内部审计在公司治理中的作用机理与实证研究

发布时间：2018-08-18 19:58

【摘要】：美国安然、世通事件中,内部审计无疑成为关注的焦点。美国《萨班斯法案》的出台、纽约证券交易所要求所有上市公司必须设立内部审计机构的规定,以及英国在安然事件后出台的Higgs报告(2003)、Smith报告(2003)、2003年新修订的“公司治理综合准则”等新的管制要求,同样提升了内部审计在公司治理中的重要性。同时内部审计可以在公司治理中发挥重要作用,以及它与董事会、高管层、外部审计共同构成良好公司治理的“四大基石”的观点逐渐得到更多审计理论界和实务界人士的认可。但是,内部审计如何在公司治理中发挥作用,它们的设立动因是什么,以及不同内部审计隶属模式、不同内部审计开展方式的影响因素有哪些,进而这些内部审计职能的实施能否改善公司治理效果等问题,从当前看来都缺乏足够的理论支撑与实证检验。因此,对这些问题的回答,将进一步加深人们对内部审计在公司治理中作用的认识,对丰富和拓展内部审计研究、强化内部审计实务和完善公司治理具有重要的理论与现实意义。论文在受托责任理论、委托代理理论、交易成本理论和公司治理理论的基础上,构建了内部审计在公司治理中发挥作用的分析框架,内部审计通过与“其他三个治理主体”之间的协作能够发挥其治理作用。同时进行博弈分析,其数值模拟的结果发现:当公司的控制风险较低时,公司将趋向不设立内部审计机构;而当公司的控制风险相对较大时,公司将设立内部审计机构自己去执行内部审计职能;但是当控制风险较大时,公司将选择内部审计部分外包或全外包的形式去执行内部审计职能。论文结合中国的制度背景,利用我国上市公司在公司治理专项自查活动中披露内部审计信息的研究契机,使用沪深A股的财务数据和交易数据考察内部审计的设立动因,内部审计隶属模式、内部审计开展方式的影响因素,以及从审计费用、审计意见和市场反应的角度检验了内部审计的治理效果。实证研究结果发现:(1)我国上市公司设立内部审计机构,将主要考虑审计委员会的设立与否、独立董事比例、市场竞争程度、公司规模、企业风险等五个因素。并且公司设立了审计委员会,独立董事比例越大,市场竞争越激烈,公司规模越大,企业风险越大,则公司将更可能设立内部审计机构。(2)上市公司在内部审计隶属模式的选择上则主要考虑市场竞争环境、企业规模和审计委员会的设立与否三个因素。如果公司规模越大、设立了审计委员会,就越可能将内部审计机构设在董事会或审计委员会下面。假如第一大股东持股比例越低,企业规模越大,则更可能设在监事会下面。但是当企业规模越大、市场竞争越激烈时,就越可能设在总经理下面。只有当企业规模越小,独立董事比例又越低时,才会设在财务部下面。(3)对于上市公司内部审计的开展方式,在实际实施时主要考虑了代理成本、内部审计资产的专用性和内部审计活动的频率、审计委员会的有效性等因素。如果公司的代理成本越高,内部审计资产的专用性越低,内部审计活动的开展越不频繁,审计委员会未成立或未有效运作,公司越可能进行内部审计外包。(4)内部审计职能的实施具有一定的治理效果。如果上市公司设立了内部审计机构,其外部审计费用相对较低,同时能够改善公司的审计意见,而且从市场反应角度看,公司设立内部审计机构,能够提高投资者对改善公司治理效果的预期,积极购买该公司的股票,从而使股票的超常收益率更高,即是说投资者认同了内部审计的治理效应。对于不同内部审计隶属模式的治理效果,在外部审计费用的节约方面和审计意见方面,内部审计隶属董事会和总经理两种模式具有明显的治理效应,但是在投资者的认同方面,投资者更认同内部审计隶属董事会模式。另外对于不同内部审计开展方式的治理效果,只有内部审计的部分外包才能显著降低外部审计费用和改善审计意见,并且在市场反应上能够提高投资者对公司治理效果的信心,导致投资者对治理效果产生了积极反应。论文构建的内部审计在公司治理中的作用分析框架,为深入理解内部审计在治理中的作用机理提供了坚实的理论支撑;同时,本文也对内部审计职能进行了实证研究的有益尝试,为我国内部审计实务及公司治理实践的结合,从实证角度进行了探索,并提出了相应的政策建议:(1)设立内部审计机构,积极发挥其治理效果。设立了内部审计机构的公司,其外部审计费用相对较低,并且能够改善公司的审计意见,而且在市场反应上能够提高投资者对该公司治理效果的信心,这也说明内部审计具有较为明显的治理效果。(2)在内部审计设立模式上,倡导最佳的内部审计隶属模式,应该是在职能上向董事会及审计委员会报告,同时在行政上向总经理报告。(3)对于内部审计职能的开展方式,应该采取部分外包的形式,即内部审计人员和外部审计人员合作执行内部审计职能,这样能够产生更好的治理效果。
[Abstract]:Internal auditing has undoubtedly become the focus of attention in Enron and WorldCom events in the United States. The introduction of the Sarbanes Act in the United States, the New York Stock Exchange's requirement that all listed companies have to set up internal auditing bodies, as well as the Haggs Report (2003), Smith Report (2003), the newly revised "Corporate Governance Synthesis" in 2003 At the same time, internal auditing can play an important role in corporate governance, and the viewpoint that internal auditing, together with the board of directors, senior management and external auditing, constitutes the "four cornerstones" of good corporate governance is gradually gaining more and more auditing theorists and practitioners. However, the problems of how internal audit plays a role in corporate governance, what are the motivations for its establishment, the different subordinate modes of internal audit, the influencing factors of different internal audit modes, and whether the implementation of these internal audit functions can improve corporate governance effect are all lacking at present. Therefore, the answer to these questions will further deepen people's understanding of the role of internal audit in corporate governance, enrich and expand the study of internal audit, strengthen internal audit practice and improve corporate governance has important theoretical and practical significance.
Based on the theory of fiduciary responsibility, principal-agent, transaction cost and corporate governance, this paper constructs an analytical framework for the role of internal audit in corporate governance. Internal audit can play its governance role through cooperation with the "other three governance subjects". The results show that: when the control risk is low, the company will tend not to set up an internal audit agency; when the control risk is relatively high, the company will set up an internal audit agency to perform its internal audit function; but when the control risk is high, the company will choose the form of partial or total outsourcing of internal audit. To perform internal audit functions.
Combining with China's institutional background, this paper makes use of the research opportunity of disclosure of internal audit information in the special corporate governance self-examination activities of Listed Companies in China, uses the financial data and transaction data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares to examine the establishment motivation of internal audit, the subordinate mode of internal audit, the influencing factors of internal audit development, and the audit fee. The effectiveness of internal audit is examined from the perspective of audit opinion and market reaction.
The empirical results show that: (1) China's listed companies to establish internal audit institutions, will mainly consider the establishment of audit committee or not, the proportion of independent directors, market competition, company size, enterprise risk and other five factors. The greater the enterprise risk, the more likely the company will set up an internal audit agency. (2) The choice of the internal audit subordinate model of listed companies mainly considers market competition environment, enterprise size and the establishment of audit committee. Under the board of directors or audit committees. If the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder is lower and the size of the enterprise is larger, it is more likely to be under the board of supervisors. (3) For the internal audit of listed companies, the agency cost, the specificity of internal audit assets, the frequency of internal audit activities, the effectiveness of the audit committee and other factors are taken into account. The less frequent the audit committee is, the more likely the company is to outsource internal audit. (4) The implementation of internal audit functions has a certain governance effect. In other words, investors agree with the governance effect of internal audit. For the governance effect of different internal audit subordinate modes, the external audit fee is the cost of external audit. In the aspect of economy and audit opinions, the two modes of internal audit subordinate to the board of directors and general managers have obvious governance effects, but in the aspect of investors'recognition, investors prefer the mode of internal audit subordinate to the board of directors. To reduce external audit fees and improve audit opinions, and in the market reaction can improve investors'confidence in the effect of corporate governance, leading to investors have a positive response to the effect of governance.
The analysis framework of internal audit in corporate governance provided a solid theoretical support for the in-depth understanding of the mechanism of internal audit in corporate governance; at the same time, this paper also made a useful attempt to conduct empirical research on the internal audit function, and provided an empirical perspective for the combination of internal audit practice and corporate governance practice in China. This paper explores and puts forward corresponding policy suggestions: (1) Setting up an internal audit institution to actively exert its governance effect. A company with an internal audit institution has a relatively low external audit fee and can improve the company's audit opinions. It also shows that the internal audit has obvious governance effect. (2) In the establishment of internal audit model, advocating the best internal audit subordinate model, should be in the function of the board of directors and audit committee report, while in the administration report to the general manager. (3) For the internal audit function, should take the form of partial outsourcing. In other words, internal auditors and external auditors cooperate to perform internal audit functions, which can produce better governance effect.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：F239.45

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