Agency Problem of Government Agency Problem of Corporate Eco

  本文关键词：经济发展、政府偏袒与公司发展——基于政府代理问题与公司代理问题的分析，由笔耕文化传播整理发布。

经济发展、政府偏袒与公司发展——基于政府代理问题与公司代理问题的分析

Economic Growth, Government Partiality and Corporate Performance --Empirical Analysis Based on Government andCorporate Agency Problems

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Hou Qingchuan, Jin Qinglu and Chen Mingduan （Shanghai University of Finance and Economics）

财经大学会计与财务研究院,上海200433

文章摘要：本文基于政府代理问题与公司代理问题，试图厘清宏观经济环境对微观企业行为影响的传导路径。本文发现，市场化进程较低时，，政府代理问题突出表现为地方政府通过在资源配置中向国有企业倾斜以实现经济粗放型增长，使得国有企业在经济发展过程中以外延型增长为主，这具体表现为企业规模的扩张与经济发展之间的相关性更强。市场化进程提高，上述政府代理问题会有所缓解，非国有企业的制度安排更有助于减少公司代理问题，实现企业从外延型增长向内涵型增长转变，这具体表现为非国有企业盈利能力提高与经济发展之间的相关性更强。

Abstr：This paper studies the relationship between economic growth and corporate performance from the perspective of the agency problem of government and of corporate. This paper intends to clarify the path through which the macroeconomic environments affect the micro corporate performance. In regions of low marketization, local governments have more discretion to allocate economic resources toward SOEs, and thus the agency problem of government exacerbates. In terms of growth, SOEs tend to focus on scale. The empirical findings indicate that for SOEs, the relation between sales growth and GDP growth is stronger than that for Non-SOEs. In regions of high marketization, the agency problem of government alleviates, and the organizational infrastructures of Non-SOEs can mitigate the agency problem of corporate, and thus the corporate puts more weight on intensive growth （earnings） rather than extensive growth （ scale）. Accordingly, the relation between earnings growth and GDP growth is stronger for Non-SOEs.

文章关键词：

Keyword：:Agency Problem of Government Agency Problem of Corporate Economic Growth Corporate Performance

课题项目：作者感谢国家自然科学基金项目（71072036,71272012,71472114）、教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划、上海市曙光计划项目（11SG35）以及上海财经大学创新团队支持计划的资助,感谢匿名审稿意见.文责自负.

  本文关键词：经济发展、政府偏袒与公司发展——基于政府代理问题与公司代理问题的分析，由笔耕文化传播整理发布。