电信业混合营销渠道冲突协调研究

发布时间：2018-03-05 09:44

本文选题：电信业　切入点：渠道冲突　出处：《北京邮电大学》2012年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着我国经济的快速增长,我国电信产业不断发展,电信市场的竞争越发激烈,从网络覆盖规模、业务种类及运营模式、用户规模、品牌竞争逐渐到现在的渠道资源竞争,渠道已成为了电信业发展中的一个不可或缺的重要资源与竞争手段。随着Internet的迅猛发展,电信网、广电网和互联网的进一步融合,电子商务应用日益普遍,为用户提供电子化服务已成为不可逆转的潮流,在这种背景下,国内外大部分主流电信运营商都在现有渠道系统的基础上引入了电子直销渠道,构建混合营销渠道系统。这种混合营销渠道结构是电信业渠道系统的重大变革,是极具应用前景的渠道模式。然而这种渠道模式的实施在给电信业带来机遇的同时也面临诸多挑战,由于社会渠道的存在,电子直销渠道的引入必定造成竞争和冲突,这种混合渠道环境下的渠道冲突问题显得越发突出,给运营商带来跨渠道的冲突与运营方面的难题,成为关注的焦点。在这种情况下,电信运营商面临的不仅是是否开通电子直销渠道的问题,为了解决混合营销渠道冲突的矛盾,电信运营商不得不探索混合营销渠道新的运作模式与冲突协调机制,达成营销渠道上下游协调和不同渠道利益之间的平衡,这已经成为电信运营商无法回避的重要课题。混合渠道表面看是一个浅显的现象,但如何用科学的理论对其进行解释和分析乃是一大挑战。本论文主要以数理模型为主,定性分析为辅,以博弈论、委托代理理论、双边激励理论等为基础,从研究传统社会渠道与运营商电子直销渠道之间的冲突入手,全面、客观地认识电信业混合营销渠道冲突与协调的过程及其影响因素,采用多种分析手段寻求有效解决渠道冲突的方法,探讨可能的协调机制,为电信运营商进行混合营销渠道的实际管理和学界进行混合营销渠道冲突协调的研究提供可资借鉴的视野和方法。全文的研究将分为七章展开：在第一章的绪论中,介绍了本文的研究背景,引出研究的问题；明确了本文的研究对象和研究方法；提出了论文的基本结构与技术路线；并阐述本文的创新之处。在第二章的理论综述中,对营销渠道及渠道冲突的相关理论进行总结,梳理国内电信运营商的营销渠道现状,对国内电信业渠道结构体系进行系统回顾,阐述其发展历程,并从中寻求有益的制度设计及发展路线。论文的第三章,运用非合作博弈理论,基于消费者渠道偏好、两渠道的横向价格竞争等要素,建立博弈模型分析运营商电子直销渠道与社会渠道之间的同层竞争和电信运营商与社会渠道商之间上下游的竞争,通过比较由于渠道系统结构变化而导致的渠道双方均衡利润变化情况,研究混合营销渠道下电子直销渠道和传统社会渠道的相互作用关系以及渠道系统的发展演变趋势,混合营销渠道结构存在的必要条件以及渠道成员对于混合渠道组合运营模式的选择策略。论文的第四章,分析电信业混合营销渠道冲突产生的根源。将电信业混合营销渠道环境下的渠道冲突细分为垂直渠道冲突、水平渠道冲突和多渠道冲突,以某行为是否妨碍渠道成员实现其利润最大化为判断渠道冲突的标准,综合应用定性研究和定量研究相结合的方法,定性分析混合营销渠道中的水平冲突产生的根源；建立不完全信息动态博弈模型定量分析混合营销渠道中垂直冲突产生的根源；建立完全信息动态博弈模型定量分析混合营销渠道中交叉冲突产生的根源。研究表明,渠道商之间追求自身利益最大化的个体理性和集体理性之间的矛盾是导致电信业混合营销渠道中水平渠道冲突的根源；信息不对称是导致电信业混合营销渠道垂直渠道冲突的根源,而多层次的营销渠道结构中信息不对称问题将更为严重,爆发冲突的可能性更大；电子直销渠道和社会渠道之间的价格竞争以及消费者固有的渠道偏好是导致电信业混合营销渠道交叉渠道冲突的根源。论文的第五章,针对电信产品自身的特点,考虑了电信产品(服务)的二次消费特征,改进现有模型,构建了适用于电信业领域的混合营销渠道中运营商电子直销渠道和社会渠道之间竞争的Stackelberg动态博弈模型,以垂直一体化渠道结构作为基准,分析比较分散控制下和垂直一体化结构下的渠道系统的最优利润,设计了一种促使混合渠道达成协调状态的收益分享合同,通过转移电信二次消费的部分收益给渠道商,解决混合渠道的交叉渠道冲突和收入分成问题,并详细探讨了运营商和渠道商之间的合作利润分配,电信运营商可以通过灵活的定价机制安排诱使渠道商合作达成渠道协调,从而实现渠道整体利润的最大化,带来增量收益,保证电信运营商和渠道商的双赢。论文的第六章,构建运营商电子直销渠道和社会渠道之间竞争的Stackelberg动态博弈模型,将渠道商的销售努力成本系数作为私有信息,通过比较渠道存在信息共享情形和不存在信息共享情形下运营商和渠道商的均衡定价策略和均衡收益,分析渠道商信息共享对于整个混合渠道绩效以及渠道成员收益的影响,研究渠道商信息共享对于整个混合营销渠道的价值。围绕混合渠道的信息共享协调激励机制问题,运用委托代理理论,分别设计了用来激励渠道商提高信息共享努力水平的单边激励监督机制和同时激励运营商和渠道商提高信息共享努力水平的双边激励机制,得出了渠道双方最优的收益分享系数以及双方最优的努力水平,并讨论了保证机制有效的参数条件。第七章作为论文最后一章,对本论文的主要研究成果进行了归纳总结,并指出了本论文研究的主要创新点、不足以及未来的研究方向。本文的主要创新之处为： 1)本文建立了电信业混合渠道中运营商电子直销渠道与传统社会渠道的竞争博弈模型,分析了三种渠道系统和三种渠道权力结构下电信运营商与社会渠道商的定价、利润等因素的对比变化,明确了两个渠道的相互作用关系,渠道成员对于混合渠道组合运营模式的选择策略,得到了电信业混合渠道稳定存在的条件。 2)本文将电信产品的二次消费特征考虑在内,建立了电信业混合营销渠道协调的动态博弈模型,设计了一个促使混合渠道达成协调状态的收益分享合同,通过灵活的定价机制安排和合同参数设计,使整个渠道的收益最大化,同时保证电信运营商和渠道商的双赢,从而协调混合渠道的渠道冲突,并探讨了渠道双方的合作利润分配。 3)本文建立博弈模型分析了在电信业混合渠道中信息共享的价值,并分别设计了激励渠道商提高信息共享努力水平的单边激励机制和同时激励运营商和渠道商的双边激励机制,协调混合渠道中由于信息不对称导致的渠道冲突,解决单边和双边道德风险问题,还探讨了保证机制有效的参数条件。
[Abstract]:With the rapid growth of China's economy, China's telecom industry development, the increasingly fierce competition in the telecommunications market, from the size of the network coverage, business types and operation mode, the user scale, brand competition gradually to the competition of channel resources now, channel has become the telecommunications industry in the development of one of the most important resources and competition means. With the rapid development of Internet, the further integration of telecommunication network, TV network and Internet, e-commerce applications become increasingly common, to provide users with electronic service has become an irreversible trend, in this context, most domestic mainstream telecom operators have introduced electronic direct channel based on the existing channel system, construct a hybrid the marketing channel system. The hybrid marketing channel structure is a major change in the telecommunication channel system, is very promising. But this channel channel mode The implementation is also facing many challenges in bringing opportunities in the telecommunications industry at the same time, because of the existence of social channels, the introduction of electronic direct channel will cause the competition and conflict, the hybrid channel under the environment of channel conflict that appears increasingly prominent, bring conflict and operational aspects of the problem of cross channel to operators, become the focus of focus. In this case, telecom operators faced is not only whether the opening of electronic direct channel problems, in order to solve the contradiction of mixed marketing channel conflict, telecom operators have to explore new marketing channel mixed operation mode and conflict coordination mechanism, between marketing channels of different channels downstream coordination and balance of interests, which has has become an important topic of telecom operators can not be avoided.
The hybrid channel surface is a simple phenomenon, but how to use scientific theory to explain and analyze its is a big challenge. This thesis is mainly based on the mathematical model, qualitative analysis, game theory, principal-agent theory, incentive theory, starting from the overall, the conflict between the traditional research social channels and operators of electronic direct channel, objective understanding of factors of telecommunications mixed marketing channel conflict and coordination process and its effects, using a variety of analysis methods to find effective method to solve the channel conflict, to explore the possible mechanism of coordination, the actual management of mixed marketing channels for telecom operators and provide vision and methods for reference the research of mixed marketing channel conflict coordination.
The full text of the study will be divided into seven chapters.
In the introduction of the first chapter, we introduce the research background of this paper, draw the research questions, clarify the research objects and research methods, put forward the basic structure and technical line of the paper, and elaborate the innovation of this paper.
In the second chapter of the theoretical review and related theories of marketing channel and channel conflict are summarized, the current situation of marketing channels combing the domestic telecom operators, a systematic review of the domestic telecommunications industry distribution system, this paper introduces its development course, and to seek useful system design and development from the route.
In the third chapter, using non cooperative game theory, consumer channel preference based on two channel lateral price competition and other factors, the game model between electronic direct channel operators and social channels with the same level of competition and telecom operators and social channels on the lower reaches of the competition, by comparing due to changes in system structure and channel to change the equilibrium channel profit, development and evolution trend to study the interaction between mixed marketing channels under the electronic channel and traditional social channels and channel system, a necessary condition for the existence of mixed marketing channel structure and channel member selection strategy for hybrid channel combination operation mode.
In the fourth chapter, analysis of the causes of the telecommunications industry mixed marketing channel conflict. The telecommunications industry mixed marketing channels under the environment of channel conflict is divided into vertical channel conflict, channel conflict and channel conflict level, with certain behaviors hinder the channel members to achieve its maximum profit for the channel conflict judgment standard, method of comprehensive application qualitative research and quantitative research, qualitative analysis of root level conflict generated in mixed marketing channels; establish analysis causes vertical conflict of mixed marketing channels in the dynamic game model of incomplete information quantitative; establish a complete information dynamic game model for quantitative analysis of root cross conflict mixed marketing channels. The research shows that the pursuit of contradiction between individual and collective rationality of their own interests to maximize the channel between the telecommunications industry is the result of water mixed marketing channels The root level of channel conflict; information asymmetry is the root cause of the telecommunications industry mixed marketing channel of the vertical channel conflict, and the problem of information asymmetry in the multi-level marketing channel structure will be more serious, the possibility of the outbreak of the conflict between the larger; electronic direct marketing channels and social channels price competition and consumer channel preference is the root cause of telecommunications mixed industry marketing channel cross channel conflict.
In the fifth chapter, according to the characteristics of telecom products itself, considering the telecom product (service) of the two consumer characteristics, improve the existing model, constructed Stackelberg dynamic game model of the competition between mixed marketing channels for telecom operators in the field of electronic direct marketing channels and social channels, with the vertical integration channel structure as a reference the optimal profit analysis, decentralized channel system under control and vertical integration under the structure, a contract to share the channel to reach a state of harmony to promote mixed income design, through the transfer of part of the electric letter two consumer benefits to solve the cross channel, channel conflict and mixed income into the channel, and discusses the cooperation the distribution of profits between operators and distributors, telecom operators can arrange to channel cooperation of channel coordination through flexible pricing, Thus the maximization of the overall profit of the channel is realized, the incremental revenue is brought, and the win-win of the telecom operators and the channel merchants will be ensured.
In the sixth chapter, the construction of Stackelberg dynamic game model of the competition between the operators of electronic direct marketing channels and social channels, the sales effort cost coefficient channels as private information, by comparing the channel information sharing case and no equilibrium pricing strategies and equilibrium income business channels and information sharing case of channel analysis business information sharing for the mixed channel performance and channel members income influence research channels of information sharing for the entire mixed channel value. Around the mixed channel problem of information sharing and coordination mechanism, using the principal-agent theory, bilateral incentive mechanism are designed to encourage unilateral channels to improve information sharing level of incentive and supervision efforts at the same time, the incentive mechanism and the carriers and channels to improve information sharing level, the both sides of the channel The optimal income sharing coefficient and the optimal level of effort are also discussed, and the effective parameters of the guarantee mechanism are discussed.
The seventh chapter, as the last chapter of the thesis, summarizes the main research results of this paper, and points out the main innovations, shortcomings and future research directions.
The main innovations of this paper are as follows:
1) this paper establishes competition game model of telecom operators in the hybrid channel electronic direct channel and traditional social channels, analyzes the pricing of telecom operators and social channels to the three channel system and three kinds of channel power structure, to compare the changes of income and other factors, clearly the interaction between the two channels for the selection of channel members, channel combination strategy of mixed operation mode, obtain the existence of telecommunications mixed stable channel conditions.
2) this paper will consider the two consumer characteristics of telecom products, establish a dynamic game model of telecom industry mixed marketing channel coordination, design a hybrid channel to reach a state of harmony to promote revenue sharing contract, through flexible pricing system and contract design parameters, the maximum profit of the whole channel, at the same time guarantee both telecom operators and channels, channel conflict and coordination of hybrid channels, and discusses the cooperation profit distribution channels between the two sides.
3) this paper builds the game model analysis of information sharing in the telecommunications industry in hybrid channel value, and we design the incentive channels to improve information sharing efforts level unilateral incentive mechanism and the simultaneous excitation of carriers and channels of the bilateral incentive mechanism, coordination of hybrid channels due to channel conflict caused by information asymmetry, unilateral and bilateral settlement the moral hazard problem, also discusses how to ensure the effective mechanism of parameters.

【学位授予单位】：北京邮电大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F274;F626

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