政府公益性项目中的寻租监管博弈研究
发布时间:2018-04-07 16:12
本文选题:政府公益性项目 切入点:寻租 出处:《工程管理学报》2017年02期
【摘要】:在综合分析了政府部门、中介机构和私人企业相互关系的基础上,根据寻租理论与委托代理理论构建了政府公益性项目中寻租与监管的博弈模型,探讨寻租与监管的关系。通过分析博弈模型的混合策略纳什均衡解,对各个利益主体的选择策略进行研究,进而寻求寻租问题相关的治理对策。研究发现:中介机构及企业间寻租行为的发生受政府部门成功监督的能力系数、成本、惩罚因子等因素影响,有效的惩罚及监督措施能有效遏制寻租行为。
[Abstract]:Based on the comprehensive analysis of the relationship among government departments, intermediary organizations and private enterprises, the game model of rent-seeking and supervision in government public welfare projects is constructed according to the rent-seeking theory and principal-agent theory, and the relationship between rent-seeking and supervision is discussed.By analyzing the Nash equilibrium solution of the mixed strategy of the game model, this paper studies the selection strategies of the various stakeholders, and then seeks the relevant governance countermeasures for the rent-seeking problem.It is found that the occurrence of rent-seeking behavior among intermediary organizations and enterprises is influenced by factors such as the ability coefficient, cost and penalty factor of successful supervision by government departments, and effective punishment and supervision measures can effectively curb the rent-seeking behavior.
【作者单位】: 河海大学商学院;
【分类号】:D630
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本文编号:1719905
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