电信业务定价模型研究

发布时间：2018-02-20 01:33

本文关键词： 电信业务垄断定价竞争定价网络容量转移成本　出处：《电子科技大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：电信服务日渐成为人们日常生活必不可少的通信手段，电信业是我国实现国民经济增长、承接产业结构转移的重要战略性产业。随着电信业的不断深化改革，越来越多的竞争机制引入电信市场，政府逐渐放松管制力度，电信企业拥有越来越大的定价决策权力。与此同时随着电信业规模的不断增长，消费者的差异化个性化需求逐渐增加。在此背景下，一方面原有的价格管制方法不能很好的适用于当今电信市场，，需要更多的考虑企业决策的视角；另一方面，现有的电信定价决策理论方法并不完善，没有综合考虑市场结构、成本、需求等因素对电信定价决策的影响。因此，本文从微观企业决策的视角出发，构建电信业务定价决策体系，综合考虑系列因素进行定价决策模型研究。本文首先研究电信垄断业务的定价模型。核心思想是：电信网络容量日渐不足的现实已深刻影响到运营商的最优定价与利润。在无网络容量约束下，构建垄断运营商基于二部制定价的利润函数模型，求解其最优定价与利润；在有网络容量约束，不考虑短期扩容的情况下，构建垄断运营商约束下的利润函数模型，求解其最优定价与利润，探讨网络容量约束对运营商定价与利润的影响；在有网络容量约束，考虑短期扩容的情况下，构建垄断运营商约束下的利润函数模型，探讨短期扩容对运营商定价与利润的影响。研究表明：有网络容量约束的情况会导致运营商的定价升高，利润降低；考虑是否进行短期扩容取决于收益弹性与成本弹性的对比，可以一定程度弥补运营商利润损失。在此基础上，本文研究电信竞争业务的定价模型。核心思想是：消费者的选择过程即为运营商的定价过程，消费者的行为影响着运营商的定价决策。研究将消费者选择过程分为两个阶段，首先在用户新入网阶段，构建双寡头垄断运营商竞争业务的利润函数模型，求解其均衡定价；进而在用户重新选择网络阶段，基于用户转移成本的约束，构建运营商约束下的利润函数模型，讨论用户的行为对运营商竞争业务定价的影响。研究表明：用户新入网阶段双寡头运营商的均衡定价存在且唯一；用户重新选择网络阶段，运营商是否重新定价取决于用户转移成本，且用户人均消费量对运营商的重新定价有直接的影响。
[Abstract]:Telecommunication service is becoming an indispensable means of communication in people's daily life. Telecommunications industry is an important strategic industry to realize the growth of national economy and to undertake the transfer of industrial structure. More and more competition mechanisms are introduced into the telecommunications market, the government gradually deregulates, and telecom enterprises have more and more power to make pricing decisions. At the same time, as the scale of the telecommunications industry continues to grow, Under this background, on the one hand, the original price control method can not be applied to the telecom market well, so it needs more perspective to consider the enterprise decision; on the other hand, The existing theories and methods of telecom pricing decision are not perfect, and the influence of market structure, cost, demand and other factors on telecom pricing decision is not considered synthetically. The pricing decision system of telecom service is constructed, and the pricing decision model is studied by considering a series of factors. This paper first studies the pricing model of telecom monopoly business. The core idea is that the reality of the increasing shortage of telecom network capacity has deeply affected the optimal pricing and profit of operators. The profit function model of monopoly operators based on two-part pricing is constructed to solve the optimal pricing and profit, and the profit function model is constructed under the constraints of network capacity without considering the short-term expansion. The optimal pricing and profit are solved, the influence of network capacity constraints on operators' pricing and profit is discussed, and the profit function model of monopoly operators is constructed under the condition of network capacity constraints and short term capacity expansion. This paper discusses the effect of short-term capacity expansion on operators' pricing and profit. The results show that the network capacity constraint will lead to higher pricing and lower profit, and the consideration of short-term capacity expansion depends on the comparison between revenue elasticity and cost elasticity. Can make up the loss of profit of operator to a certain extent. On this basis, this paper studies the pricing model of telecom competitive services. The core idea is that the process of consumer selection is the pricing process of operators. The behavior of consumers affects the pricing decision of operators. The study divides the process of consumer selection into two stages. Firstly, in the stage of new users entering the network, the profit function model of duopoly monopoly operators' competitive business is constructed, and the equilibrium pricing is solved. Then, in the stage of re-selecting the network, the profit function model under the constraints of operator constraints is constructed based on the constraints of user transfer costs. This paper discusses the influence of users' behavior on the pricing of competitive services of operators. The research shows that the equilibrium pricing of duopoly operators exists and is unique in the new network entry phase, and the users re-select the network stage. Whether the operator repricing or not depends on the user transfer cost, and the per user consumption has a direct impact on the operator repricing.
【学位授予单位】：电子科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F626

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