上市公司管理层持股与现金股利政策关系研究

发布时间：2018-01-06 13:29

本文关键词：上市公司管理层持股与现金股利政策关系研究　出处：《广东商学院》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：本文从如何解决上市公司的自由现金流问题，规范上市公司现金股利发放，提高公司治理效率,减少代理成本的角度进行深入研究，依据委托代理理论、剩余控制权理论及利益趋同与盘踞固守效应为理论基础,试图通过研究管理层持股与现金股利的关系，，来解决上市公司股东与管理层之间的代理问题，通过增加管理层持股,将股东的利益与管理层的利益结合起来,降低代理成本、提高代理效率的作用。本文以2006～2010年沪深两市上市公司为样本,剔除不相关数据,利用描述性统计与多元线形回归等实证方法进行研究得到以下结论。研究结论发现:(1)管理层持股比例与上市公司现金股利分配成正相关关系,但是结果并不显著,这与我国管理层持股比例过低,公司治理结构不完善有很大的关系;(2)在管理层持股的上市公司中，国有控股企业更倾向于发放现金股利;(3)在前文结论的基础上，我们对国有控股上市公司进行了进一步的研究,结果发现管理层持股比例与发放现金股利在0.05水平上显著正相关,这一结果也体现了管理层持股对于解决国有控股上市公司代理成本的程度。基于研究结果本文从宏观和微观两个层面进行分析,分别在资本市场制度建设与公司治理结构方面提出了相关建议。
[Abstract]:From the perspective of how to solve the problem of free cash flow of listed companies, standardize the distribution of cash dividend of listed companies, improve the efficiency of corporate governance and reduce agency costs, this paper carries out in-depth research, according to the principal-agent theory. Based on the theory of residual control, the convergence of interests and the clinging effect, this paper attempts to solve the problem of agency between shareholders and management of listed companies by studying the relationship between management ownership and cash dividend. By increasing the shareholding of management, the interests of shareholders and management are combined to reduce agency cost and improve agency efficiency. This paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies as samples from 2006 to 2010 to eliminate irrelevant data. By using descriptive statistics and multiple linear regression, the following conclusions are obtained. The research results show that the proportion of management ownership is positively correlated with the cash dividend distribution of listed companies. However, the results are not significant, which is related to the low proportion of management ownership and the imperfect corporate governance structure. Among the listed companies which are owned by the management, the state-owned holding enterprises tend to pay cash dividends; On the basis of the previous conclusions, we further study the state-owned holding listed companies, the results show that the proportion of management ownership and cash dividend in the 0.05 level significantly positive correlation. This result also reflects the extent of managerial shareholding in solving the agency costs of state-owned listed companies. Based on the results of the study, this paper from the macro and micro level analysis. In the capital market system construction and corporate governance structure of the relevant recommendations.
【学位授予单位】：广东商学院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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