上市公司注册会计师审计委托模式探讨
发布时间：2018-08-21 14:06
【摘要】：近年来,不论国际还是国内,上市公司会计造假丑闻此起彼伏,广大投资者遭受了巨大损失,严重损害了资本市场的声誉和上市公司的公信力。对于会计造假财务舞弊事件,人们可以从现存制度和公司治理结构出发分析财务舞弊的成因,也可以从上市公司注册会计师审计监督这一方面分析财务舞弊的原因,并提出相关对策。对于上市公司注册会计师审计监督的研究主要集中在注册会计师审计的独立性方面。大量的研究表明,导致注册会计师审计独立性丧失的原因是多方面的,‘注册会计师审计委托模式存在缺陷则是其中一个重要的制度原因。因此,对我国上市公司现行注册会计师审计委托模式的内在问题进行深入研究,并提出相应的改进建议,对于增强我国上市公司注册会计师审计的独立性,维护我国会计师事务所的健康发展以及促进我国证券市场持续有序发展有着重要意义。 目前,理论界对注册会计师审计委托模式的选择持有不同的见解,但在实践中做得比较好、可行性比较高的注册会计师审计委托模式是审计委员会模式。本.文在对注册会计师审计委托模式的基本理论进行阐述与分析的前提下找出我国注册会计师审计委托模式存在的问题并进行了深层次的成因分析,而后提出具有针对性的改进建议。具体而言,全文共分为五个部分： 第一部分为引言,首先阐述本文研究的背景及意义,列举相关重要的国内外研究文献并进行综合的述评,阐述写作的主要思路及研究方法,并列示出论文的基本写作框架。 第二部分包括两大方面内容,一是阐述注册会计师审计委托模式的基本概念,二是阐述注册会计师审计委托模式的理论基础。在基本概念中,主要解释注册会计师审计的涵义以及注册会计师审计委托模式的涵义。在注册会计师审计委托模式的理论基础中主要从委托代理理论、产权经济学理论以及供需理论三个方面进行阐述,并分析其与注册会计师审计委托模式之间的关系。 第三部分主要是分析我国上市公司注册会计师审计委托模式存在的问题,并对其进行成因分析。我国上市公司注册会计师审计委托模式存在的主要问题是注册会计师审计委托主体不明确；注册会计师审计费用的确定及支付方式不科学；注册会计师审计的监督与评价体系不完善；注册会计师相对被审计单位不够独立。产生这些问题的原因主要有上市公司治理缺陷和委托权的移位；审计的买方市场特征与会计师事务所独立性的缺失；注册会计师审计相关法律法规不完善。 第四部分主要围绕理论与实务界提出的三种比较具有代表性的上市公司注册会计师审计委托模式进行讨论,分别是证监会模式、财务报表保险模式、审计委员会模式。在分别对这三种审计委托模式的构建思路及其优越性进行概述的基础上,对其各自的缺陷进行了分析。证监会模式的缺陷在于：我们无法确定证监会是真实会计信息的需求者；另外,由于证监会权利较大,如果将上市公司注册会计师审计的委托监管权赋予证监会,势必会导致证监会权力膨胀。财务报表保险模式的缺陷在于：首先,这一理论是以股票交易市场半强式有效为前提的,但我国股票市场远并未达到半强式有效,因此我国采用财务报表保险模式在本质上并不能发挥该模式的显著优点；其次,在实务中,财务报表保险模式缺乏强制性；最后,是目前我国保险行业可能没有能力也没有胆量承担上市公司注册会计师审计代理委托人这一重要职责。审计委员会模式的缺陷在于：首先,上市公司审计委员会中的独立董事与公司之间的利益关联不是很强,独立董事自身并不是真实会计信息的需求者,因此,审计委员会中的独立董事在履行其职能时并不具有很强的积极性和主动性；其次是学者们怀疑独立董事有可能受到上市公司内部执行董事的利益驱使,使独立董事与内部董事合谋成为可能。在对三种注册会计师审计委托模式进行分析比较的基础上,本文认为最优选择是审计委员会模式。 第五部分是对我国上市公司注册会计师审计委托模式选择审计委员会模式进行探讨。该部分针对我国上市公司注册会计师审计委托模式存在的问题及其成因,借鉴美国《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》中规定的一些做法,提出构建我国以审计委员会为委托主体的审计委托模式的构建思路,并通过提高审计委员会的独立性、健全相关法律法规使我国上市公司注册会计师审计委托模式得到完善。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the accounting fraud scandals of listed companies have arisen one after another, which have caused huge losses to investors and seriously damaged the reputation of the capital market and the credibility of listed companies. We can also analyze the causes of financial fraud from the aspect of CPA audit supervision of listed companies and put forward relevant countermeasures. In many ways,'the defects of the CPA audit entrustment mode are one of the important institutional reasons. Therefore, this paper makes a thorough study of the internal problems of the current CPA audit entrustment mode of Listed Companies in China, and puts forward corresponding suggestions for improvement in order to enhance the independence of the CPA audit of Listed Companies in China. It is of great significance to maintain the healthy development of Chinese accounting firms and to promote the sustainable and orderly development of China's securities market.
At present, the theoretical circles hold different opinions on the choice of the CPA audit entrustment mode, but in practice, the CPA audit entrustment mode with higher feasibility is the audit committee mode. The problems existing in the audit entrustment model of CPA are analyzed in depth and some suggestions for improvement are put forward.
The first part is the introduction. First of all, it expounds the background and significance of this study, lists relevant important domestic and foreign research literature and makes a comprehensive review, expounds the main ideas and research methods of writing, and lists the basic writing framework of the paper.
The second part consists of two parts, one is to expound the basic concept of the CPA audit entrustment model, the other is to expound the theoretical basis of the CPA audit entrustment model. The theoretical basis of the model is mainly from three aspects: principal-agent theory, property rights economics theory and supply-demand theory, and analyzes the relationship between the model and CPA audit principal-agent model.
The third part mainly analyzes the problems existing in the auditing entrustment mode of the listed companies in China, and analyzes the causes. The main reasons for these problems are the defect of listed companies'governance and the shift of entrustment right; the lack of buyer's market characteristics of audit and the independence of accounting firms; the related laws of CPA audit. The legislation is not perfect.
The fourth part mainly discusses three representative auditing entrustment modes of listed companies put forward by the theoretical and practical circles, namely, the SFC mode, the financial statement insurance mode and the audit committee mode. On the basis of the above analysis, the shortcomings of the SFC model are as follows: we can not confirm that the SFC is the demander of true accounting information; in addition, because the SFC has a large power, if the authorized supervision power of the CPA audit of listed companies is entrusted to the SFC, it will inevitably lead to the expansion of the SFC's power. The drawbacks of the statement insurance model lie in: firstly, the theory is based on the semi-strong form of the stock exchange market, but the stock market in China is far from semi-strong form of efficiency, so the financial statement insurance model in China can not play a significant advantage in essence; secondly, in practice, the financial statement insurance model is lacking. Finally, China's insurance industry may not have the ability or the courage to assume the important responsibility of the CPA audit agent of listed companies. As the matter itself is not the demander of true accounting information, the independent directors in the audit committee do not have strong enthusiasm and initiative in performing their functions; secondly, scholars suspect that the independent directors may be driven by the interests of the internal executive directors of listed companies, making the collusion between independent directors and internal directors possible. On the basis of analyzing and comparing the three models of CPA audit entrustment, this paper argues that the best choice is the audit committee model.
The fifth part is to discuss the mode of CPA audit entrustment in listed companies of our country and the mode of audit committee.This part aims at the problems and causes of the mode of CPA audit entrustment in listed companies of our country, and refers to some practices stipulated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the United States, and proposes to construct our country to audit. By improving the independence of the audit committee and perfecting relevant laws and regulations, the CPA audit entrustment model of Listed Companies in China has been perfected.
【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：F233;F239.4
本文编号：2195979
[Abstract]:In recent years, the accounting fraud scandals of listed companies have arisen one after another, which have caused huge losses to investors and seriously damaged the reputation of the capital market and the credibility of listed companies. We can also analyze the causes of financial fraud from the aspect of CPA audit supervision of listed companies and put forward relevant countermeasures. In many ways,'the defects of the CPA audit entrustment mode are one of the important institutional reasons. Therefore, this paper makes a thorough study of the internal problems of the current CPA audit entrustment mode of Listed Companies in China, and puts forward corresponding suggestions for improvement in order to enhance the independence of the CPA audit of Listed Companies in China. It is of great significance to maintain the healthy development of Chinese accounting firms and to promote the sustainable and orderly development of China's securities market.
At present, the theoretical circles hold different opinions on the choice of the CPA audit entrustment mode, but in practice, the CPA audit entrustment mode with higher feasibility is the audit committee mode. The problems existing in the audit entrustment model of CPA are analyzed in depth and some suggestions for improvement are put forward.
The first part is the introduction. First of all, it expounds the background and significance of this study, lists relevant important domestic and foreign research literature and makes a comprehensive review, expounds the main ideas and research methods of writing, and lists the basic writing framework of the paper.
The second part consists of two parts, one is to expound the basic concept of the CPA audit entrustment model, the other is to expound the theoretical basis of the CPA audit entrustment model. The theoretical basis of the model is mainly from three aspects: principal-agent theory, property rights economics theory and supply-demand theory, and analyzes the relationship between the model and CPA audit principal-agent model.
The third part mainly analyzes the problems existing in the auditing entrustment mode of the listed companies in China, and analyzes the causes. The main reasons for these problems are the defect of listed companies'governance and the shift of entrustment right; the lack of buyer's market characteristics of audit and the independence of accounting firms; the related laws of CPA audit. The legislation is not perfect.
The fourth part mainly discusses three representative auditing entrustment modes of listed companies put forward by the theoretical and practical circles, namely, the SFC mode, the financial statement insurance mode and the audit committee mode. On the basis of the above analysis, the shortcomings of the SFC model are as follows: we can not confirm that the SFC is the demander of true accounting information; in addition, because the SFC has a large power, if the authorized supervision power of the CPA audit of listed companies is entrusted to the SFC, it will inevitably lead to the expansion of the SFC's power. The drawbacks of the statement insurance model lie in: firstly, the theory is based on the semi-strong form of the stock exchange market, but the stock market in China is far from semi-strong form of efficiency, so the financial statement insurance model in China can not play a significant advantage in essence; secondly, in practice, the financial statement insurance model is lacking. Finally, China's insurance industry may not have the ability or the courage to assume the important responsibility of the CPA audit agent of listed companies. As the matter itself is not the demander of true accounting information, the independent directors in the audit committee do not have strong enthusiasm and initiative in performing their functions; secondly, scholars suspect that the independent directors may be driven by the interests of the internal executive directors of listed companies, making the collusion between independent directors and internal directors possible. On the basis of analyzing and comparing the three models of CPA audit entrustment, this paper argues that the best choice is the audit committee model.
The fifth part is to discuss the mode of CPA audit entrustment in listed companies of our country and the mode of audit committee.This part aims at the problems and causes of the mode of CPA audit entrustment in listed companies of our country, and refers to some practices stipulated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the United States, and proposes to construct our country to audit. By improving the independence of the audit committee and perfecting relevant laws and regulations, the CPA audit entrustment model of Listed Companies in China has been perfected.
【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：F233;F239.4
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