基于双边市场理论的电子商务O2O平台定价策略研究

发布时间：2018-05-25 03:20

本文选题：双边市场 + 网络外部性　；参考：《东北财经大学》2016年硕士论文

【摘要】：信息网络技术和大数据处理技术的快速发展推动了 O2O平台的出现,作为继B2B、B2C和C2C平台后的一种新型电子商务平台,O2O平台具有典型的双边市场特征。不过,虽然与其他平台具有类似的特征,即平台运作模式的核心问题均是定价机制与定价策略,但O2O平台在定价方面的影响因素和传统的双边市场相比则有一定的差异。首先,参与人不仅关心另一边参与人的数量,同时也关心自已这一边参与人的数量;其次,随着信息技术的快速发展,尤其是智能手机终端的普及和无线网络的大面积覆盖,消费者通常会安装几个具有相似功能的平台软件如外卖平台、打车平台和团购平台等。因此,可以认为O2O平台同时存在着间接外部性、直接外部性和部分多归属这三类特征。但现有研究往往过度聚焦于其中的单个特征,未能综合考虑当三个特征同时存在时将会对O2O平台定价策略产生的影响,因而也难以对O2O平台运营实践做出极具效力的解释。鉴于这一问题,本文试图在平台差异化的基础上系统阐释直接网络外部性、间接网络外部性和部分多归属三类特征对O2O平台定价的影响机制,以更为准确地剖析O2O平台的定价策略,从而提出相应的政策建议。通过具体的研究,本文首先认为由于平台参与人之间存在着直接网络外部性和间接网络外部性特征,使得无论是垄断平台或是竞争平台均会采取"倾斜式定价策略",即平台企业对一边参与人进行补贴甚至免费的策略,而对另一边参与人收取高价的定价策略。这一定价方式明显违背了单边市场中边际成本的定价原则:其次,在竞争性平台中,当平台双边参与人中具有单归属特征的人数更多时平台将具有更高的利润,而当具有部分多归属特征的人数越多时平台的利润则会越低。因此,从这比较中可以认为平台企业具有降低双边参与人部分多归属的内在激励。此外,本文在平台差异化基础上,综合分析了直接网络外部性、间接网络外部性和部分多归属对于平台定价策略的影响,并且进一步阐释了 O2O平台采用倾斜式定价策略的原因,不仅证明了其合理性,也丰富了其理论内涵,同时,考虑到平台企业具有降低双边参与人部分多归属的意愿,本文认为反垄断机构在执法中应警惕平台企业的排他性行为和平台企业之间的横向合并。本文对于O2O平台定价策略的研究将丰富双边市场理论研究的内容,同时也为O2O电子商务平台内在规律的研究提供新视角。本文的具体研究内容可以分为以下五个部分:第一部分介绍O2O平台的研究背景和研究意义;第二部分对双边市场的相关理论进行了系统性的梳理和归纳;第三部分则分析了垄断性O2O平台的定价策略,介绍了O2O0电子商务平台的平台结构及其所具有的双边市场特征;第四部分详细考察了竞争性O2O平台的定价策略;第五部分对本文在研究过程中所得到的结论进行了系统性的总结,并在此基础上提出与之相应的若干政策建议。其中,第三部分和第四部分是本文的核心章节。
[Abstract]:The rapid development of information network technology and large data processing technology has promoted the emergence of O2O platform. As a new type of e-commerce platform following B2B, B2C and C2C platform, O2O platform has typical bilateral market characteristics. However, although it has similar features with other platforms, the core issues of the platform operation model are all pricing mechanisms. And the pricing strategy, but the impact factors of the O2O platform in pricing and the traditional bilateral market there are certain differences. First, the participants not only care about the number of people on the other side, but also concerned about the number of their own participants. Secondly, with the rapid development of information technology, especially the popularity and lack of smart phone terminals. A large area coverage of a line network, consumers usually install several platform software with similar functions such as a takeoff platform, a taxi platform and a group buying platform. Therefore, it can be considered that the O2O platform has three types of characteristics such as indirect externality, direct externality and part ownership. However, the existing research tends to focus over the individual. Characteristics can not take into account the impact on the O2O platform pricing strategy when the three features exist simultaneously, so it is difficult to make a very effective interpretation of the O2O platform operation practice. In view of this problem, this paper tries to explain the direct network externality, the indirect network externality and the partial return on the basis of the platform differentiation. In order to analyze the pricing mechanism of the O2O platform, it is more accurate to analyze the pricing strategy of the O2O platform, so as to put forward the corresponding policy recommendations. Through the specific research, the paper first considers that there are direct network externalities and indirect external characteristics between the platform participants, which make the platform or competition of the platform, whether it is a monopoly platform or competition. The platform will adopt the "tilting pricing strategy", that is, the platform enterprise has a subsidy or even free strategy for one side participant, and a high price pricing strategy on the other side, which clearly violates the pricing principle of marginal cost in the unilateral market. Secondly, in the competitive platform, when the platform bilaterally participates in the platform, The platform will have higher profits when the number of people with a single attribute is more, and the lower the profit of the platform when the number of part of the number of ownership is more. Therefore, it can be considered that the platform enterprise has the internal incentive to reduce the part of the part of the bilateral participants. The influence of the direct network externality, the indirect network externality and the partial multi ownership on the platform pricing strategy is analyzed, and the reason for the O2O platform to adopt the inclined pricing strategy is further explained, which not only proves its rationality, but also enriches its theoretical connotation. At the same time, it takes into account that the platform enterprises can reduce the partial ownership of the bilateral participants. In this paper, the research on the O2O platform pricing strategy will enrich the content of the research on the bilateral market theory and provide a new perspective for the study of the internal rules of the O2O e-commerce platform. The content can be divided into the following five parts: the first part introduces the research background and significance of the O2O platform; the second part systematically reviews and generalize the related theories of the bilateral market; the third part analyzes the pricing strategy of the monopolistic O2O platform, and introduces the platform structure of the O2O0 e-commerce platform and its features. The characteristics of the bilateral market; the fourth part examines the pricing strategy of the competitive O2O platform in detail; the fifth part makes a systematic summary of the conclusions obtained in the study process and puts forward some corresponding policy suggestions on this basis. Among them, the third and fourth parts are the core chapters of this article.
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F724.6;F274

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