基于随机审计的供需双方博弈模型
发布时间：2018-08-26 14:15
【摘要】：在供应链中，各成员企业因为职责和利益各不相同，每个企业都以自身利益最大化为目标制定策略，容易导致供应链系统效率低下，并造成巨大的浪费。因此，需要一种系统的协调机制将供应链企业集成起来。 信息不对称是供应链协调中普遍存在的问题，为了降低信息不对称给供应链运作带来的负面影响，现代企业倾向于建立“战略联盟”来达到使联盟中的企业共享信息的目的。而处于战略联盟中的企业在相互间的合同中经常会包含“收益共享”的条款。收益共享的一个必备条件是，在买家有审计权利的条件下双方进行开放式的定价谈判，，因为要是没有完整、可信的成本信息，双方基本不可能就分配比例达成一致。为了使买家能够有效地行使其检查的权利，审计是行之有效地方法。供应商审计可以作为一个企业内部控制的一部分，保证供应商提供的产品在成本和质量方面都达到要求。 本文在委托 代理理论和信号博弈理论的基础上，建立并分析了基于审计的供需双方纯策略以及混合策略的博弈模型。首先建立了基于审计的供需双方信号博弈模型，得出了在审计惩罚大到一定程度时，将达到最高效率的均衡状态；其次建立了包含利润分配和随机审计的供需双方混合策略博弈模型，证明了在均衡情况下审计惩罚的增加或审计成本的降低都可以提高供应商选择诚实的可能性；最后通过与完全信息下的均衡的比较，进一步阐述了前述审计惩罚和审计成本的变动可以使买方得益接近于完全信息下的情形。
[Abstract]:In the supply chain, each member enterprise has different responsibilities and interests, each enterprise makes the strategy with the goal of maximizing its own interests, which easily leads to the inefficiency of the supply chain system and causes a huge waste. Therefore, a systematic coordination mechanism is needed to integrate supply chain enterprises. Information asymmetry is a common problem in supply chain coordination. In order to reduce the negative impact of information asymmetry on supply chain operation, modern enterprises tend to establish "strategic alliance" to achieve the purpose of sharing information among enterprises in the alliance. Companies in strategic alliances often include "profit sharing" clauses in their contracts with each other. An essential condition for revenue-sharing is open pricing negotiations between the two parties under conditions where the buyer has the right to audit, because without complete and credible cost information, it is virtually impossible for both sides to agree on the distribution ratio. In order to enable buyers to effectively exercise their inspection rights, auditing is an effective method. Supplier audit can be used as part of the internal control of an enterprise to ensure the cost and quality of the products provided by the supplier. Based on the principal-agent theory and signal game theory, this paper establishes and analyzes the game model of pure strategy and mixed strategy between supply and demand parties based on audit. Firstly, the signal game model of supply and demand based on audit is established, and the equilibrium state of maximum efficiency is obtained when the audit penalty is high to a certain extent. Secondly, the mixed strategy game model of supplier and supplier is established, which includes profit distribution and random audit, which proves that the increase of audit penalty or the decrease of audit cost can improve the possibility of supplier choosing honesty under equilibrium condition. Finally, by comparing with the equilibrium under complete information, the author further explains that the above audit penalty and the change of audit cost can make the buyer benefit from the situation of complete information.
【学位授予单位】：上海交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：F239.2;F224.32
本文编号：2205121
[Abstract]:In the supply chain, each member enterprise has different responsibilities and interests, each enterprise makes the strategy with the goal of maximizing its own interests, which easily leads to the inefficiency of the supply chain system and causes a huge waste. Therefore, a systematic coordination mechanism is needed to integrate supply chain enterprises. Information asymmetry is a common problem in supply chain coordination. In order to reduce the negative impact of information asymmetry on supply chain operation, modern enterprises tend to establish "strategic alliance" to achieve the purpose of sharing information among enterprises in the alliance. Companies in strategic alliances often include "profit sharing" clauses in their contracts with each other. An essential condition for revenue-sharing is open pricing negotiations between the two parties under conditions where the buyer has the right to audit, because without complete and credible cost information, it is virtually impossible for both sides to agree on the distribution ratio. In order to enable buyers to effectively exercise their inspection rights, auditing is an effective method. Supplier audit can be used as part of the internal control of an enterprise to ensure the cost and quality of the products provided by the supplier. Based on the principal-agent theory and signal game theory, this paper establishes and analyzes the game model of pure strategy and mixed strategy between supply and demand parties based on audit. Firstly, the signal game model of supply and demand based on audit is established, and the equilibrium state of maximum efficiency is obtained when the audit penalty is high to a certain extent. Secondly, the mixed strategy game model of supplier and supplier is established, which includes profit distribution and random audit, which proves that the increase of audit penalty or the decrease of audit cost can improve the possibility of supplier choosing honesty under equilibrium condition. Finally, by comparing with the equilibrium under complete information, the author further explains that the above audit penalty and the change of audit cost can make the buyer benefit from the situation of complete information.
【学位授予单位】：上海交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：F239.2;F224.32
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前2条
1 赵晗萍;冯允成;姚李刚;;供应链博弈问题综述[J];北京航空航天大学学报(社会科学版);2005年04期
2 王迎军;顾客需求驱动的供应链契约问题综述[J];管理科学学报;2005年02期
相关博士学位论文 前1条
1 李善良;供应链委托代理问题分析[D];复旦大学;2005年
本文编号：2205121
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/guanlilunwen/shenjigli/2205121.html
