上市公司治理结构对审计行为影响的实证研究
发布时间：2018-12-24 12:44
【摘要】：良好的公司治理结构往往是具有高价值企业的核心特征之一，但是高价值的企业并不一定拥有较好的公司治理结构。这是因为现代企业的特征之一就是所有权和经营权分离，由此产生的代理成本问题使得公司治理成为阻碍公司价值提升的因素之一。为了有效降低由于信息不对称和虚假信息而产生的管理和企业绩效问题，审计机制被引入到企业运营和管理框架中。审计机制作为降低上市公司管理层与股东层之间的信息不对称，平滑代理成本的有效制度设计，其在本质上是管理层与股东层原有代理关系在外的另一层代理关系。显然独立且具有高度客观性的审计结果往往向市场和投资者提供更加准确的信息，然而也正是有审计本身是另一层面的代理关系，那么上市公司股权结构以及管理层结构等相关公司治理结构将决定上市公司的审计选择，进而影响上市公司的审计质量，并最终影响上市公司的价值。 本文立足于中国上市公司审计行为的特征，尝试挖掘上市公司治理结构对审计选择的影响关系，以此确定上市公司治理结构在影响外部监督代理关系的基本机制。本文将提供中国上市公司内部治理结构对相关审计行为的具体影响，如对审计机构数目的选择、境内境外审计机构的选择、审计意见的选择以及审计资费的选择等，，进而判断上市公司治理结构影响审计效率的方式。通过研究，本文所得结论将有助于分析何种公司治理结构更能维持稳健的审计环境，进而为投资者评价和判定上市公司审计行为奠定基础。 在充分考虑中国审计市场开放和数据完整性的前提下，本文选取了2010年沪深所有上市公司的审计记录，并以此为样本运用一般线性回归方法和二元选择模型对上市公司治理结构影响审计行为的机制进行了全面的剖析。实证过程中本文从管理层结构和股权结构两个层面对上市公司治理结构影响审计行为的机制进行计量检验和分析，并按照指标所反映出的基本特征进行分类回归，以识别和确定上市公司结果影响审计行为的具体机制。 本文结论表明上市公司治理结构真实影响审计行为选择，其中管理层能够更为直接的影响审计机构的相关活动，进而影响审计质量和审计市场的效率。当然实证结果还表明我国审计市场的独立性正逐步加强，同时随着资本市场的逐步完善，资本市场改善上市公司治理环境的能力也不断提高，有理由相信审计市场所反映的资本信息会不断增多，其可信赖性也会不断提高。
[Abstract]:Good corporate governance structure is often one of the core characteristics of high-value enterprises, but high-value enterprises do not necessarily have better corporate governance structure. This is because one of the characteristics of modern enterprises is the separation of ownership and management right, which makes corporate governance one of the factors hindering the promotion of corporate value. In order to effectively reduce the management and enterprise performance problems caused by asymmetric and false information, the audit mechanism is introduced into the enterprise operation and management framework. As an effective system to reduce information asymmetry and smooth agency cost between management and shareholders in listed companies, audit mechanism is in essence another level of agency relationship between management and shareholders. Obviously independent and highly objective audit results often provide more accurate information to the market and investors. However, it is the audit itself that is another level of agency relationship. Then the ownership structure and management structure of listed companies will determine the audit choice of listed companies, and then affect the audit quality of listed companies, and ultimately affect the value of listed companies. Based on the characteristics of the audit behavior of listed companies in China, this paper tries to explore the relationship between the governance structure of listed companies and the audit choice, so as to determine the basic mechanism of the governance structure of listed companies affecting the external supervision and agency relationship. This paper will provide the specific impact of the internal governance structure of Chinese listed companies on the relevant audit behavior, such as the selection of the number of audit institutions, the selection of domestic and foreign audit institutions, the selection of audit opinions and the selection of audit fees, etc. Then judge the way that the listed company's governance structure affects the audit efficiency. Through the research, the conclusion of this paper will be helpful to analyze which corporate governance structure can maintain a stable audit environment, and then lay the foundation for investors to evaluate and judge the audit behavior of listed companies. On the premise of fully considering the opening of China's audit market and the integrity of data, this paper selects the audit records of all listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2010. Based on this model, the author makes a comprehensive analysis of the mechanism of the influence of corporate governance structure on audit behavior by using the general linear regression method and the binary selection model. In the process of demonstration, this paper makes econometric examination and analysis on the mechanism of governance structure influencing audit behavior from two aspects of management structure and equity structure, and classifies and regresses according to the basic characteristics reflected by the indicators. In order to identify and determine the results of listed companies affect the audit behavior of the specific mechanism. The conclusion of this paper shows that the governance structure of listed companies has a real impact on the choice of audit behavior, in which the management can directly affect the activities of the audit institutions, and then affect the audit quality and the efficiency of the audit market. Of course, the empirical results also show that the independence of the audit market in China is gradually strengthened, and with the gradual improvement of the capital market, the ability of the capital market to improve the governance environment of listed companies is also continuously improved. There is reason to believe that the capital information reflected in the audit market will continue to increase and its reliability will continue to increase.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F239.4;F276.6;F224
本文编号：2390642
[Abstract]:Good corporate governance structure is often one of the core characteristics of high-value enterprises, but high-value enterprises do not necessarily have better corporate governance structure. This is because one of the characteristics of modern enterprises is the separation of ownership and management right, which makes corporate governance one of the factors hindering the promotion of corporate value. In order to effectively reduce the management and enterprise performance problems caused by asymmetric and false information, the audit mechanism is introduced into the enterprise operation and management framework. As an effective system to reduce information asymmetry and smooth agency cost between management and shareholders in listed companies, audit mechanism is in essence another level of agency relationship between management and shareholders. Obviously independent and highly objective audit results often provide more accurate information to the market and investors. However, it is the audit itself that is another level of agency relationship. Then the ownership structure and management structure of listed companies will determine the audit choice of listed companies, and then affect the audit quality of listed companies, and ultimately affect the value of listed companies. Based on the characteristics of the audit behavior of listed companies in China, this paper tries to explore the relationship between the governance structure of listed companies and the audit choice, so as to determine the basic mechanism of the governance structure of listed companies affecting the external supervision and agency relationship. This paper will provide the specific impact of the internal governance structure of Chinese listed companies on the relevant audit behavior, such as the selection of the number of audit institutions, the selection of domestic and foreign audit institutions, the selection of audit opinions and the selection of audit fees, etc. Then judge the way that the listed company's governance structure affects the audit efficiency. Through the research, the conclusion of this paper will be helpful to analyze which corporate governance structure can maintain a stable audit environment, and then lay the foundation for investors to evaluate and judge the audit behavior of listed companies. On the premise of fully considering the opening of China's audit market and the integrity of data, this paper selects the audit records of all listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2010. Based on this model, the author makes a comprehensive analysis of the mechanism of the influence of corporate governance structure on audit behavior by using the general linear regression method and the binary selection model. In the process of demonstration, this paper makes econometric examination and analysis on the mechanism of governance structure influencing audit behavior from two aspects of management structure and equity structure, and classifies and regresses according to the basic characteristics reflected by the indicators. In order to identify and determine the results of listed companies affect the audit behavior of the specific mechanism. The conclusion of this paper shows that the governance structure of listed companies has a real impact on the choice of audit behavior, in which the management can directly affect the activities of the audit institutions, and then affect the audit quality and the efficiency of the audit market. Of course, the empirical results also show that the independence of the audit market in China is gradually strengthened, and with the gradual improvement of the capital market, the ability of the capital market to improve the governance environment of listed companies is also continuously improved. There is reason to believe that the capital information reflected in the audit market will continue to increase and its reliability will continue to increase.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F239.4;F276.6;F224
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