防范审计合谋与奖惩审计师选择研究
发布时间：2019-05-12 02:51
【摘要】：审计合谋严重影响了审计的独立性,具有严重的经济后果。审计合谋在对资本市场产生深重危害的同时,也对整个审计行业的生存和发展提出了严峻挑战。因此,对防范审计合谋进行研究十分必要。 本文以经济人假说、信息不对称理论为基础,根据逆向选择原理建立委托—代理模型,对审计合谋现象进行逻辑推理和数理论证,分析奖、惩审计师以防范审计合谋的有效性,并把研究的结论应用于我国审计行业的具体监管。 在委托——代理关系中,为防止代理人偷懒,委托人聘请审计师对代理人的工作进行监督和审查。由于代理人的偷懒行为具有随机性,因此委托人理想的策略是实施随机审计。为了自己的偷懒行为不被审计师报告给委托人,代理人采取贿赂审计师的办法以达成合谋。针对代理人的策略,委托人对审计师进行奖励以诱使其不参与合谋。然而,委托人奖励审计师的策略,会被有信息优势的代理人加以利用,代理人高额贿赂审计师,委托人给予审计师的奖金将随代理人的贿赂数值的增加而同益看涨,博弈均衡的结果是代理人的偷懒概率与委托人支付的奖金不断增加,使得奖励审计师不能有效防范审计合谋。为此,委托人转而寻求惩罚措施,聘请监管者对审计师进行审查。由于代理人和审计师之间的合谋是随机的,委托人的最优策略是实施随机监管。面对合谋事发将遭受高额罚款,审计师参与合谋的可能性大大降低,因此,和奖励措施相比,惩罚能有效地防范审计合谋。我国在对审计行业实施监管政策时,必须注意把惩罚的额度、监管的力度和监管的投入结合起来考虑。
[Abstract]:Audit collusion seriously affects the independence of audit and has serious economic consequences. Audit collusion not only does great harm to the capital market, but also poses a severe challenge to the survival and development of the whole audit industry. Therefore, it is necessary to study the prevention of audit collusion. Based on the hypothesis of economic man and the theory of information asymmetry, this paper establishes the principal-agent model according to the principle of adverse selection, makes logical reasoning and mathematical demonstration on the phenomenon of audit collusion, analyzes the award, and punishes auditors in order to prevent the effectiveness of audit collusion. And the conclusions of the study are applied to the specific supervision of the audit industry in China. In the principal-agent relationship, in order to prevent the agent from being lazy, the principal employs an auditor to supervise and examine the work of the agent. Because the lazy behavior of the agent is random, the ideal strategy of the principal is to carry out random audit. In order not to be reported to the principal by the auditor, the agent bribed the auditor to achieve collusion. In view of the agent's strategy, the principal rewards the auditor to induce him not to participate in collusion. However, the principal's strategy of reward auditors will be taken advantage of by agents who have the advantage of information. Agents bribe auditors in large quantities. The bonus given to auditors by the principal will be bullish with the increase of the bribe value of the agent. The result of game equilibrium is that the probability of laziness of the agent and the bonus paid by the principal are increasing, which makes the reward auditor unable to prevent the audit collusion effectively. To this end, clients instead seek penalties and hire regulators to review auditors. Because the collusion between agent and auditor is random, the optimal strategy of principal is to implement random supervision. In the face of high fines for collusion, auditors are greatly less likely to participate in collusion. Therefore, compared with incentives, punishment can effectively prevent audit collusion. When carrying out the supervision policy to the audit industry in our country, we must pay attention to the amount of punishment, the intensity of supervision and the investment of supervision.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2005
【分类号】：F239.4
[Abstract]:Audit collusion seriously affects the independence of audit and has serious economic consequences. Audit collusion not only does great harm to the capital market, but also poses a severe challenge to the survival and development of the whole audit industry. Therefore, it is necessary to study the prevention of audit collusion. Based on the hypothesis of economic man and the theory of information asymmetry, this paper establishes the principal-agent model according to the principle of adverse selection, makes logical reasoning and mathematical demonstration on the phenomenon of audit collusion, analyzes the award, and punishes auditors in order to prevent the effectiveness of audit collusion. And the conclusions of the study are applied to the specific supervision of the audit industry in China. In the principal-agent relationship, in order to prevent the agent from being lazy, the principal employs an auditor to supervise and examine the work of the agent. Because the lazy behavior of the agent is random, the ideal strategy of the principal is to carry out random audit. In order not to be reported to the principal by the auditor, the agent bribed the auditor to achieve collusion. In view of the agent's strategy, the principal rewards the auditor to induce him not to participate in collusion. However, the principal's strategy of reward auditors will be taken advantage of by agents who have the advantage of information. Agents bribe auditors in large quantities. The bonus given to auditors by the principal will be bullish with the increase of the bribe value of the agent. The result of game equilibrium is that the probability of laziness of the agent and the bonus paid by the principal are increasing, which makes the reward auditor unable to prevent the audit collusion effectively. To this end, clients instead seek penalties and hire regulators to review auditors. Because the collusion between agent and auditor is random, the optimal strategy of principal is to implement random supervision. In the face of high fines for collusion, auditors are greatly less likely to participate in collusion. Therefore, compared with incentives, punishment can effectively prevent audit collusion. When carrying out the supervision policy to the audit industry in our country, we must pay attention to the amount of punishment, the intensity of supervision and the investment of supervision.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2005
【分类号】：F239.4
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