经济学视角下的国家工程项目舞弊审计研究

发布时间：2018-08-03 12:31

【摘要】： 由于我国基础设施建设的投资规模巨大,工程领域出现了很多的违法违规问题,诸如管理分散,监督和制约机制不健全、招投标阶段存在大量违法违纪问题、合同管理舞弊、行贿受贿等,由此引发了一系列的社会问题,有的地区已严重影响了经济的发展与社会的安定。本文通过收集、分析“长江重要堤防隐蔽工程”、“中国体育博物馆工程”、“粤海铁路工程”等国家工程项目舞弊案例资料,说明国家工程项目在各环节都有可能出现舞弊行为。为了保证国家工程项目顺利进行,确保有关财政财务信息的透明度和真实性,保证政府职能的实现和公众利益不受损害,以杜绝欺诈、滥用职权、权钱交易等舞弊行为,及时发现围标舞弊行为,实施国家工程项目舞弊审计势在必行。本文阐述了国家工程项目舞弊及国家工程项目舞弊审计的必要性,对国家工程项目舞弊审计存在审计监督体制缺乏透明性和有效性、审计的独立性易受到人为因素的干扰、审计经费和审计力量相对不足、审计执行处理的难度较大等问题进行了揭示;采用寻租理论、不对称信息、成本效益等理论、委托代理理论对国家工程项目的被审计人的“经济人”行为凸显、舞弊审计违规的惩罚成本小于预期收益、国家工程项目建设方及施工方与审计方相互寻租、审计机构与被审计单位的博弈失衡、围标行为及围标行为发现存在时间差异等成因进行了较深入的分析;并针对国家工程项目舞弊审计存在的问题提出应完善国家工程项目舞弊审计机制、增加国家工程项目舞弊审计腐败行为的惩罚成本、建立健全激励和约束机制以约束审计双方寻租行为、提升国家工程项目审计的透明度及有效性、加大被审单位围标行为的查处及处罚力度等相关对策。
[Abstract]:Due to the huge scale of investment in infrastructure construction in our country, there are many illegal and illegal problems in the engineering field, such as decentralized management, imperfect supervision and restriction mechanism, a large number of illegal and disciplinary problems in the bidding stage, and fraud in contract management. Bribery and bribery have caused a series of social problems, some regions have seriously affected the economic development and social stability. Through collecting and analyzing the cases of fraud in national engineering projects, such as "concealment project of important embankment of the Yangtze River", "China Sports Museum Project" and "Guangdong Railway Project", etc. State engineering projects in all links are likely to appear fraud. In order to ensure the smooth progress of state engineering projects, ensure the transparency and authenticity of relevant financial and financial information, and ensure that the functions of the government and the public interests are not harmed, so as to put an end to fraud, abuse of power, trading of power and money, etc., Timely detection of fraud, the implementation of national engineering project fraud audit imperative. This paper expounds the necessity of the national project fraud and the national engineering project fraud audit, and the lack of transparency and effectiveness of the audit supervision system for the national engineering project fraud audit, the independence of the audit is easily disturbed by human factors. The relative shortage of audit funds and audit power, the difficulty of audit execution and other problems are revealed, and the theory of rent-seeking, asymmetric information, cost benefit and so on is adopted. The principal-agent theory highlights the "economic person" behavior of the auditees of national engineering projects, the penalty cost of fraud and auditing irregularities is less than the expected income, and the construction and construction parties and auditors of national engineering projects seek rent from each other. The game imbalance between the audit institution and the auditee is analyzed deeply, and the cause of the difference between the behavior of the audit institution and the auditee is analyzed deeply. Aiming at the problems existing in the fraud audit of national engineering projects, the author puts forward that the mechanism of fraud audit of national engineering projects should be perfected, and the penalty cost of corrupt practices of national engineering projects should be increased. To establish and perfect the incentive and restraint mechanism to restrain the rent-seeking behavior of both sides of the audit, to enhance the transparency and effectiveness of the national project audit, and to increase the investigation and punishment of the bidding behavior of the units under review and other relevant countermeasures.
【学位授予单位】：长沙理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：F239.4

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