律责任变迁经历了复杂的变迁过程，习惯法下的民事责任呈现出逐渐扩大的趋势，成文法下的法律责任变迁则较为曲折，总体经历了“三起两落”的变迁过程，会计师事务所姐织形式的变迁是会计职业经营管理和法律责任这两种因素共同作用的结果.通过对这两种制度安排的分析表明，合理的法律贵任和组织形式安排旗圈热颇会计取业与会计报表使用者的利益，单纯考虑会计职业的利益或者会计娘表使用者的利益都是不可取的。第六章本章主要阐述我国独立审计制度安排与变迁。本章通过回顾我国独立审计制度安排的纵向变迁后认为，作为转轨经济国家，我国独立审计制度变迁具有深深的行政烙印和特殊的路径依赖.之后，笔者绪合我国实际情况，从独立审计监管模式、独立性制度安排、独立审计的法律责任和会计师事务所组织形式三个方
[Abstract]:This paper, taking the new institutional economics as the main theoretical basis, analyzes the interactive relationship between the changes of independent audit system and the behavior of Certified Public Accountants in the United States and China. This article is divided into six chapters. The first chapter tries to construct the analysis framework of this article, and the second to the fifth chapter describes the change of independent audit system and the CPA bank in the United States. For the interactive relationship, the sixth chapter discusses the interactive relationship in light of China's actual situation. The main ideas and main contents of each chapter are as follows:
In the first chapter, this chapter tries to build a theoretical framework for the full text analysis. After a brief introduction to the development of new institutional economics, this chapter describes and combs the basic concepts of the basic assumptions of human behavior, the origin and system of the system, the game theory and the new institutional economics, the institutional arrangement and the institutional change, the system and the organization. Based on the basic framework of the degree analysis, in combination with the independent audit system, the author holds that in the longitudinal change of the system, the game between the state and the certified public accountants around the cost and benefit of the independent audit system is the most important reason to promote the change of the independent audit system, and the force contrast between the parties of the game is the change of the independent audit system. The most important factor of defeat is that in the horizontal institutional arrangement, the limited rational economic person and opportunist behavior tendency are the basic values of the CPA behavior choice, and the cost benefit measurement of game and system is the basic method of analyzing CPA Behavior, whether the intention of the system arrangement is consistent with the choice of CPA behavior. It is the standard to judge the performance of an independent audit system.
The second chapter mainly expounds the origin of the independent audit system in the United States. The process of the introduction of the independent audit system has experienced the game of two stages of voluntary arrangement and compulsory arrangement. The emergence of the joint stock company is the basis of the first stage game. With the large-scale emergence of the joint stock companies, how to reduce the owners and managers of the joint-stock companies Between the agent cost, the owner and the manager start to start the game. Through the continuous game, the independent audit can reduce the agency cost between the owner and the manager. In this way, the independent audit, as an effective institutional arrangement, is first formed in some companies. In the game of the second stage, the accounting information user group, The accounting information provider group, the accounting profession and the government game based on their respective interests. In the case of the constant change in the social ideology and the strength of the game, the game process has been broken, and the value of the accounting information is fully recognized by the society and independent trial after the outbreak of the great economic crisis from 1929 to 1933. Finally, it became the legal system arrangement in the US stock market.
The third chapter mainly expounds the arrangements and changes of the independent audit supervision system in the United States. The basic services provided by the state are the basic rules of the game, and the supervision of the government to the accounting profession constitutes the most basic institutional arrangement of the independent audit system. The longitudinal change process of the independent audit supervision system in the United States is the participation of the government supervision department. After the introduction of the securities law in 1930s, the independent audit of the United States has been pursuing a regulatory model of "industry self-discipline mainly and government regulation supplemented". In 1970s and 90s, the government intervened in accounting profession with the decrease of audit quality in 1970s and 90s, but it did not cause supervision. After the outbreak of Enron and its series of financial scandals in 2001, the government intervened in the accounting profession again. The supervision mode of the accounting profession changed from the industry self-discipline to the independent supervision.
Pluck
H meal excerpts
From - ~ ~ - ~ - ~ - ~ ~ ~
Horizontal analysis of self regulatory system shows that the success of industry self-regulation has led to an increasing number of Accountants' professional power.
Strong, the government regulatory power is becoming weaker and weaker. The serious imbalance between the two forces is the result of the industry self-discipline in the United States.
The main reason for the failure of the main regulatory model.
The fourth chapter mainly expounds the institutional arrangements and changes of independent audit in the United States.
The focus of game between occupation and government supervision department is the most important institutional arrangement in the arrangement of independent auditing system.
This chapter first reviews the academic achievements of independence, hoping to make an analysis through the independent academic discussion.
On the basis of theory, the author begins to describe the change of independence arrangement, and the longitudinal change of independence arrangement is
The game between government regulation department and accounting profession revolves around the different understanding of independence.
On the basis of this, I turn to the horizontal analysis of independence. In horizontal analysis, the author suggests that the degree of independence is
It is decided by the CPA's interest in the independence mechanism. In the analysis, the author also finds that
There are major defects in the independence mechanism. In order to solve this problem, independence must be placed in a wider range.
After analyzing and thinking, the independent mode is rebuilt. The updating of independence chess style also requires the current independence.
Arrangements for improvement. Only by re recognizing the independence and improving the existing independence arrangements based on this.
The problem of independence can be fundamentally solved.
The fifth chapter mainly states the legal responsibility of independent audit in the United States and the organization form of accounting firms.
Institutional arrangements and changes. The arrangement of the legal liability system of independent audit in the United States is an important system for auditing independence.
The organization of accounting firms is arranged by the independent legal system.
The change of legal responsibility of independent audit in the United States has gone through a complex process of change.
The civil liability under the customary law shows a trend of gradual expansion, and the change of legal liability under statute law is more complicated.
As a whole, it has gone through the process of "three ups and two falls". The change of the form of accounting firms is accounting.
The two factors of professional management and legal liability are the result of the joint action of these two systems.
The analysis shows that a reasonable legal responsibility and organizational form can be used to arrange the flag business.
It is not desirable to consider the interests of accounting profession or the interests of users of accounting mothers.
The sixth chapter mainly expounds the arrangement and change of independent auditing system in our country.
After the vertical change of the audit system arrangement, we believe that as a transitional country, the independent auditing system changes in China.
It has deep administrative branding and special path dependence. After that, the author combines the actual situation of China from independence.
Audit supervision mode, independence system arrangement, legal responsibility of independent audit and organization form of accounting firms.
Three parties
【学位授予单位】：厦门大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2003
【分类号】：F239.2

【引证文献】