审计任期、强制轮换与审计独立性研究
发布时间：2018-08-01 10:35
【摘要】： 1.主要内容及观点 独立性一直是审计的本质特征和灵魂所在。围绕审计任期的长短是否影响审计独立性,以及实行强制轮换制度是否能提高审计独立性这个中心,本文分为五章加以论证,主要内容与观点如下: 第一章导论 本章首先阐述了本文的研究动机。美国安然公司及世通公司相继发生的惊天财务丑闻,担任其审计业务多年的安达信也轰然倒塌。尽管关于长审计任期是否有利于提高审计独立性的讨论引起了广泛的关注,美国国会为了提高审计的独立性和社会公众对审计执业的信任,于2002年颁布了《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》,提出实行审计合伙人轮换制度,并授权美国审计总署(GAO)对会计师事务所强制轮换制度进行研究。随后,中国证监会、财政部颁布了《关于证券期货审计业务签字注册会计师定期轮换的规定》,也要求签字注册会计师连续为某一相关机构提供审计服务,不得超过五年。 其次,笔者界定了强制轮换的概念,认为强制轮换是对一家会计师事务所、审计合伙人或复核合伙人可以审计某特定公司财务报告的任期做出的限制,包括会计师事务所强制轮换、审计合伙人或复核合伙人强制轮换两种形式。 最后,阐述了审计独立性的概念及经济性质。 第二章公司治理与审计变更相关理论 这是全文的基础部份,分二部份加以论述。第一部份阐述了公司治理的概念,以及独立审计与公司治理的关系,并认为审计是作为保持受托经济责任之全面有效履行而存在的一种特殊的经济控制手段或机制。 第二部份借鉴Wallac博士的审计动因的理论(代理人理论、信
[Abstract]:1. The main content and viewpoint independence is the essential characteristic and soul of audit all the time. This paper is divided into five chapters to demonstrate whether the length of the audit term affects the audit independence and whether the mandatory rotation system can improve the audit independence. The main contents and viewpoints are as follows: the first chapter introduces the motivation of this paper. Andersen, which has been auditing Enron and WorldCom for many years, also collapsed after the financial scandal. Despite the widespread concern over whether the tenure of the long-run audit is conducive to enhancing audit independence, the United States Congress has sought to enhance the independence of the audit and the public's confidence in the practice of auditing. In 2002, Sarbanes-Oxley Act was promulgated, which proposed the implementation of audit partner rotation system, and authorized (GAO) to study the mandatory rotation system of accounting firms. Subsequently, the CSRC and the Ministry of Finance promulgated the regulations on the regular rotation of signed Certified Public Accountants for Securities and Futures auditing, and also required the signed Certified Public Accountants to continue to provide audit services to a relevant institution for no more than five years. Secondly, the author defines the concept of mandatory rotation, and considers that mandatory rotation is the limitation of the term of office of an accounting firm, an audit partner or a reviewing partner who can audit the financial statements of a particular company. Including the mandatory rotation of accounting firms, audit partners or review partners mandatory rotation of two forms. Finally, the concept and economic nature of audit independence are expounded. The second chapter is the theory of corporate governance and audit change, which is the basic part of this paper, which is discussed in two parts. The first part expounds the concept of corporate governance and the relationship between independent audit and corporate governance, and considers that audit is a special economic control means or mechanism to maintain the overall and effective performance of entrusted economic responsibility. The second part draws on Dr Wallac's theory of audit motivation (agent theory, lette
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2006
【分类号】：F239.4
本文编号：2157295
[Abstract]:1. The main content and viewpoint independence is the essential characteristic and soul of audit all the time. This paper is divided into five chapters to demonstrate whether the length of the audit term affects the audit independence and whether the mandatory rotation system can improve the audit independence. The main contents and viewpoints are as follows: the first chapter introduces the motivation of this paper. Andersen, which has been auditing Enron and WorldCom for many years, also collapsed after the financial scandal. Despite the widespread concern over whether the tenure of the long-run audit is conducive to enhancing audit independence, the United States Congress has sought to enhance the independence of the audit and the public's confidence in the practice of auditing. In 2002, Sarbanes-Oxley Act was promulgated, which proposed the implementation of audit partner rotation system, and authorized (GAO) to study the mandatory rotation system of accounting firms. Subsequently, the CSRC and the Ministry of Finance promulgated the regulations on the regular rotation of signed Certified Public Accountants for Securities and Futures auditing, and also required the signed Certified Public Accountants to continue to provide audit services to a relevant institution for no more than five years. Secondly, the author defines the concept of mandatory rotation, and considers that mandatory rotation is the limitation of the term of office of an accounting firm, an audit partner or a reviewing partner who can audit the financial statements of a particular company. Including the mandatory rotation of accounting firms, audit partners or review partners mandatory rotation of two forms. Finally, the concept and economic nature of audit independence are expounded. The second chapter is the theory of corporate governance and audit change, which is the basic part of this paper, which is discussed in two parts. The first part expounds the concept of corporate governance and the relationship between independent audit and corporate governance, and considers that audit is a special economic control means or mechanism to maintain the overall and effective performance of entrusted economic responsibility. The second part draws on Dr Wallac's theory of audit motivation (agent theory, lette
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2006
【分类号】：F239.4
【引证文献】
相关博士学位论文 前1条
1 沈玉清;审计任期、公司治理与盈余质量[D];电子科技大学;2009年
相关硕士学位论文 前4条
1 田桂凡;强制轮换对审计质量影响的实证研究[D];西南财经大学;2007年
2 陈钰星;会计师事务所定期轮换制有效性研究[D];长沙理工大学;2008年
3 刘鑫;签字注册会计师轮换制度对审计质量影响的实证研究[D];南京财经大学;2008年
4 汤梦宇;强制轮换会计师事务所制度的有效性研究[D];北京交通大学;2012年
，本文编号：2157295
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