大型工程项目低标价高造价的形成机理分析

发布时间：2018-05-25 17:41

本文选题：低标价 + 高造价　；参考：《公路》2005年09期

【摘要】：在工程项目建设过程中,低标价中标而最终导致高造价的现象有其内在的必然性。中标机会大小影响报价变动。低价中标预示业主取得了“超额利益”,导致建设期间业主与承包商存在利益上的先对抗、后妥协的“对抗—妥协”关系。承包商进场后,业主风险损失系数变大而趋向于“妥协”,以利项目按时完工。“对抗—妥协”关系存在动态平衡点,但双方在争夺利益的过程中均付出了代价,资源被无形消耗。动态平衡点的计算也存在陷阱,用错也使造价大幅提升。本文运用数学模型分析了其中的机理,并提出了防范和改变这种局面的建议,可应用于大型工程项目管理。
[Abstract]:In the process of project construction, it is inevitable to win the bid with low price and lead to high cost. The chance of winning will affect the change of quotation. Winning a bid at a low price indicates that the owner has obtained "excess interest", which leads to a "confrontation" relationship between the owner and the contractor during the construction period, which is characterized by "confrontation and compromise" in the interests of the owner and the contractor. After the contractor comes into the field, the risk loss coefficient of the company increases and tends to "compromise" so that the project can be completed on time. There is a dynamic equilibrium point in the "confrontation-compromise" relationship, but both sides pay the price in the process of competing for interests, and the resources are intangibly consumed. There are pitfalls in the calculation of the dynamic equilibrium point, and the cost is greatly increased by mistake. This paper analyzes the mechanism by using mathematical model, and puts forward some suggestions to prevent and change this kind of situation, which can be applied to the management of large engineering projects.
【作者单位】：重庆交通学院天津市高速公路投资建设发展公司
【分类号】：F284;

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