考虑物流企业努力水平的仓单质押业务中银行激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-01-24 11:20

本文关键词： 仓单质押监管努力水平耗损率激励　出处：《东华大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：当前,中小企业由于缺乏足够的可抵押不动产、信用低等原因,难以通过传统融资渠道获得财务资源,导致资金短缺、融资难问题成为发展的瓶颈。在这种情况下,仓单质押作为一种创新融资服务得到迅速发展。实际操作中,一些存货存在一定耗损率、较容易变质,因而质押过程中会产生耗损量。在质押过程中,物流企业对质押物起到仓储、监管的作用,它可以通过提供与质押物匹配的仓储条件,加强监管流程规范等措施减少质押物的耗损量。因此,银行如何激励物流企业提高监管努力是一个有现实意义的问题。本文研究由供应商、零售商、银行、物流企业组成的供应链系统,其中零售商以仓单质押的融资方式向银行贷款,在仓单质押模型中考虑物流企业监管努力对质押物耗损量的影响,进而研究银行对物流企业监管努力的激励契约。首先,建立物流企业的监管努力影响质押物耗损量的仓单质押模型。假设零售商违约概率外生和存货具有一定的损耗率,计算得到银行对零售商的最优质押率决策,分析物流企业监管努力、存货耗损率和零售商主观违约概率对银行质押率和利润的影响;并进行数值分析。研究结果表明:提高借款企业主观违约率、降低质押物耗损率和提高物流企业监管努力都能带来银行利润的增加,在借款企业及其质押物固定的情况下,相较于前两者,通过激励物流企业提高监管努力来获得更多的利润更有现实意义。随后,讨论在这种情形下银行与物流企业间的委托代理关系。考虑到质押物会因仓储条件、气温、外部环境突变等风险产生损失,假设物流企业是风险规避的。结合委托代理理论,本文在信息对称和信息不对称两种情况下,基于三种不同的契约模式,研究银行对物流企业的激励问题。重点研究在信息不对称情形下银行激励契约以及激励和监督相结合契约。研究发现:信息对称时,银行只需采用固定支付模式,就可使供应链达到帕累托最优;信息不对称时,银行可以采取激励契约也可采取激励与监督结合的契约模式,此时都需为物流企业提供固定支付加分成比例的报酬,才能达到激励效果;引入监督机制,可以降低信息不对称的程度,从而提高银行利润。最后对三种模式下的激励契约进行对比分析,讨论银行利润、质押率决策与物流企业风险规避程度、监管努力成本系数和监督信号准确度间存在的关系。最后,文章通过数值分析对结论进行了验证,并就参数对决策变量的影响做出分析和解释。
[Abstract]:At present, due to the lack of enough mortgaged real estate and low credit, it is difficult for SMEs to obtain financial resources through traditional financing channels, resulting in a shortage of funds. In this case, warehouse receipt pledge, as an innovative financing service, has been developed rapidly. In practice, some stocks have a certain consumption rate, which is easy to deteriorate. In the process of pledge, the logistics enterprise plays the role of warehousing and supervision of the pledge, it can provide the storage conditions matching with the pledge. Therefore, how to encourage logistics enterprises to improve the regulatory efforts is a practical issue. This paper studies the suppliers, retailers, banks. Logistics enterprises constitute a supply chain system, in which retailers borrow from banks in the form of warehouse receipt pledge, and consider the influence of logistics enterprise supervision efforts on the amount of collateral consumption in the warehouse receipt pledge model. And then study the incentive contract of the bank to the logistics enterprise supervision efforts. First of all. Based on the assumption that the retailer default probability and inventory have a certain loss rate, the optimal pledge rate decision of the bank to the retailer is obtained. The paper analyzes the influence of logistics enterprises' supervision efforts, inventory loss rate and retailer's subjective default probability on bank pledge rate and profit. The results show that increasing the subjective default rate of the borrowing enterprises, reducing the loss of pledge and improving the supervision of logistics enterprises can bring about the increase of bank profits. In the case of borrowing enterprises and their pledge fixed, compared with the former two, it is more realistic to obtain more profits by encouraging logistics enterprises to improve regulatory efforts. In this case, the principal-agent relationship between banks and logistics enterprises is discussed. It is assumed that logistics enterprises are risk-averse. Combined with principal-agent theory, this paper bases on three different contract models in the case of information symmetry and information asymmetry. This paper focuses on the incentive contract of bank and the combination of incentive and supervision in the case of asymmetric information. As long as the bank adopts the fixed payment mode, it can make the supply chain reach Pareto optimal. When the information is asymmetric, the bank can adopt the incentive contract or the contract mode of the combination of incentive and supervision. In this case, it is necessary to provide the logistics enterprise with the fixed payment plus the proportion of the reward, in order to achieve the incentive effect; The introduction of supervision mechanism can reduce the degree of information asymmetry, thereby increasing bank profits. Finally, the incentive contracts under the three modes are compared and analyzed, and the bank profits are discussed. The relationship between pledge rate decision and risk aversion degree of logistics enterprise, the cost coefficient of supervision effort and the accuracy of supervision signal. Finally, the paper verifies the conclusion by numerical analysis. The influence of parameters on decision variables is analyzed and explained.
【学位授予单位】：东华大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F259.23;F832.4;F253.7

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