审计定价的博弈分析

发布时间：2018-06-22 06:39

本文选题：审计定价 + 审计关系　；参考：《武汉理工大学》2006年硕士论文

【摘要】：博弈论是将现实世界中不同参与人之间各种复杂的行为关系进行抽象，概括为不同参与人之间的利益冲突与一致，进而通过构建经济行为模型，来研究不同参与人的策略选择问题，使分析更加准确。审计定价确定的过程是会计师事务所、被审计单位、委托人和监管机构等决策主体的行为决策发生相互作用并达到平衡的过程，属于博弈论问题研究的范畴。审计定价的博弈分析在运用市场规律、行为心理学、委托．代理理论和保险理论等理论，充分分析审计定价的影响因素的基础上，将博弈理论引入到审计业务的不同时段，综合运用博弈矩阵等博弈论分析方法，对会计师事务所与不同的利益主体在审计业务的定价过程中的战略选择进行博弈分析，证明各个利益主体的行为动机对审计定价的重大影响，以及分析国内会计师事务所审计收费低的部分原因。博弈分析主要有理论博弈分析和案例分析两大部分，其中理论博弈分析包括揽客竞争、审计质量、审计合谋、审计监管、其它影响因素五个方面：案例分析包括安达信会计师事务所案例和北京天健与德勤合并案例两个案例分析。通过分析，得出以下结论，会计师事务所和其他利益主体从自身利益考虑而作出的决策对审计费用的高低存在重大影响。其具体有，，揽客竞争会导致审计定价偏低，不利于审计市场的健康发展；审计质量与审计定价存在正相关关系；会计师事务所和被审计单位为追求自身利益，使得高额的审计费用影响审计独立性，导致审计合谋；审计监管机构的处罚力度不足以影响会计师对经济利益的诱惑，对遏制违规审计的作用不大；审计费用高于经济处罚，是大量审计合谋事件发生的原因之一；非审计服务影响审计独立性，从而影响审计收费，非审计服务费用的提高会导致审计费用的提高；会计师事务所往往会因高额的非审计服务费用而丧失审计独立性；审计信誉，会计师事务所的规模等因素对审计定价也有很大影响。审计定价的博弈分析对理解审计费用的构成，规范我国审计收费，保证审计质量，提高国内会计师事务所的市场竞争力，具有重要现实意义。
[Abstract]:Game theory abstracts various complex behavioral relationships among different participants in the real world and generalizes them as conflicts of interest and consistency among different participants, and then constructs economic behavior models. To study the strategy selection of different participants to make the analysis more accurate. The process of determining audit pricing is the process of interaction and balance among the decision makers such as accounting firms, audited units, clients and regulators, which belongs to the category of game theory research. Based on the theory of market law, behavioral psychology, principal-agent theory and insurance theory, the game theory of audit pricing is introduced into different periods of audit business. By using game theory analysis methods such as game matrix, this paper analyzes the strategic choice of accounting firms and different stakeholders in the process of auditing business pricing. This paper proves the significant influence of the behavior motivation of various stakeholders on audit pricing, and analyzes some reasons for the low audit fees of domestic accounting firms. The game analysis includes two parts: theoretical game analysis and case analysis. The theoretical game analysis includes competition for clients, audit quality, audit collusion, audit supervision. Other influencing factors are as follows: case study including Andersen accounting firm case and Beijing Tianjian and Deloitte case. Based on the analysis, the following conclusions are drawn: the decision made by accounting firms and other stakeholders from their own interests has a significant impact on the audit expenses. In particular, the competition will lead to low audit pricing, which is not conducive to the healthy development of the audit market; audit quality and audit pricing have a positive correlation; accounting firms and audited units to pursue their own interests, The high audit costs affect the audit independence and lead to audit collusion; the punishment of audit supervision is not enough to affect the financial interests of accountants, and it has little effect on curbing the illegal audit; the audit fee is higher than the economic punishment, the audit cost is higher than the economic punishment, and the audit cost is higher than the economic punishment. It is one of the reasons that a large number of audit collusion events occur, the non-audit service affects the audit independence, thus affects the audit fee, and the increase of the non-audit service cost will lead to the increase of the audit cost. Accounting firms often lose their audit independence because of the high non-audit service costs, and the audit reputation and the size of accounting firms also have a great impact on audit pricing. The game analysis of audit pricing is of great practical significance in understanding the composition of audit fees, standardizing audit fees in China, ensuring audit quality, and improving the market competitiveness of domestic accounting firms.
【学位授予单位】：武汉理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2006
【分类号】：F239.0

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