基于双边市场理论的电子商务平台竞争规制研究

发布时间：2018-06-10 17:37

本文选题：双边市场 + 电子商务平台　；参考：《东北财经大学》2010年博士论文

【摘要】：在经济交易活动中,有些市场交易活动必须在某个平台(platform)上进行,这个平台通过一定的价格策略向交易双方(如消费者和商户)出售平台产品或服务,并努力促成它们在平台上实现交易,我们把具有这种特征的产业市场归属于“双边市场(two-sided markets)"。具有上述特征产业市场中的平台企业类型很多,如计算机操作系统生产商,向两类消费群体(消费者和软件开发商)提供计算机操作系统平台,消费者使用计算机操作系统来运行软件开发商的应用程序,而软件开发商也必须借助于计算机操作系统才能吸引消费者；再如电子商务平台厂商,它为交易双方提供交易服务,交易双方通过平台相互了解,促进交易的达成。经济学所讨论的不完全竞争市场大多基于传统工业经济中单边市场的理论,实际上在双边市场中,企业之间的竞争也会导致垄断的发生。目前,反垄断规制的政策都是针对传统单边市场中企业而制定的,对于具有双边市场特征的平台厂商,由于理论的缺失,如果贸然依照单边市场规制理论来判断,则势必会造成判断的失误。基于此,本文主要研究内容就是针对具有双边市场特征的电子商务平台厂商的竞争与规制问题。随着互联网信息产业的兴起,中国电子商务得到了迅猛的发展,经过10多年的发展已进入高速增长期。从1999年8月易趣网的创立开始,我国的C2C市场就一直处于寡头垄断的格局中。目前该市场已不再是eBay易趣与淘宝网“两强对峙”的情形,而主要由淘宝网、TOM易趣、腾讯拍拍和百度有啊四家企业组成的寡头垄断市场结构。由此,展开对电子商务平台运行的竞争机制和电子商务平台产业规制研究,具有重要的现实意义。从产业特征来看,电子商务平台是具有典型的双边市场特征的产业,但是它也有自己独特的产业特点,比如说,第三方支付平台也是具有双边市场特征的,有其核心业务,但它往往会被企业是一体化于电子商务平台。那么一体化效率是否高于非一体化,非一体化是否有利于市场竞争,其社会福利是否能够改善,这些重大理论问题都有待于进一步研究解释。此外,交易积分制提高了消费者对网络价值的评价,但由于网络不能互联,增加了交易的多平台接入倾向。交易积分制对消费者来说增加了转移成本,对产业来讲提高了进入壁垒。从目前已有的文献来看,对双边市场的研究大多拘泥于研究双边不对称的价格结构和定价机制,对于不同平台之间的竞争与合作,特别是不同平台之间的非一体模块化生产还鲜有系统的研究。同时,已有对电子商务平台的研究大多把它当做一个普通网络企业,研究内容局限在产业结构和盈利模式等方面。而把它当做一个双边网络平台的研究对象,以及对其竞争机制和规制对策的研究,目前还没有出现系统的研究文献。本文选题正是在此背景下,遵循产业组织理论的SCP研究范式,运用博弈论等分析工具和案例分析方法,探究电子商务平台产业的运行机制和定价的内在机理,分析其市场结构,研究厂商在市场竞争中的策略行为,并分析比较其企业绩效和社会福利,最后对电子商务产业规制提出相应的对策思路。本文旨在为电子商务平台产业运行机制和竞争策略的研究做出理论探索,也为电子商务平台产业规制政策提供理论支持,这是本文研究的重大意义,也是价值所在。全文主体共分八章,主要研究内容和成果概述如下：第一章绪论,主要介绍了本文研究的背景和意义,通过提出问题,确定了研究内容、研究方法和研究的基本框架。最后提出了本文的创新点。第二章对双边市场的基本理论进行了详细的理论综述。首先对基本概念进行了界定,接着从外部性理论入手,介绍了直接网络外部性和间接网络外部性以及和经济学传统外部性的区别。在特征与分类中,从需求和供给等方面阐述了双边市场的基本特征。通过平台厂商的定价策略和平台偏好差异化与平台竞争引出目前反垄断规制的内容,从理论研究的角度看,尚缺乏一个判断双边市场反垄断的理论体系。接下来是本文对双边市场的经济学解释,也是本部分的一个创新。本文运用制度经济学原理对双边市场的产生、市场和平台的关系、以及平台的集中交易进行了经济学的分析,解释了交易双方为什么会集中在平台上,平台如何保证生产以及平台服务由谁生产的问题。最后本部分对双边市场的市场结构类型进行了科学的划分,分别是基本结构、存在中间商的结构、用户多平台接入结构、平台互联互通结构、多平台服务结构。第三章对双边市场平台定价模式进行了分析和研究。通过对已有的垄断竞争定价模型分析和总结,得出无论是垄断平台还是竞争平台,其价格结构的设计目的是一致的,都是为了吸引双边的成员到平台上来。随后,本部分研究从影响电子商务平台定价模式的需求价格弹性、用户多平台接入行为、网络外部性强度、平台竞争、信誉和模块化治理等方面入手,对电子商务平台厂商价格效应做出分析,为后续模型假设做出理论的铺垫。第四章研究了电子商务厂商横向差异化竞争和互联互通对福利的影响。本部分首先用经济学理论解释了间接网络外部性和直接网络外部性的经济学意义,区分了金钱外部性和技术外部性,并指出无论网络外部性直接还是间接,在双边市场上,通过平台交易都可以内在于价格机制。本部分通过垄断和竞争的数理模型对电子商务厂商定价做出辨析,得出网络外部性差异是导致电子商务平台双边价格结构不均衡的主要因素,一边可能高于边际成本定价,另一半可能会给予补贴。通过电子商务平台厂商的社会福利比较分析,本章研究表明：竞争平台之间网络的互联互通,实现用户之间跨平台交易,可以降低市场进入壁垒,使市场重新恢复到竞争性垄断的市场结构,有助于技术创新和社会福利改善,这是本部分的一个创新之处。第五章从转移成本的角度研究了电子商务平台厂商中存在用户多平台接入行为的厂商竞争机制。本章系统分析了电子商务平台兼容的两个层次,这是本部分的一个创新点。第一层次是交易数据库的共享,第二层次的兼容是在第一层次交易数据库共享的基础上实现网络互连,用户可以跨平台交易。通过对不同转移成本下电子商务平台定价及利润的分析得出,当转移成本存在时,用户单平台接入效用要大于多平台接入效用,高级用户将被锁定在原平台上。从整个市场来看,被划为两个层次,即垄断市场和寡头市场。在第一层次兼容条件下,交易信用所形成的转移成本将不存在。此时,对网络评价较高的用户将选择多平台接入。在实现两个层次兼容的条件下,用户可以跨平台交易,用户将不存在多平台接入行为。从社会福利角度来分析,后者要大于前者。第六章主要研究电子商务平台模块化网络治理的可能性。利用交易费用理论分析了电子商务平台非一体化治理的条件和可能性,认为电子商务搜索平台是其系统的主导企业,其模块供应商应当是支付平台、银联和物流平台。在主导企业电子商务搜索平台制定规则和标准下,价值模块之间进行“背对背”的竞争。研究表明,模块化比一体化有效率,对于消费者来说模块化能带来更多消费者剩余。电子商务平台选择一体化而非模块化的原因是系统模块之间的间接网络外部效应,即能够为厂商带来更大的进入壁垒和市场势力。第七章主要研究电子商务平台的规制与对策。从结构壁垒和行为壁垒两个影响因素提出了规制电子商务平台的建议。一是互联互通。作为以促进交易为主要目的平台服务,由于网络外部效应和不兼容因素使双边客户不能跨平台交易,成为制约竞争和降低社会福利的主要因素。因此,互联互通可以降低市场进入壁垒,使市场重新恢复到竞争性垄断的市场结构,有助于技术创新和社会福利改善。是模块化网络生产。一体化会提高市场的进入壁垒,在位厂商可以采取交叉补贴打击潜在进入者。而采用非一体化生产可以提高生产效率,降低进入壁垒,促进竞争,有利于消费者剩余的提高和改善社会福利。第八章简要归纳了本文的基本结论,提出了不足之处,并对后续研究进行了展望。
[Abstract]:In economic transactions, some market trading activities must be carried out on a platform (platform). The platform sells platform products or services to both parties (such as consumers and merchants) through a certain price strategy, and tries to facilitate their transactions on the platform. We attribute the industrial market with this feature to "double". Two-sided markets ". There are many types of platform enterprises in the industrial market, such as computer operating system manufacturers, providing computer operating system platform to two types of consumer groups (consumers and software developers), and consumers using computer operating systems to run software developers' applications, and the software is open. The dealer also has to use the computer operating system to attract consumers, as well as the e-commerce platform manufacturer, which provides transaction services for both parties, and the parties understand each other through the platform to promote the achievement of the transaction.
The incomplete competitive market discussed by economics is mostly based on the theory of unilateral market in the traditional industrial economy. In fact, in the bilateral market, the competition between enterprises will lead to the occurrence of monopoly. At present, the policy of antitrust regulation is formulated for the enterprises in the traditional unilateral market and for the platform factory with the characteristics of bilateral market. Because of the lack of theory, it is bound to make a mistake in judgment if it is judged according to the theory of unilateral market regulation. Based on this, the main content of this paper is to deal with the competition and regulation of the e-commerce platform manufacturers with bilateral market characteristics.
With the rise of the Internet information industry, China's e-commerce has developed rapidly and has entered a high speed growth period after 10 years of development. Since the establishment of eBay net in August 1999, the C2C market in China has been in the pattern of oligopoly. At present, the market is no longer the situation of eBay eBay and the "strong confrontation" between the Taobao network and the Taobao net. It is mainly made up of the oligopoly market structure composed of Taobao, TOM eBay, Tencent patting and Baidu, which consists of four enterprises. Therefore, it is of great practical significance to carry out the research on the competition mechanism of the operation of the e-commerce platform and the industrial regulation of the e-commerce platform.
According to the characteristics of the industry, e-commerce platform is an industry with typical bilateral market characteristics, but it also has its own unique industrial characteristics. For example, the third party payment platform is also characterized by bilateral market and its core business, but it will often be integrated into the e-commerce platform by the enterprise. Whether it is higher than non integration, whether non integration is beneficial to market competition, and whether its social welfare can be improved, these important theoretical problems need further study and explanation. In addition, the transaction integration system improves the consumer's evaluation of the network value. But because the network cannot be interconnected, it increases the multi platform access tendency of the transaction. For the consumers, the transfer cost is increased, and the barriers to entry are raised for the industry. From the existing literature, the research on bilateral markets is mostly confined to the study of bilateral asymmetric price structure and pricing mechanism. For the competition and cooperation between different platforms, specifically, it is a non integrated modular production between different platforms. There are few systematic studies. At the same time, most of the research on e-commerce platform is regarded as an ordinary network enterprise, and the research content is limited to the industrial structure and profit model. As a research object of a bilateral network platform, and the research on its competition mechanism and Regulation Countermeasures, there is no system at present. Research literature.
This article is under this background, following the SCP research paradigm of industrial organization theory, using analysis tools such as game theory and case analysis to explore the operating mechanism and internal mechanism of the e-business platform industry, analyze its market structure, study the strategic behavior of the manufacturers in the market competition, and analyze and compare their enterprise performance. And the social welfare, finally to the electronic commerce industry regulation put forward the corresponding countermeasures. This article aims to make theoretical exploration for the research of the operation mechanism and competition strategy of the e-commerce platform industry, and also provide theoretical support for the industrial regulation policy of the e-commerce platform. This is the great significance and value of this paper.
The main body of the thesis is divided into eight chapters. The main research contents and achievements are summarized as follows:
The first chapter is the introduction, which mainly introduces the background and significance of the study. By putting forward the questions, the research content, the research method and the basic framework of the research are determined. Finally, the innovation points of this paper are put forward.
The second chapter gives a detailed theoretical overview of the basic theories of the bilateral market. First, the basic concepts are defined, and then from the external theory, the direct network externality and indirect network externality and the difference between the traditional externality of economics and the economics are introduced. In the characteristics and classification, the two sides are expounded from the aspects of demand and supply. The basic characteristics of the market. Through the pricing strategy of platform vendors and the differentiation of platform preference and platform competition, the content of antitrust regulation is drawn up. From the perspective of theoretical research, there is still a lack of a theoretical system to judge the antitrust of bilateral markets. This paper uses the principle of institutional economics to analyze the production of bilateral markets, the relationship between the market and platform, and the centralized trading of the platform. This paper explains why the two parties are concentrated on the platform, how the platform ensures production and the production of platform services. Finally, this part of the market is a market knot in the bilateral market. The structure type is divided into the basic structure, the structure of the middleman, the multi platform access structure of the user, the interconnected structure of the platform, the multi platform service structure.
The third chapter analyzes and studies the pricing model of bilateral market platform. Through the analysis and summary of the existing model of monopoly competition pricing, it is concluded that the design aim of the price structure is consistent, whether it is a monopoly platform or a competitive platform. All of them are to attract bilateral members to the platform. Then, this part of the study from the influence of electricity. The price elasticity of the pricing model of the sub business platform, the user multi platform access behavior, the strength of the network externality, the platform competition, the reputation and the modularized governance, make an analysis of the price effect of the e-commerce platform manufacturer, and make the paving for the hypothesis of the follow-up model.
The fourth chapter studies the effects of horizontal differentiation competition and interconnection on the welfare of e-commerce manufacturers. This part first explains the economic significance of indirect network externality and direct network externality by economic theory, differentiates the externality of money and the externality of technology, and points out that whether the network externality is direct or indirect, it is bilateral. On the market, the price mechanism can be within the platform through the platform transaction. This part analyzes the pricing of e-commerce manufacturers through the mathematical model of monopoly and competition. It is concluded that the difference of the network externality is the main factor that leads to the imbalance of the bilateral price structure of the e-commerce platform, and one side may be higher than the marginal cost pricing, the other half may be given. Through the comparative analysis of the social welfare of the e-commerce platform manufacturers, this chapter shows that the interconnection and intercommunication between the competitive platforms and the realization of cross platform transactions between the users can reduce the barriers to market entry, restore the market to a competitive monopoly market structure, and help improve the technological innovation and social welfare. An innovation in this part.
In the fifth chapter, from the point of view of transfer cost, this chapter studies the competitive mechanism of multi platform users in e-commerce platform. This chapter systematically analyzes the two levels of the compatibility of e-commerce platform. This is an innovation in this part. The first level is the sharing of the transaction database, and the compatibility of the second levels is at the first level. On the basis of transaction database sharing, network interconnection can be realized. Users can cross platform transaction. Through the analysis of the pricing and profit of the e-commerce platform under different transfer costs, it is concluded that when the transfer cost exists, the user single platform access utility is greater than the multi platform access utility, and the high level users will be locked on the original platform. It is divided into two levels, namely, the monopoly market and the oligopoly market. Under the first level compatible conditions, the transfer cost of the transaction credit will not exist. At this time, the users with higher network evaluation will choose multi platform access. Under the condition of realizing the compatibility of two levels, the users can trade across the platform, and the users will not have multiple platforms. Access behavior. From the perspective of social welfare, the latter is larger than the former.
The sixth chapter mainly studies the possibility of the modular network governance of e-commerce platform. Using the transaction cost theory, the conditions and possibilities of the non integrated governance of the e-commerce platform are analyzed. It is considered that the e-business search platform is the leading enterprise of its system, and its module suppliers should be the payment platform, the UnionPay and the logistics platform. Under the rules and standards of e-commerce search platform, the competition between value modules is "back to back". Research shows that modularization is more efficient than integration, and modularization can bring more consumer surplus for consumers. The reason for the integration of e-commerce platform and not modularization is the indirect network between the system modules. Part effect, that is, can bring greater barriers to entry and market forces for manufacturers.
The seventh chapter mainly studies the regulation and Countermeasures of e-commerce platform. From the two influencing factors of structure barrier and behavior barrier, it puts forward some suggestions on the regulation of e-commerce platform. One is interconnection and interoperability. As a platform to promote trading as the main purpose platform, because of the external and incompatible factors, the bilateral customers can not cross platform transaction, As the main factor restricting competition and reducing social welfare, interoperability can reduce the barriers to market entry, restore the market to a competitive monopoly market structure, help improve technological innovation and improve social welfare. It is a modular network production. Integration will improve market entry barriers, and the incumbent can take a cross supplement. The use of unintegrated production can improve production efficiency, reduce entry barriers, promote competition, improve consumer surplus and improve social welfare.
The eighth chapter briefly summarizes the basic conclusions of this paper, puts forward the shortcomings, and makes a prospect for future research.
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：F224;F724.6

【引证文献】