基于博弈论的道路货运绿色发展及政府补贴分配研究

发布时间：2018-01-01 14:11

本文关键词：基于博弈论的道路货运绿色发展及政府补贴分配研究　出处：《北京交通大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：全球气候变化是人类现在及未来长时间内面临的最严峻挑战之一,主要原因就在于温室气体的排放和能源的消耗快速增长。交通运输行业是排放温室气体和消耗能源的大户,也是城市空气质量问题的重要来源,其中道路货运行业又占据相当大的部分。因此,推动货运行业的节能减排,发展绿色货运,已成为社会关注的热点。绿色货运是针对传统货运的负外部性,基于节约资源、保护环境的理念发展而成的一种新的货运模式。虽然我国政府大力倡导绿色货运的发展,为道路货运行业提供创造竞争优势的新契机,但由于缺乏合理的激励机制和利益分配机制,现有的绿色化行为往往流于表面,并没有真正的落实,从而导致绿色货运在我国发展的十分缓慢。本文以道路货运行业为研究对象,将绿色货运引入其中,以促进道路货运行业绿色发展为目的,并把道路货运行业从业务上看成运输企业和租赁企业两类企业,建立租赁企业、运输企业和政府三方博弈模型,对博弈主体之间的关系和主体的收益情况进行研究。具体的工作:首先,对绿色货运进行系统分析。从绿色货运的内涵,租赁企业、运输企业和政府之间的利益关系,租赁企业、运输企业和政府之间的博弈现象三个方面进行分析。其次,根据博弈模型的相关概述和特定的假设条件,建立绿色化博弈模型,通过博弈树和收益矩阵分析主体间的博弈关系,运用纳什均衡分析得出纯策略和混合策略均衡分析结果。通过博弈分析得出政府在促进绿色货运的发展中起引导作用,通过制定财政补贴的政策,可以促进绿色货运的发展。然后,根据模型假设建立绿色化补贴分配模型,运用非合作和合作博弈均衡对模型进行分析,研究政府如何分配补贴可以达到绿色最优化,以及影响补贴分配的因素。通过对比不同博弈均衡的分析结果,可以得出博弈主体的边际效益会影响补贴的分配。最后,以某综合物流园区的道路货运企业为例,利用具体数据,带入博弈模型和补贴分配模型进行计算,验证模型。
[Abstract]:Global climate change is one of the most serious challenges facing mankind now and in the long term. The main reason lies in the rapid growth of greenhouse gas emissions and energy consumption. Transport industry is a major source of greenhouse gas emissions and energy consumption, but also an important source of urban air quality problems. Therefore, promoting energy saving and emission reduction of freight industry and developing green freight has become the focus of social concern. Green freight is the negative externality of traditional freight. Based on the concept of saving resources and protecting the environment, a new freight transport model is developed. Although our government strongly advocates the development of green freight transport, it provides a new opportunity for the road freight industry to create competitive advantages. However, due to the lack of a reasonable incentive mechanism and benefit distribution mechanism, the existing green behavior often flows to the surface, and does not really implement. As a result, the development of green freight in China is very slow. This paper takes the road freight industry as the research object, introduces the green freight transport into it, in order to promote the green development of road freight industry. And the road freight industry from the business as transport enterprises and leasing enterprises two types of enterprises, the establishment of leasing enterprises, transport enterprises and government game model. The specific work: first of all, the green freight system analysis. From the connotation of green freight, leasing enterprises. The relationship between transport enterprises and the government, leasing enterprises, transport enterprises and the game between the government are analyzed in three aspects. Secondly, according to the relevant overview of the game model and specific assumptions. The green game model is established, and the game relationship between the agents is analyzed by the game tree and the income matrix. Through game analysis, the government plays a leading role in promoting the development of green freight transport, through the formulation of financial subsidies policy. It can promote the development of green freight transport. Then, according to the model hypothesis to establish a green subsidy allocation model, using non-cooperative and cooperative game equilibrium to analyze the model. This paper studies how the government allocates subsidies to achieve green optimization, and the factors that affect the allocation of subsidies. By comparing the results of different game equilibrium analysis. It can be concluded that the marginal benefit of the main body of the game will affect the distribution of subsidies. Finally, taking a road freight transport enterprise in a comprehensive logistics park as an example, using specific data, the game model and subsidy allocation model are introduced to calculate. Verify the model.
【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F812.45;F224.32;F542

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