基于博弈论的审计职业判断探析

发布时间：2018-08-06 13:41

【摘要】：作为一种外部监督机制,审计旨在克服所有者和管理者之间的信息不对称、提高财务报告的可信度和保障各相关方面的利益。伴随着我国市场经济体制的日益完善,审计已成为了资本市场中的一项必不可少的内容。在审计部门的社会地位不断得到提高的同时,社会公众对审计质量也提出了更高的期望。但进入21世纪,国际和国内的资本市场陆续出现了审计造假和出错的情况,负责审计的会计师事务所(审计人员)由于审计工作都没有起到有效的判断评价作用而经常被卷入其中。目前,审计判断工作遇到了不可避免的挑战,审计人员面临的审计风险不断加大,审计判断的质量也总体表现出不高的趋势。尽管我国的审计准则和规范不断完善,但是也表现出明显的不足,对于审计过程中发生的违规行为却缺乏有效的监管和处罚机制,这在一定程度上加剧了审计风险的发生和审计判断质量的下降。导致存在上述问题的原因有多种,可能由于审计人员违反职业道德,发现造假却没有报告出来,甚至与被审计单位合谋造假,如安达信公司；也可能是由于审计人员的专业胜任能力有限,虽然努力工作却没有发现造假；或者排除道德和业务水平因素,单纯地是因为审计师的审计工作比较匆忙,审计时间比较有限,即没有付出应有的努力程度而没能发现造假。在经济快速发展的情况下,会计、审计准则和规范呈现出一定的滞后性,对会计、审计事项的约束力明显不足。另外,社会监管机构对违规行为的处罚也缺乏力度。可见,被审计单位管理者为了个人或者集体利益有造假的动机,考验着审计师的道德水平和执业技能,审计人员与被审计单位潜在的“友好合作”考验着审计监管机构的能力和力度,那么两者之间的博弈关系就非常值得学者们进行深入地研究。本文的写作主线采用以理论分析为基础,结合国内外学者研究的具体情况进行分析论证,总结了审计职业判断目前存在的问题,然后通过引用不完全信息动态博弈模型,分析博弈双方的具体博弈过程,得出产生以上问题的原因及怎样进行改善的几点思考。本文在借鉴学者研究的基础上,简要介绍了将博弈论引入审计职业判断的合理性及博弈论在经管学的广泛应用。在过去文献建立诸多博弈模型中,本文认为审计判断过程准确地说属于不完全信息动态博弈。原因有二：首先,博弈活动的参与者分别处于不同的执业环境、掌握不同的信息,当融入到整个博弈中去时,对博弈对手信息并不能完全准确地掌握,即所谓的“信息不对称”,因此存在博弈信息不完全性；其次,审计判断的参与者之间的行动是有先后顺序的,在审计人员与被审计单位博弈时,先是被审计单位管理者选择一定的概率对财务报告造假,然后由审计人员在不清楚被审计单位管理者的行为选择情况下决定是否合谋或合规,所以审计判断是一种动态博弈。关于外部审计的不完全信息动态博弈,以前的研究也出现了不少。由于我国是比较注重法治的国家,外部监管大都是国家权力机构(如国家审计署)或者社会组织(如注册会计师协会),相信外部监管在法治社会下对审计的博弈参与者决策有更强的影响力,故文章分别建立了审计人员与被审计单位、审计人员与监管机构的不完全信息动态博弈模型,根据对博弈均衡结果的分析,发现审计判断在博弈环境、博弈技能和博弈规则等方面存在的不足,进而提出减少财务造假和审计舞弊发生的建议,更加强调对审计外部监管工作的注重,希望可以对目前存在的审计判断问题有所帮助,对以后的审计判断研究工作起到一定的积极作用。
[Abstract]:As an external supervision mechanism, the audit aims to overcome the information asymmetry between the owner and the manager, improve the credibility of the financial report and protect the interests of all related aspects. With the increasing perfection of the market economic system in China, the audit has become an essential part of the capital market. At the same time, the public has also raised higher expectations for the quality of the audit, but in twenty-first Century, the international and domestic capital markets have appeared in the case of audit fraud and error. The auditors who are in charge of auditing have not played an effective judgment and evaluation because of the audit work. At present, the audit judgment has met the inevitable challenge. The audit risk is increasing and the quality of the audit judgment is not high. Although the auditing standards and standards are constantly improved in China, there are also obvious deficiencies in the auditing process. The lack of effective supervision and punishment mechanism has aggravated the occurrence of audit risk and the decline of the quality of audit judgment to some extent. There are many reasons for the above problems, which may be due to the auditors' violation of professional ethics, which have not been reported or even conspire with the audited units, such as Andersen. It may also be due to the limited professional competence of the auditors, although hard work has not been found to be fraudulent; or to exclude moral and business level factors simply because the auditor's audit work is in a hurry and the audit time is limited, that is, it does not pay due diligently and fails to find counterfeit. Under the circumstances, accounting, auditing standards and norms have shown a certain lag, and the binding force on accounting and audit is obviously insufficient. In addition, the social regulatory agency is also lack of punishment for the violation of the rules. It is clear that the auditor's moral level and the moral level are tested for individual or collective interests. The skills of practice, the potential "friendly cooperation" between the auditors and the audited units test the ability and strength of the audit supervision institutions, so the game relationship between the two is well worth the in-depth study of the scholars.
In this paper, the main line of writing is based on theoretical analysis, combined with the specific situation of scholars at home and abroad to analyze and demonstrate the problems existing in the audit career judgment, and then by citing the dynamic game model of incomplete information, the specific game process of the two parties is analyzed, and the reasons for the above problems and how to get into it are obtained. On the basis of the study of scholars, this paper briefly introduces the rationality of game theory and the wide application of game theory in the economics of economics and economics. In the past literature, this paper holds that the audit judgment process is exactly the dynamic game of incomplete information. There are two reasons. First, the participants in the game activities are in different practice environment and master different information. When they are integrated into the game, the information of the game can not be fully grasps, that is, the so-called "information asymmetry", so there is incomplete information of the game. Secondly, the action among the auditors is the action of the participants. In order, when the auditor and the audited unit game, the auditor chooses a certain probability to falsification of the financial report first, and then the auditor decides whether to conspire or comply with the behavior choice of the auditor, and the audit judgment is a dynamic game. Considering the dynamic game of incomplete information, there have been a lot of previous studies. Because China is a country that pays more attention to the rule of law, the external supervision is mostly the state authority (such as the State Audit Office) or the social organization (such as the CPA). It is believed that external supervision has a stronger effect on the decision-making of audit players under the rule of law. The paper establishes a dynamic game model of incomplete information between auditors and auditors, auditors and regulators. According to the analysis of game equilibrium results, it is found that audit judgment is not sufficient in game environment, game skills and game rules, and then puts forward to reduce financial fraud and audit fraud. The suggestion of birth emphasizes more emphasis on external audit supervision, and hopes to help the existing audit judgment problems, and play a positive role in the future research work of audit judgment.
【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F239.4;F224.32

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