快递企业间共同配送的演化博弈分析及激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-01-26 18:30

本文关键词： 快递企业共同配送演化博弈激励机制　出处：《郑州大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：快递业作为我国的新兴行业,发展速度快,为我国经济发展做出了巨大贡献。由于我国快递业发展时间过短,市场准入的门槛较低,经营者数量较多,市场集中度偏低,竞争激烈且无序,使得目前我国快递企业普遍出现服务质量欠缺、资源浪费严重,而且资源共享及利用率较低,配送成本较高。如何解决这一发展问题是亟需关注的,而实施共同配置就是解决这一问题的最优方案,开展快递企业间共同配送服务有利于降低社会物流总成本,又可以有效刺激社会需求,促进资源的优化配置,有力的推动了市场经济的健康发展。因此,本文首先将整理和归纳共同配送及演化博弈的国内外研究现状,随后分析我国快递业现状及共同配送的必要性。接下来,基于演化博弈分析了快递企业间竞争与合作涉及的影响因素,建立了竞合机制下快递企业间共同配送的演化博弈模型,从模型假设、模型建立、模型求解、参数分析以及数值仿真,分析不同快递企业间合作竞争行为及其动态演化过程,对因素的变化影响路径选择和演化博弈结果进行研究,从而为构建快递企业间共同配送的激励机制的研究奠定基础。最后,通过快递企业间共同配送激励机制的构建,以期促进快递企业间共同配送的形成与实施,进而促进我国快递行业的发展。以上研究结果表明:快递企业独立运营时产生的收益对快递企业间共同配送结果和演化博弈中的合作概率没有影响,但是快递企业的初始合作意愿则对共同配送的形成具有决定性作用。同时,共同配送所带来的额外合作收益的分配比例必须合理,快递企业之间才会形成稳定的长期合作关系,即共同配送合作关系。此外,鞍点的横纵坐标值是竞合机制下系统演化博弈路径改变的阀值,各因素参数对快递企业间共同配送的演化路径改变具有不同的影响:共同配送的形成与额外合作收益正相关,与共同配送投入成本和企业经营风险状况负相关,而且存在一个最优的共同配送的额外合作收益的分配系数,使得快递企业间共同配送的合作可能性最大。最后,本文结合快递企业间共同配送演化博弈模型分析结论,从五个影响因素出发,构建了快递企业间共同配送的激励机制,期望促使快递企业间的合作,以期引导共同配送能够顺利形成并运行。
[Abstract]:As a new industry of our country, express industry has made great contribution to the economic development of our country. Because of the short time of development, the threshold of market access is lower, and the number of operators is more. The market concentration is low, the competition is fierce and disorderly, which makes the express delivery enterprises in our country generally lack of service quality, serious waste of resources, and low resource sharing and utilization. Distribution cost is high. How to solve this development problem is urgent concern, and the implementation of common allocation is the best solution to solve this problem. Developing joint distribution service among express delivery enterprises is conducive to reducing the total cost of social logistics, but also can effectively stimulate social demand, promote the optimal allocation of resources, and promote the healthy development of the market economy. This paper will sort out and summarize the domestic and foreign research status of joint distribution and evolution game, and then analyze the current situation of express delivery industry and the necessity of joint distribution. Based on the evolutionary game, this paper analyzes the influence factors of competition and cooperation between express delivery enterprises, and establishes the evolutionary game model of joint distribution between express delivery enterprises under the mechanism of competition and cooperation, which is based on the hypothesis of the model, the establishment of the model, and the solution of the model. Parameter analysis and numerical simulation to analyze the cooperative competition behavior and its dynamic evolution process among different express delivery enterprises, and to study the influence of factors on path selection and evolution game results. Finally, through the construction of joint distribution incentive mechanism among express delivery enterprises, in order to promote the formation and implementation of joint distribution among express enterprises. The above research results show that the income generated by express companies when they operate independently has no effect on the joint distribution results and the cooperation probability in evolutionary game between express delivery enterprises. However, the initial cooperation intention of express delivery enterprises has a decisive role in the formation of joint distribution. At the same time, the distribution ratio of additional cooperative benefits brought by joint distribution must be reasonable. Express delivery enterprises will form a stable long-term cooperation relationship, that is, joint distribution cooperation relationship. In addition, the saddle point of the vertical coordinate value is the system evolution game path change threshold under the competing mechanism. Each factor parameter has different influence on the evolution path change of joint distribution among express delivery enterprises: the formation of joint distribution is positively related to the additional cooperative income, and negatively related to the input cost of joint distribution and the operating risk of the enterprise. And there is an optimal co-distribution of additional cooperative income distribution coefficient, which makes the cooperation between express delivery enterprises is the most likely. Finally. Based on the conclusion of the game model of joint distribution evolution among express delivery enterprises, this paper constructs the incentive mechanism of joint distribution among express delivery enterprises from five factors, in order to promote the cooperation between express delivery enterprises. In order to guide the joint distribution can be formed and run smoothly.
【学位授予单位】：郑州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F224.32;F259.23

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