在线交易者行为策略选择与网上信用风险演化

发布时间：2018-03-13 20:30

本文选题：网上信用风险　切入点：演化博弈　出处：《重庆邮电大学学报(社会科学版)》2017年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：网上失信行为扩散阻碍了电子商务的发展,把握其演化规律是防止其扩散的前提。文章基于在线交易群体的视角,应用演化博弈理论,构建网上信用风险演化的博弈模型,并对模型进行推演和数值模拟。研究结果表明:仅考虑在线交易群体参与博弈的网上信用风险演化系统有四个均衡点,在线交易群体均采取失信策略的均衡点为演化稳定策略;网上信用风险演化是其他非稳定均衡点向这一稳定均衡点的演化过程;无论初始均衡点在何处,都将向演化稳定策略收敛,但初始均衡点影响了演化路径,三个非稳定均衡点形成了三种不同的网上信用风险演化路径。本研究的启示是必须对电子商务市场进行人为干预,设置有效防御机制。
[Abstract]:The diffusion of online discredit behavior hinders the development of electronic commerce, and the premise of preventing it from spreading is to grasp its evolution law. Based on the perspective of online trading group, this paper constructs a game model of online credit risk evolution by applying evolutionary game theory. The results show that there are four equilibrium points in the online credit risk evolution system which only considers the online trading groups participating in the game, and the online trading groups adopt evolutional stability strategy as the equilibrium point of the discredit strategy. The evolution of network credit risk is the evolution process from other unstable equilibrium points to this stable equilibrium point. No matter where the initial equilibrium point is, it will converge to the evolutionary stability strategy, but the initial equilibrium point will affect the evolution path. The three unstable equilibrium points form three different evolution paths of online credit risk. The enlightenment of this study is that we must artificially intervene the e-commerce market and set up an effective defense mechanism.
【作者单位】：河南工业大学管理学院;上海财经大学信息管理与工程学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目:网上信用风险的群体演化机制与多维防控策略研究(14BGL153) 河南省人文社会科学研究项目:基于演化博弈论的网上信用风险扩散机理研究(2013-ZD-013)
【分类号】：F724.6

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