基于演化博弈论的微信运营商与银行协同营销研究
发布时间:2018-04-19 08:32
本文选题:演化博弈论 + 微信运营商 ; 参考:《兰州理工大学》2017年硕士论文
【摘要】:随着互联网技术应用和社交化平台被广为接受,具有社交性质的微信平台在国内高速发展,尤其是微信支付功能在极大方便了用户线上线下结算服务的同时获得了用户高度认同。微信平台的成长和壮大,对银行带来了深远影响。从营销角度看,微信运营商企业服务业务拓展了银行营销渠道,丰富了银行促销方式,节约了银行营销成本;同时银行可以从微信支付中获得存款和结算手续费,并为微信运营商营销过程提供资金和信用保障。双方通过协同营销能够整合资源、降低彼此营销成本,提高营销效率,在营销关系上达成了合作共赢。但由于微信运营商与银行用户存在重叠,高效便捷、功能强大、用户规模庞大的微信运营商理财、贷款和支付等业务对银行业务造成了巨大冲击,银行为应对冲击推出了同质金融平台和产品、发布了政策和措施,限制了微信运营商转账次数和额度。由此,双方在协同营销中又产生了竞争。面对这一复杂局面,微信运营商与银行协同营销关系是否应该终止,已经成为双方营销关系中遇到的最大问题。通过对背景分析和以往文献梳理,本文首先回顾了演化博弈论与协同营销的基本理论,然后分析了微信运营商与银行协同营销现状,阐述了微信运营商与银行协同营销产生的积极影响和出现的问题。在此基础上通过对微信运营商与银行协同营销现状存在的问题分析,结合演化博弈理论建立了微信运营商与银行营销关系支付矩阵,利用支付函数构建与复制动态方程求解得出了微信运营商与银行营销关系最终演化结果,展示了不同决策参数对双方协同营销状态影响。结果表明,微信运营商与银行营销关系演化结果趋向于两种模式,但只有(协同,协同)营销策略才能使双方利益达到最大化,并得出决策参数增量收益、分配系数对双方协同营销关系存在正向影响;协同营销成本、资源投入对双方协同营销关系存在负向影响。最后根据分析结果,在解决现有问题的基础上,分别从增量收益、协同营销成本、双方投入资源、分配系数等方面提出促进微信运营商与银行协同营销的对策建议:合理划分目标市场、提高协同营销增量收益、降低协同营销成本、控制资源恰当投入、保障合理收益分配系数、利用政府奖惩作用提高协同营销积极性。
[Abstract]:With the wide acceptance of the application of Internet technology and social platform, the social nature of the WeChat platform in China has developed rapidly.In particular, WeChat Pay function greatly facilitates the online and offline settlement services, while obtaining high user recognition.The growth and growth of WeChat platform, has brought the profound influence to the bank.From the marketing point of view, the enterprise service business of WeChat operators expands bank marketing channels, enriches bank promotion methods and saves bank marketing costs. At the same time, banks can obtain deposits and settlement fees from WeChat Pay.And for the WeChat operator marketing process to provide funds and credit protection.Through cooperative marketing, the two sides can integrate resources, reduce each other's marketing costs, improve marketing efficiency, and achieve win-win cooperation in marketing relations.However, because of the overlap between WeChat operators and bank users, the high efficiency, convenience, powerful function and the huge scale of users, WeChat operators have a huge impact on the banking business, such as financing, loan and payment, and so on.Banks launched homogeneous financial platforms and products to deal with the impact, issued policies and measures that limited the number and quota of WeChat operators' transfers.As a result, the two sides in the collaborative marketing has produced competition.In the face of this complex situation, whether the cooperative marketing relationship between WeChat operators and banks should be terminated has become the biggest problem in the marketing relationship between the two sides.Based on the background analysis and literature review, this paper reviews the basic theories of evolutionary game theory and cooperative marketing, and then analyzes the current situation of cooperative marketing between WeChat operators and banks.This paper expounds the positive influence and problems arising from the cooperative marketing between WeChat operators and banks.On this basis, by analyzing the problems existing in the current situation of the cooperative marketing between WeChat operators and banks, and combining with the evolutionary game theory, the paper establishes the payment matrix of the relationship between WeChat operators and banks.Using payment function to construct and copy the dynamic equation, the final evolution result of marketing relationship between WeChat operator and bank is obtained, and the influence of different decision parameters on cooperative marketing state of both parties is shown.The results show that the evolution results of the relationship between WeChat operators and banks tend to two models, but only the (collaborative, cooperative) marketing strategy can maximize the interests of both parties, and obtain the incremental benefits of decision parameters.The distribution coefficient has a positive effect on the cooperative marketing relationship between both sides, and the cost and resource input of the cooperative marketing have a negative influence on the cooperative marketing relationship between the two sides.Finally, according to the analysis results, on the basis of solving the existing problems, from the incremental income, cooperative marketing costs, both sides invested resources,Some suggestions are put forward to promote cooperative marketing between WeChat operators and banks, such as dividing target market reasonably, increasing incremental profit of cooperative marketing, reducing the cost of cooperative marketing, and controlling the appropriate input of resources.To ensure reasonable income distribution coefficient and improve the enthusiasm of cooperative marketing by using the role of government rewards and punishments.
【学位授予单位】:兰州理工大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F49;F832;F224.32
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