上市公司股东利益冲突和行为监督博弈分析

发布时间：2017-12-31 21:25

本文关键词：上市公司股东利益冲突和行为监督博弈分析　出处：《首都经济贸易大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在高度集中的股权结构下，大股东代表全体股东掌握公司的控制权，担当起搜集信息、监督经理人以及做出重大决策的责任。控股股东为追求私人利益侵害公司和其他股东的利益。本文首先建立股东利益冲突成因的博弈模型，分析大小股东间监督经理人的博弈，得到博弈均衡结果：大股东选择监督经理人，小股东选择搭便车不监督经理人，小股东由此放弃了公司的控制权。然后分别在同股同价以及股权分置假设下建立股东利益侵害模型，分析大股东侵害小股东利益的额外收益、付出损失以及何种条件下大股东会选择侵害小股东，得到博弈结果：同股同价下公司经营不善时大股东会选择侵害小股东；股权分制下高股价（流通价）的公司大股东会选择侵害小股东。再而建立股东行为监督博弈模型，分析有外部监管使大股东侵占行为受到惩罚时，大小股东间侵害与被侵害、监督与被监督的混合博弈均衡。并做比较静态分析，得到对大股东的惩罚力度、小股东的监督成本、企业规模、流通股与非流通股股价差异、股价随供求变动情况、公司长期发展态势以及公司获利能力等因素对大股东侵占行为的影响。最后通过分析和综合博弈结果，最终从健全经理人市场，合理缓解发行市场和流通市场间的股价失衡，加大对控股股东侵占小股东行为的处罚力度，加强上市公司的信息披露，加强对大规模企业的监管力度，，健全保护中小投资者的法律制度，提高小股东自身素质等七个方面给出可行建议。
[Abstract]:Under the highly centralized ownership structure, the majority shareholders hold the control of the company on behalf of all the shareholders and play the role of collecting information. Supervision of managers and responsibility for making major decisions. Controlling shareholders violate the interests of the company and other shareholders in pursuit of private interests. This paper first establishes the game model of the causes of shareholders' conflict of interest, analyzes the game of supervisory managers between large and small shareholders, and obtains the game equilibrium result: the majority shareholders choose the supervisory managers. The minority shareholders choose to hitchhike without supervising managers, so the minority shareholders give up the control rights of the company. Then, under the assumption of the same share price and the split share structure, the model of shareholders' interests infringement is established. This paper analyzes the additional benefits of the large shareholders against the interests of the minority shareholders, the loss and the conditions under which the large shareholders will choose to infringe on the minority shareholders. The result of the game is as follows: under the same share and same price, when the company is mismanaged, the large shareholders will choose to infringe on the minority shareholders; Large shareholders of companies with high share price (current price) under the split share system will choose to infringe on minority shareholders. Then the game model of shareholder behavior supervision is established to analyze the penalty of the behavior of large shareholders encroaching on by external supervision. Large and small shareholders are infringed and infringed, supervision and supervision of the mixed game equilibrium. And compared with static analysis, get the punishment of large shareholders, the supervision cost of small shareholders, the size of the enterprise. The difference between tradable and non-tradable shares, the influence of the stock price with the change of supply and demand, the long-term development situation of the company and the profitability of the company on the behavior of major shareholders' encroachment. Finally through the analysis and the synthesis game result, finally from the sound manager market, reasonably alleviates the stock price imbalance between the issuing market and the circulation market, increases to the controlling shareholder encroach the minority shareholder behavior punishment dynamics. Seven feasible suggestions are put forward, such as strengthening the information disclosure of listed companies, strengthening the supervision of large-scale enterprises, perfecting the legal system to protect the small and medium-sized investors, and improving the quality of the minority shareholders.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F224.32;F832.51

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