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基于博弈论的物流金融信用风险管理研究

发布时间:2018-01-01 14:05

  本文关键词:基于博弈论的物流金融信用风险管理研究 出处:《重庆师范大学》2012年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


  更多相关文章: 物流金融 信用风险 委托-代理 博弈论


【摘要】:中小企业是我国国民经济和社会发展的重要力量。促进中小企业发展,是保持国民经济平稳较快发展的重要基础,是关系民生和社会稳定的重大战略任务。然而长期以来,超过半数以上的中小企业因融资难而制约了发展,特别是2008年的金融危机进一步加剧了该问题,很多中小型企业由于资金链断裂而面临着生存危机。如何帮助中小企业获得融资,已成为全社会共同关注的热点。物流金融业务的出现,有效的缓解了这一难题,得到业界与学术界的广泛认可。物流金融是指银行等金融机构与物流企业相互协作而推出的一系列金融产品,旨在解决供应链上中小企业融资困难的瓶颈,实现物流,资金流与信息流的有机统一,达到三方共赢的目的。 但物流金融作为一种尚在探索发展阶段的创新服务产品,还存在着许多问题,尤其是传统信贷业务中商业银行与中小企业两方主体之间的信贷风险,变为了物流金融业务中商业银行、中小企业、第三方物流企业三方主体之间的信用风险。能否有效地分析和控制信用风险是物流金融业务能否成功的关键之一。以往信用风险的管理研究,着重客观层面的评估与度量,而在实际上主观信用风险问题更以难控制,而后者产生的根源在于信息不对称而导致的道德风险。因此运用博弈论分析信用风险,能更深入挖掘信用风险产生的本质原因,从而更加有效地加以控制。 本文首先对物流金融业务进行了相关介绍与理论综述;其次,,使用委托-代理理论深入探究物流金融业务中信用风险发生的内在动因,识别商业银行和第三方物流企业在物流金融业务中可能会面临的信用风险;然后,以广东发展银行的物流金融业务为例,借助传统信贷业务的两方博弈模型与物流金融业务的三方博弈模型进行实证分析。最后,提出结论并从政府及物流金融三个主体的角度,给出信用风险控制的建议,并指出研究的不足与下一步的研究方向。 通过量化博弈模型的实证研究,本文试图为物流金融的信用风险管理提出理论依据,为商业银行规避物流金融业务带来的信用风险提供一种新的思路,从而促进中小企业的顺利融资及我国物流金融的发展。
[Abstract]:Small and medium-sized enterprises are an important force in the development of our national economy and society. To promote the development of small and medium-sized enterprises is an important foundation to maintain the steady and rapid development of the national economy. However, for a long time, more than half of small and medium-sized enterprises have restricted their development because of financing difficulties, especially the financial crisis in 2008 further aggravated the problem. Many small and medium-sized enterprises are facing the survival crisis because of the break of the capital chain. How to help the small and medium-sized enterprises to obtain the financing has become the focus of attention of the whole society and the appearance of the logistics financial business. Logistics finance is a series of financial products that banks and other financial institutions cooperate with logistics enterprises. The purpose of this paper is to solve the bottleneck of financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises in supply chain, to realize the organic unification of logistics, capital flow and information flow, and to achieve the goal of tripartite win-win. However, as a kind of innovative service product which is still exploring the stage of development, logistics finance still has many problems, especially the credit risk between commercial banks and small and medium-sized enterprises in traditional credit business. Into the logistics financial business commercial banks, small and medium-sized enterprises. Whether the credit risk can be effectively analyzed and controlled is one of the keys to the success of logistics financial business. The management of credit risk has been studied in the past. In fact, the subjective credit risk is more difficult to control, and the source of the latter lies in the moral hazard caused by asymmetric information. Therefore, the game theory is used to analyze the credit risk. It can dig into the essential causes of credit risk and control it more effectively. Firstly, this paper introduces the logistics finance business and summarizes its theory. Secondly, using the principal-agent theory to explore the inherent causes of credit risk in the logistics financial business, identify the commercial banks and third party logistics enterprises in the logistics financial business may face the credit risk; Then, taking the logistics financial business of Guangdong Development Bank as an example, with the help of the two-party game model of the traditional credit business and the tripartite game model of the logistics financial business, the empirical analysis is carried out. From the angle of government and logistics finance, the paper gives the suggestion of credit risk control, and points out the deficiency of the research and the research direction of the next step. Through the empirical study of quantitative game model, this paper tries to provide a theoretical basis for the credit risk management of logistics finance, and provide a new way of thinking for commercial banks to avoid the credit risk brought by logistics financial business. So as to promote the smooth financing of small and medium enterprises and the development of logistics finance in China.
【学位授予单位】:重庆师范大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F252;F832.2;F224.32

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8 郭e

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