基于双重声誉的重大工程工厂化预制动态激励机制

发布时间：2019-01-30 14:20

【摘要】：重大工程拥有超越一般工程的影响力,参与重大工程建设成为其关键部件供应商将显著提高企业品牌价值和影响力,因此,将声誉机制引入重大工程工厂化预制商的激励模型中可以更好地促使其考虑未来收益而提高当前的努力水平。为此构建双重声誉激励与显性激励相结合的两阶段动态激励模型,分析声誉对代理人市场的激励机理,并与不考虑声誉机制的显性激励模型进行对比,得到声誉激励机制实现帕累托改善的基本条件。最后,结合数据模拟进行验证。结果表明:在一定条件下引入声誉激励机制可以更好地协调业主与预制商的合作关系,防范代理人道德风险;显性声誉激励可以降低合作双方的信息不对称并提高工厂化预制商第1阶段的努力水平,隐性声誉激励对工厂化预制商在两阶段内有持续性的激励作用。
[Abstract]:Major projects have more influence than ordinary projects, and participation in major projects as a supplier of key components will significantly increase the brand value and influence of the enterprise. Introducing the reputation mechanism into the incentive model of the factory prefabricators of major projects can better urge them to consider the future income and improve the current level of effort. Therefore, a two-stage dynamic incentive model combining dual reputation incentive and explicit incentive is constructed, and the incentive mechanism of reputation to the agent market is analyzed, and compared with the dominant incentive model without considering reputation mechanism. Get reputation incentive mechanism to achieve Pareto improvement of the basic conditions. Finally, the data simulation is used to verify. The results show that the introduction of reputation incentive mechanism under certain conditions can better coordinate the cooperative relationship between the owner and the prefabricator and prevent the moral hazard of the agent. Explicit reputation incentive can reduce the information asymmetry of both partners and improve the level of effort in the first stage of the factory preform. The implicit reputation incentive has a sustained incentive effect on the factory preform in the two stages.
【作者单位】：南京大学工程管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重大项目(71390521);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71501084,71301062,71271107,71471077,71571098,71201073) 江苏省研究生培养创新工程项目(KYZZ15_0023,KYLX15_0031) 交通运输部建设科技项目(2013318282310)
【分类号】：TU741

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