领导任职期限设置的经济解释:基于效率的分析

发布时间：2018-03-10 00:34

  本文选题：任职期限　切入点：激励　出处：《财经研究》2006年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：领导任职期限制度能激励个人在管理技能培养上进行投入,这有利于增加社会总剩余;然而,任职期限制度在提供激励的同时,也造成了潜在效率的损失。领导任职期限的设置是这二者之间权衡的结果。文章通过一个两阶段博弈的分析框架,利用动态的局部均衡权衡模型,从个人收益最大化和社会总剩余最大化的相互作用中,推导出了社会最优的领导任职期限。在此动态的局部均衡权衡模型中,个人投入水平是任职期限制度的内生产物。
[Abstract]:The leadership tenure system can encourage individuals to invest in the development of management skills, which helps to increase the total surplus of society; however, the tenure system provides incentives at the same time, The setting of leadership term is the result of the tradeoff between the two. This paper uses a two-stage game analysis framework to use the dynamic local equilibrium trade-off model. From the interaction between the maximization of personal income and the maximization of total social surplus, the author deduces the social optimal term of leadership, and in this dynamic partial equilibrium trade-off model, the level of personal input is the endogenous product of the tenure system.
【作者单位】： 复旦大学管理学院 复旦大学管理学院
【分类号】：C933
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本文编号：1591006