中国注册会计师审计业务的博弈分析
发布时间：2018-10-22 07:13
【摘要】： 在现代企业制度下,企业所有者与其他利益相关者对企业的监控更多采取的是间接监控的手段,会计信息也越发成为这些信息的使用者对企业经营者的受托经营责任的履行情况进行监督和评价,进而作出相关决策的重要证据,这显然离不开注册会计师所提供的鉴证服务——受托对企业会计信息的合法性、公允性和一贯性进行鉴证,合理保证会计报表使用人确认已审会计报表的可靠程度。 本文运用博弈论的方法,从经济学的角度对注册会计师审计质量与管理当局和监管方的行为进行分析,指出我国的会计信息披露过程中博弈各方的行为战略选择的原因、存在的问题,并因此得到启示:提高会计信息的质量需要提高注册会计师的审计效率、降低审计成本;加大对注册会计师的惩罚力度;减少管理当局对注册会计师的影响程度;增强监管当局的监管能力。
[Abstract]:Under the modern enterprise system, business owners and other stakeholders are more likely to take indirect monitoring of the enterprise. Accounting information has increasingly become an important evidence for users of these information to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the fiduciary business responsibilities of business operators, and then make relevant decisions. This is obviously inseparable from the certification service provided by the CPA, which is entrusted with authenticating the legality, fairness and consistency of the accounting information of the enterprise, so as to ensure reasonably the reliability of the accounting statements to be confirmed by the users of the accounting statements. By using the method of game theory, this paper analyzes the audit quality of CPA and the behavior of management authorities and regulators from the angle of economics, and points out the reasons for the behavior strategy choice of the game parties in the process of accounting information disclosure in China. In order to improve the quality of accounting information, it is necessary to improve the audit efficiency of CPA, reduce the audit cost, increase the punishment of CPAs, reduce the influence of management on CPAs. Strengthening the regulatory capacity of regulatory authorities.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2006
【分类号】：F239.43
本文编号：2286468
[Abstract]:Under the modern enterprise system, business owners and other stakeholders are more likely to take indirect monitoring of the enterprise. Accounting information has increasingly become an important evidence for users of these information to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the fiduciary business responsibilities of business operators, and then make relevant decisions. This is obviously inseparable from the certification service provided by the CPA, which is entrusted with authenticating the legality, fairness and consistency of the accounting information of the enterprise, so as to ensure reasonably the reliability of the accounting statements to be confirmed by the users of the accounting statements. By using the method of game theory, this paper analyzes the audit quality of CPA and the behavior of management authorities and regulators from the angle of economics, and points out the reasons for the behavior strategy choice of the game parties in the process of accounting information disclosure in China. In order to improve the quality of accounting information, it is necessary to improve the audit efficiency of CPA, reduce the audit cost, increase the punishment of CPAs, reduce the influence of management on CPAs. Strengthening the regulatory capacity of regulatory authorities.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2006
【分类号】：F239.43
【引证文献】
相关期刊论文 前1条
1 唐文杰;谢新凤;;财务重述与审计风险的博弈模型分析[J];会计之友;2012年19期
相关硕士学位论文 前2条
1 谢新凤;上市公司财务重述与审计风险关系研究[D];贵州财经学院;2011年
2 苏哲;注册会计师审计失败探究[D];河北大学;2008年
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