当前位置:主页 > 管理论文 > 物流管理论文 >

需求不确定环境下制造企业与零售商的供应链契约研究

发布时间:2018-01-15 22:05

  本文关键词:需求不确定环境下制造企业与零售商的供应链契约研究 出处:《中国海洋大学》2015年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


  更多相关文章: 供应链协调 契约协调机制 利润共享契约 需求不确定


【摘要】:在当今时代,科技的进步和经济的发展使企业拥有了更多机遇的同时,也感受到了前所未有的竞争压力,快节奏的市场变化和多样化的用户需求都使得企业需要对市场迅速做出响应。在这个过程中,人们日渐认识到供应链管理的重要性,只依靠单个企业的力量难以在竞争环境中生存,越来越多的企业把目光放在了供应链上,企业之间的竞争已经演变成了供应链之间的竞争,良好的供应链管理可以通过整合和优化物流、信息流、资金流等方式使信息被供应链上的成员企业共享,供应链管理强调的是合作而非竞争。但是供应链在运作的过程中会遇到一些问题,一方面,供应链上的成员企业是不同的经济实体,都想要追求自身利益的最大化,往往会与供应链系统的整体目标产生冲突;另一方面,供应链本身是一个复杂的网络结构,而且具有动态性。所以供应链协调问题成为了研究的重点,人们希望在供应链运作的过程中,通过有效的协调机制来为供应链创造竞争优势。在各种协调机制中,供应链契约协调机制是一种能够有效协调供应链的方法,契约对每位成员企业的行为做出规定,对从订货到交货这个流程中的每一个环节都进行严格的管理,约束成员的行为,保证供应链在良好有效运作的同时,能够提升竞争优势,创造更多的收益。本文正是基于这种背景,运用斯坦克尔伯格博弈理论等方法对制造企业和零售商的利润共享契约进行了研究。首先,在需求不确定的环境下,构建了一个由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的二级供应链,制造商是主导企业,零售商占从属地位,先研究普通契约下的各方收益等情况,然后引入利润分配系数,研究在利润共享契约下的各方收益等情况,同时进行数值模拟,进而将两种情况进行对比,得出在此情况下,合理的利润共享契约设计可以提高各方收益、增强供应链协调性的结论。随即为了更贴近实际情况,把单一零售商扩展到多零售商的情况,研究普通契约和利润共享契约两种情况下的各方收益等情况,进行数值模拟,将两种契约的情况进行比较分析,得出在多零售商的情况下,合理的利润共享契约设计同样可以有效增加各方收益、协调供应链的结论。最后,描述了利润共享契约如何在实际的企业中应用。本文的创新之处有两点,一是设计了需求不确定环境下的利润共享契约模型,研究契约实施后产品订购量、销售价格以及供应链系统和各成员企业的收益等情况,二是构建了以制造商为主导企业的供应链结构,把与制造企业合作的零售商数量从单个扩展到多个,引入“零售商数量”这个变量,研究零售商数量的变化对供应链及成员企业收益等情况的影响。
[Abstract]:In today's era, the progress of science and technology and economic development make enterprises have more opportunities, but also feel the unprecedented competitive pressure. Rapid market changes and diverse user needs make enterprises need to respond to the market quickly. In this process, people increasingly realize the importance of supply chain management. Relying on the strength of a single enterprise, it is difficult to survive in the competitive environment. More and more enterprises focus on the supply chain, the competition between enterprises has evolved into the competition between the supply chain. Good supply chain management can integrate and optimize logistics, information flow, capital flow and other ways to enable information to be shared by member enterprises in the supply chain. Supply chain management emphasizes cooperation rather than competition, but the supply chain will encounter some problems in the process of operation. On the one hand, the member enterprises in the supply chain are different economic entities. All want to pursue the maximization of their own interests, often conflict with the overall goal of the supply chain system; On the other hand, supply chain itself is a complex network structure and dynamic, so supply chain coordination has become the focus of research, people hope in the process of supply chain operation. Through effective coordination mechanism to create a competitive advantage for the supply chain. Among all kinds of coordination mechanisms, supply chain contract coordination mechanism is a method to effectively coordinate the supply chain. The contract provides for the behavior of each member enterprise, and strictly manages every link in the process from ordering to delivery, constraining the behavior of the member, and ensuring the supply chain to operate well and effectively at the same time. Based on this background, this paper studies the profit sharing contract between manufacturing enterprises and retailers by using the method of Steinkerberg game theory. In the environment of uncertain demand, a two-level supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer is constructed. The manufacturer is the leading enterprise and the retailer plays a subordinate role. This paper first studies the situation of the parties' income under the ordinary contract, then introduces the profit distribution coefficient, studies the situation of the parties' income under the profit-sharing contract, and carries on the numerical simulation at the same time, and then compares the two kinds of situations. In this case, reasonable profit sharing contract design can improve the income of all parties, enhance the coordination of the supply chain. Then in order to be closer to the actual situation, the single retailer will be extended to the situation of multiple retailers. Study the general contract and profit sharing contract under the two circumstances of the income of the parties and other situations, numerical simulation, the two contracts are compared and analyzed, the case in the case of multiple retailers. Reasonable design of profit-sharing contract can also effectively increase the benefit of all parties and coordinate the conclusion of supply chain. Finally, it describes how the profit-sharing contract is applied in practical enterprises. There are two innovations in this paper. The first is to design a profit-sharing contract model under uncertain demand environment, and to study the quantity of products ordered, the sales price and the income of the supply chain system and each member enterprise after the implementation of the contract. The second is to construct the supply chain structure with manufacturer as the leading enterprise, expand the number of retailers cooperating with manufacturing enterprise from single to multiple, and introduce the variable of "the number of retailers". To study the influence of retailer number on supply chain and profit of member enterprises.
【学位授予单位】:中国海洋大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:F274

【参考文献】

相关期刊论文 前10条

1 张志敏;;我国制造商与零售商协同升级战略与路径选择[J];商业时代;2014年33期

2 刘浪;石岩;;回购契约下供应链协调应对非常规突发事件[J];北京理工大学学报(社会科学版);2014年05期

3 于俭;崔雷雷;李晓;;产品服务系统中的三方利润共享契约研究[J];杭州电子科技大学学报(社会科学版);2014年03期

4 罗玲玲;吴浪;;关于供应链中“牛鞭效应”产生原因及策略问题的探究[J];科技广场;2014年01期

5 赵金娥;王天淼;齐凤至;;供应链契约研究综述[J];中国商贸;2013年33期

6 严帅;李四杰;卞亦文;;基于质保服务的供应链契约协调机制[J];系统工程学报;2013年05期

7 李永飞;苏秦;;考虑随机需求及返回策略的供应链协调分析[J];软科学;2013年02期

8 徐广业;但斌;;电子商务环境下双渠道供应链协调的价格折扣模型[J];系统工程学报;2012年03期

9 吴忠和;陈宏;赵千;吴晓志;;两零售商竞争下多因素同时扰动的供应链协调研究[J];中国管理科学;2012年02期

10 高波;石书生;韦诗韵;;需求和价格时间敏感下供应链应对突发事件[J];控制与决策;2011年09期

相关博士学位论文 前2条

1 周丽娜;供应链管理中的分销网络服务优化方法[D];哈尔滨工业大学;2012年

2 张志清;面向不确定需求的供应链协同需求预测研究[D];哈尔滨工业大学;2010年

相关硕士学位论文 前4条

1 黄海明;零售商主导下的两级供应链收益共享契约研究[D];华南理工大学;2013年

2 孟翠翠;基于制造商视角的供应链中断风险管理研究[D];中国石油大学;2009年

3 董秀;供应链协调中的利润共享契约研究[D];北京交通大学;2008年

4 李荣平;基于供应链管理的制造商—零售商合作利润分配策略研究[D];天津大学;2007年



本文编号:1430242

资料下载
论文发表

本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/guanlilunwen/wuliuguanlilunwen/1430242.html


Copyright(c)文论论文网All Rights Reserved | 网站地图 |

版权申明:资料由用户10e0d***提供,本站仅收录摘要或目录,作者需要删除请E-mail邮箱bigeng88@qq.com