规则偏好对合作决策的影响

发布时间：2018-02-26 16:45

本文关键词： 规则偏好合作共享资源　出处：《南京理工大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：规则引导着人们的行为,虽然没有法律一样的强制力,却因为被人们普遍认同而具有规范人们行为的能力。然而,规则种类繁多、涉猎范围广泛。因此,即使在同一场景,面对同一事物,也会同时存在两种或者两种以上的规则。随着认知的不同,人们会在日积月累的生活过程中产生不同的规则偏好,即,对不同规则的喜好和厌恶程度不同。而人们会根据自己的规则偏好审视和判断他人的行动,并对偏离自己所偏好的规则的他人行为作出反应,最终影响事物的状态或事件的发展。因此,我们可以认为个体的规则偏好会影响个体的合作决策。随着中国经济体制改革,政府正逐步退出一些领域的治理与资源供给。在这过程中人们需要逐步放弃原有的治理规则,自发形成一种新的合作规则。尤其是在边界、权属界定不明确的共享资源领域,在摸着石头过河的制度转变过程中,逐步形成各自规则偏好的个体在实践中碰撞,已逐渐发张成为矛盾日益突出的社会问题。比较典型领域的就是随着住房改革政策产生的小区公共部分的治理。对这一共享资源的维护与管理究竟采取何种规则通常是住宅小区矛盾产生的根源,例如是依赖政府管理还是共同商讨、共同决策、共同承担费用、共同享受收益的自主治理。基于上述探讨,本文拟构建携带规则偏好的函数模型,将规则偏好内化,作为解释变量考察个体行动,并结合经典的社会偏好博弈实验说明模型的解释能力。文章最后将选取具有代表性的小区共享资源治理案例,从规则偏好的角度分析案例中存在的问题及成功的经验。
[Abstract]:Rules guide people's behavior, although they do not have the force of law, but they have the ability to regulate people's behavior because they are generally accepted. However, rules are of a wide variety and range. Therefore, even in the same scene, In the face of the same thing, there will be two or more rules at the same time. People look at and judge the actions of others based on their own preferences and react to other people's actions that deviate from their preferred rules. Ultimately affect the state of things or the development of events. Therefore, we can think that individual rule preference will affect individual cooperative decision-making. With the reform of China's economic system, The government is gradually withdrawing from some areas of governance and resource supply. In the process, people need to gradually abandon the existing rules of governance and spontaneously form a new cooperative rule. In the course of the institutional transformation of crossing the river by touching the stone, the individuals who gradually formed their preferences for the rules collided in practice. It has gradually become an increasingly prominent social problem. The more typical area is the governance of the public part of the community with the housing reform policy. What kind of rules should be taken to maintain and manage this shared resource. Is usually the root of the conflict in residential areas, For example, it depends on government management or independent governance of joint negotiation, common decision, shared cost and common income. Based on the above discussion, this paper intends to construct a functional model of carrying rule preference and internalize the rule preference. As an explanatory variable to investigate individual action, and combined with the classical social preference game experiment to illustrate the explanatory ability of the model. Finally, the paper will select a representative case of community shared resources governance. From the point of view of rule preference, the problems and successful experiences in cases are analyzed.
【学位授予单位】：南京理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：C934

【相似文献】