中国数字内容产业的发展与平台生态自我规制研究

发布时间：2018-03-09 09:32

  本文选题：数字内容产业　切入点：平台　出处：《东南大学》2016年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：互联网的发展,特别是数字化技术的应用推动了数字内容产业的发展,是内容产业的一次革命。内容产业的数字化不仅仅是产品的转型升级,更是企业商业模式以及消费者理念的革新。数字化时代,内容产业的发展多以平台模式为主,企业通常采用样本品免费,增值品、衍生品收费以及征收广告费用等方式来盈利,内容为王时代来临。互联网时代媒介的多样化为内容产品的传播提供了便利,这也是内容逐渐成为核心竞争力的关键。论文首先以综述和全景性展示的方式描述了这一变化的发生及其意义。科技是一把双刃剑,互联网巨量的信息内容对传统的以政府为主体的单边规制模式提出了挑战,在内容产业发生革命性的变革时代,政府的独家规制显然已经不适应平台型发展模式的数字内容产业。以平台企业规制为核心的自我规制的有效性、自由性、激励性、低成本等特性较好地弥补了市场失灵以及政府失灵,自我规制的“软”性特征也符合国家治理的理念,是政府权力到市场的回归,并且自我规制有利于提高社会的福利水平,所以以平台企业为核心的自我规制体系应运而生并推广开来。在以平台企业为核心的自我规制体系重构方面,本文首先阐述了企业成长为平台型企业,进而演化出平台生态系统的机理及路径。企业成长为平台型企业主要依靠企业的核心产品或服务的不断创新,而平台型企业演化为平台生态系统的关键则是网络外部性。企业到平台型企业、再到平台生态系统的成长与演化历程,不仅仅是组织结构复杂程度的变化,更重要的是实现了从单赢到多赢、再到共赢的经营理念的转变,这也是平台经济时代的主流商业模式。在上述工作的基础上,论文讨论了平台生态系统下的平台企业自我规制体系,利用考虑了法律成本及不确定性等因素的博弈模型分别解释了政府规制主导体系和自我规制主导体系下的社会福利状况。研究发现,在政府规制主导的体系下,政府的规制政策对消费者越有利,政府的收益越大；法律的不确定性越大,社会福利水平越低。在自我规制主导的体系下,法律的不确定性较大时,政府的收益要高于政府规制；消费者对政府的影响程度越大,社会福利水平越高。在通常情况下,政府规制主导与自我规制主导哪一个更适合作为数字内容产业的规制体系将取决于规制方式和手段的调整成本。显然,自我规制主导体系所具有的灵活性等优点使其调整成本要低于政府规制体系。也就是说,对于数字内容产业的规制而言,采用自我规制主导的体系可能优于政府的单边规制模式。为了阐明自我规制主导体系的运作激励,论文进一步将政府、数字内容运营商、提供商以及消费者等4类利益主体纳入到自我规制为主的体系框架中,以探究利益主体的激励行为及均衡状态。研究结果显示,在数字内容运营商作为自我规制者的体系下,如果运营商曝光内容提供商不良行为的概率增加,则内容提供商需要输送更多的利益给内容运营商,从而导致内容提供商和运营商合谋的意愿降低。如果消费者的投诉成本减少,运营商和提供商合谋的概率也会相应降低。在串谋均衡状态下,作为自我规制者的内容运营商的监督水平将高于曝光均衡；但是,如果运营商的边际监督激励处于低水平状态,那么内容提供商高水平欺诈行为的发生不仅仅取决于运营商的低监督水平,还取决于内容提供商的行贿成本。最后,论文利用类Hotelling模型分析了完全垄断及寡头垄断两种市场结构下,消费者偏好、内容运营商竞争以及内容运营商是否承担社会规制责任对于运营商数字内容产品价格的影响。研究结果显示,内容运营商之问的竞争可以降低数字内容产品的价格并有利于提高运营商的专业化程度；消费者偏好的多样性对于运营商的运营策略有重要影响,运营商的内容产品相对于消费者偏好的偏离程度受消费者偏好的区间跨度控制；数字内容运营商作为自我规制者承担社会规制责任时,运营商的内容产品相对于消费者偏好的偏离大于不承担社会规制责任时的偏离,同时数字内容产品的价格也要高于无自我规制责任时的价格。
[Abstract]:The development of the Internet, especially the application of digital technology to promote the development of the digital content industry, is a revolution in the content industry. Digital content industry is not only the transformation and upgrading of products, is the enterprise business model and consumer. The innovation of the concept of the digital era, the development of content industry in platform mode, enterprises generally adopt the sample is free, value-added products, derivatives fees and advertising costs levied way to profit, the content is king era. The diverse Internet era media facilitate the dissemination of the contents of the product, which is content has gradually become the core competitiveness of the key. Firstly, to review and panoramic display mode describes the occurrence and significance of this a change. Science and technology is a double-edged sword, the Internet information content of the traditional government unilateral regulation mode as the main body. A challenge, a revolutionary change in the content industry era, exclusive government regulation is obviously not adapt to the platform development model of the digital content industry. The effectiveness, to the platform of enterprise regulation as the core of the self regulation of freedom, incentive, low cost and other characteristics is to make up for market failure and government failure. The self regulation of "soft" characteristics are in line with national governance concept, is the return of government power to the market, and self regulation is conducive to improve the level of social welfare, self regulation system so as to enterprises as the core of the platform came into being and spread. In the reconstruction of self regulation system on the platform of enterprise as the core, this paper first elaborated the enterprise growth platform for the enterprise, and the evolution mechanism of ecological system and platform of enterprise growth path. As a platform for enterprises mainly rely on the enterprise's core products Continuous innovation and service platform, and enterprise evolution as a key platform of ecological system is the network externality. The enterprise to the enterprise platform, and then to the growth and evolution of the platform ecosystem, is not only the change of organizational structure complexity, more important is to achieve a single win from to win, to change win-win business philosophy, which is the mainstream business model platform economy era. Based on the above work, this paper discussed the platform ecosystem under the platform of enterprise self regulation system, with the consideration of the game model of legal costs and uncertain factors are explained in social welfare system of government regulation and self regulation of dominant dominant under the system of government regulation. The study found that in the leading system, government regulation policies more favorable to consumers, government income is bigger; the greater the legal uncertainty, The level of social welfare is lower. In the leading self regulation system, legal uncertainty is large, government revenue is higher than that of government regulation; consumers more influence on the degree of government, the level of social welfare is higher. Under normal circumstances, government regulation and self regulation of dominant dominant which one is more suitable for digital content industry regulation system will adjust the cost depends on the regulation of ways and means. Obviously, the advantages of flexibility of self regulation leading system to adjust its cost is lower than the government regulation system. That is to say, for the regulation of the digital content industry, the self regulation of the dominant system may be superior to the government in order to unilateral regulation mode. Operation of self regulation system of the dominant incentive to clarify, the government will further, digital content providers and operators, consumers and other 4 categories of stakeholders into the self The regulation framework, to encourage the behavior of stakeholders and the equilibrium state. The results of the study show that in the digital content operators as a self regulation system, if the operator exposure increases the probability of bad behavior, content providers, content providers need to deliver more benefits to content operators, which leads to the content providers and operators collusion will reduce consumer complaints. If the cost is reduced, the probability of collusion of operators and providers will be reduced accordingly. In collusion equilibrium, the level of supervision content operators as self regulation within the exposure will be higher than the equilibrium; however, if the marginal supervision Operators Incentive in the low level then, the content provider of high level fraud not only depends on the operator's low level of supervision, the cost of bribery also depends on the content provider. Finally, the paper use Hotelling model to analyze the monopoly and oligopoly under two different market structures, consumer preferences, content operators competition and content operators should bear the social responsibility regulation for operators of digital content product price. The results showed that the contents of the operation business competition can reduce the digital content products the price and increase the degree of specialization of operators; diversity of consumer preference has great influence on the operation strategy of operators, operators of content products relative to the interval span control deviation degree of consumer preference by consumer preferences; digital content operators as a self regulation to undertake the social responsibility regulation, operator content the product is offset with respect to consumer preferences than do not bear the social responsibility from regulation, at the same time, the digital content products price The grid is also higher than the price of no self regulated liability.

【学位授予单位】：东南大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F49
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本文编号：1587957