封闭与开放：网络信息产品平台竞争策略研究

发布时间：2018-06-11 15:03

本文选题：双边市场 + 网络信息产品　；参考：《山东大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来,随着互联网搜索引擎巨头Google研发Android操作系统以及斥资收购Motorola,向着手机、电脑等移动互联网领域扩张；消费类电子产品生产商Apple推出iCloud云端服务以及苹果广告平台iAd,开始涉足移动互联网领域,二者业务领域的竞争愈演愈烈,引发了笔者对网络信息产品平台竞争策略的关注。同时,不断发展和完善的双边市场理论为网络信息产品平台竞争策略的研究提供新的思路。本文正是基于双边市场理论,通过构建平台竞争策略模型,并结合Apple(封闭式平台策略)和Google(开放式平台策略)的案例,对封闭式与开放式两种不同的平台竞争策略进行研究。文章首先分析网络信息产品平台竞争需要解决的基本问题,即用户数量和网络规模,从而引出平台初期和平台稳定期两个角度对平台竞争策略进行探讨,其中,平台初期竞争策略的焦点在于获得基本用户数量,形成最低网络规模；平台稳定期则主要解决平台盈利模式问题,维持平台稳定发展。然后,分别构建平台初期竞争模型和平台稳定期竞争模型进行理论阐述,并对封闭式平台和开放式平台进行对比分析。最后,结合Apple和Google的案例,对二者分别采用封闭式和开放式两种不同的平台策略,最终都能取得成功进行合理解释。研究发现,平台初期无论封闭式平台厂商还是开放式平台厂商,都采取对卖方一侧进行补贴或投资的策略,但是二者的区别在于补贴程度不同。平台进入稳定期,封闭式与开放式平台策略的差异表现在：用户端市场,开放式平台厂商实行产品免费定价策略,而封闭式平台厂商采取基于产品定价的策略,且对用户的定价会随着终端用户对于开放式平台和封闭式平台的偏好而变化；软件开发商市场,与开放式平台互补的软件开发商对终端用户收取的价格与交叉网络外部性和平台厂商收取的服务费用有关,且交叉网络外部性和服务费的乘积越大,则软件开发商收取的费用就越低。而封闭式平台中软件开发商对终端用户的定价会随着开放式平台厂商的介入而提高。另外,研究发现,开放式平台产品的销售数量与交叉网络外部性和服务费用有关,且交叉网络外部性越小,服务费越低,则开放式平台厂商的销售量越高,因此,开放式平台厂商可采取较低服务费用或者进行免费定价的方式扩大市场份额。而随着开放式平台厂商的介入,对于封闭式平台厂商而言,市场最大需求量会随着消费者偏好不同而低于垄断市场时平台厂商的最大需求量,从而封闭式平台产品的销售数量会低于先前垄断市场的销售量。进一步分析得出,当平台厂商具备垄断能力时,可以采取封闭式平台策略,对两边用户进行不对称定价,通过不断地技术创新提高单位产品的价格来实现盈利,随着开放式平台厂商的加入,封闭式平台厂商对用户端收费降低,但提高软件开发商端的价格；当平台厂商不具备垄断能力,作为潜在者进入市场时,可采取开放式平台策略。通过对两端用户进行免费定价或收取较低价格,来扩大平台用户数量,完善平台网络规模,并通过第三方付费的方式获取利润,因此它盈利的关键在于通过平台产品或服务进一步扩大平台两边的用户数量,通过提高单位产品的数量来增加利润。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the development of the Android operating system and the acquisition of Motorola, the Internet search engine giant Google has expanded to mobile phones, computers and other mobile Internet fields. Consumer electronics manufacturer Apple has launched iCloud cloud service and the Apple advertising platform iAd, starting to dabble in the mobile internet field, and the two business areas are competing. The fierce competition has caused the author's attention to the competition strategy of the network information product platform. At the same time, the continuous development and perfection of the bilateral market theory provide new ideas for the research of the competition strategy of the network information product platform.
This paper is based on the bilateral market theory, and through the construction of the platform competition strategy model, combined with the Apple (closed platform strategy) and the Google (open platform strategy) case, the closed and open two different platform competition strategies are studied. The article first analyzes the basic problems to be solved in the competition of the network information product platform. That is, the number of users and the scale of the network, which leads to the discussion of the platform competition strategy in the two aspects of the platform initial stage and the platform stability period. Among them, the focal point of the platform initial competition strategy is to obtain the basic user number and form the minimum network scale; the platform stability period mainly solves the platform profit model problem and maintains the stable development of the platform. Then, this paper constructs the platform initial competition model and the platform stability period competition model respectively, and compares the closed platform and the open platform. Finally, combining the cases of Apple and Google, the two parties are respectively closed and open two different leveling strategies respectively. Finally, a reasonable explanation can be achieved.
It has been found that both the closed platform and the open platform vendors have adopted the strategy of subsidy or investment on the side of the seller's side, but the difference between the two is that the degree of subsidies is different. The platform enters the stable period. The difference between the closed and open platform strategies is manifested in the user market and the open platform manufacturer. Free pricing strategy, and closed platform vendors adopt a product based pricing strategy, and the pricing of users varies with the preference of the end users to open and closed platforms; the software developer market, the price and cross network of the software developers complementary to the open platform for the end users The externality is related to the service fees charged by the platform vendors, and the greater the product of the cross network externality and service charge, the lower the cost of the software developers. And the software developers in the closed platform will increase the price of the end users with the intervention of the open platform vendors. The number of sales is related to the externality and service costs of the cross network, and the smaller the externality of the cross network and the lower the service charge, the higher the sales volume of the open platform vendors. Therefore, the open platform vendors can take a lower service charge or make a free pricing method to expand the market share. With the involvement of the open platform vendors, For the closed platform manufacturers, the maximum market demand will be lower than the maximum demand of the platform vendors in the monopoly market with the different consumer preferences, and the sales of the closed platform products will be lower than the previous monopolistic market sales.
The further analysis shows that when the platform vendors have monopoly power, they can adopt a closed platform strategy, make asymmetric pricing for both sides, and improve the price of the unit products by continuous technological innovation. With the accession of the open platform vendors, the closed platform vendors reduce the user fees, but improve the software. The price of the developer end; when the platform vendor does not have the monopoly power, as a potential person enters the market, it can take an open platform strategy. Through the free pricing of users at both ends or lower prices, the number of platform users will be expanded, the scale of the platform network is improved, and the profit is obtained through the third party payment, so it is profitable. The key is to further expand the number of users on both sides of the platform through platform products or services, and increase profits by increasing the number of units.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F49;F224

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