EPR制度下WEEE回收处理模式研究

发布时间：2018-01-12 19:24

本文关键词：EPR制度下WEEE回收处理模式研究　出处：《浙江工业大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着经济的发展,科学技术的发展和工业化进程的加快,现代社会给人们丰富物质生活的同时,也带来了资源过度消耗和生态污染等问题。在电子电器行业,由于其产品的更新周期较短,寿命终结(End-of-Life, EOL)的废旧家电产品更新换代速度加快,导致了大量废弃电器电子产品(Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment, WEEE)数量急剧增加。随着人们环保意识的提高,对废旧产品的回收处理再利用问题逐渐成为社会共识。基于生产延伸责任(EPR)制度,合理有效实施WEEE回收条例,对于加强废旧电器电子产品的回收再制造,提高资源利用率,发展循环经济,创建环境友好型社会,践行可持续发展战略具有重要意义。目前我国已进入家电产品报废高峰期,而再制造产业则尚处于起步阶段,EPR制度相关体系建设不够完善,回收处理系统也尚未成熟。鉴于此,本文采用博弈论和相关最优化理论研究了EPR制度下考虑消费者偏好和市场竞争等因素WEEE回收处理问题,以期得到有用结论为供应链成员回收再制造废弃电器电子产品提供建议,为政府有效协调和监督管理供应链提供政策制定方向。本文主要研究内容概述如下。(1)针对以回收商作为核心企业的逆向供应链在消费者偏好、市场竞争以及制造商本身差异等因素影响下,建立Stackelberg博弈模型,分别讨论WEEE委托回收处理和制造商自行回收处理模式,比较各个回收处理渠道下供应链成员的博弈问题,探讨产品替代率对渠道策略的影响。通过分析比较,指出了制造商、回收商等相关主体在不同情况下对回收处理模式偏好不一致,其中对于制造商来说,自主回收处理模式是最优的选择。(2)针对制造商自主回收处理废旧电器电子产品的情况,进一步分析其承担单独回收责任和集体回收责任两种模式下的决策问题。分别构建两种模式下的供应链成员收益函数,计算其均衡解,分析不同责任制度对制造商DfE (Design of Environment,环保设计)选择的影响。同时考虑消费者偏好和集体回收责任下制造商对平均回收处理成本加权比例等因素的影响,并通过算例分析比较两种模式下DfE选择的差异。结果表明,制造商在单独回收处理其废旧产品时的DfE决策总是优于其集体回收责任下的DfE选择,集体回收处理模式下容易产生搭便车现象而打击制造商DfE投资积极性,导致该回收处理模式下的效率低下。
[Abstract]:With the development of economy, the development of science and technology and the acceleration of industrialization, modern society has enriched people's material life, but also brought problems such as excessive consumption of resources and ecological pollution. Because of the short renewal cycle of its products, the replacement speed of the end-of-life end-of-life (EOLs) used household appliances is accelerated. This has led to a large number of waste electrical and electronic products waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment. With the improvement of people's awareness of environmental protection, the problem of recycling and reuse of waste products has gradually become a social consensus. Based on the system of extended responsibility for production, the EPRs system has become more and more important. The rational and effective implementation of WEEE recycling regulations will strengthen the recycling and remanufacturing of used electrical and electronic products, improve the utilization of resources, develop circular economy, and create an environment-friendly society. The implementation of sustainable development strategy is of great significance. At present, our country has entered the peak period of household appliances scrapping, while the remanufacturing industry is still in the initial stage of EPR system construction is not perfect. The recovery and treatment system is not mature. In view of this, this paper studies the problem of WEEE recovery under EPR system considering consumer preference and market competition by using game theory and related optimization theory. In order to obtain useful conclusions for supply chain members to recycle and remanufacture waste electrical and electronic products to provide advice. This paper provides a direction for the government to coordinate and supervise the supply chain effectively. The main research content of this paper is as follows: 1) the reverse supply chain with recycler as the core enterprise in the consumer preference. Under the influence of market competition and the difference of manufacturer itself, the Stackelberg game model is established to discuss the WEEE entrustment recovery model and the manufacturer self-recovery treatment model respectively. This paper compares the game problem of supply chain members under different recovery channels, and discusses the influence of product substitution rate on channel strategy. Through analysis and comparison, the author points out the manufacturer. Recyclers and other related agents in different cases of recycling processing model preference is inconsistent, which for manufacturers. Self-recovery treatment mode is the best choice. 2) for manufacturers to recover and dispose of used electrical and electronic products on their own. Furthermore, the decision problems under the two modes of individual recovery responsibility and collective recovery responsibility are analyzed. The income function of supply chain members under the two models is constructed, and the equilibrium solution is calculated. This paper analyzes the different liability system to the manufacturer DfE Design of Environment. The influence of environmental design) selection. Considering the influence of consumer preference and collective recycling responsibility on the weight ratio of average recycling cost. The difference of DfE selection between the two modes is analyzed and compared by an example. The results show that the DfE decision of the manufacturer is always better than the DfE selection under collective recycling responsibility when the manufacturer reclaims its old and spent products alone. Under the collective recovery treatment mode, hitchhiking is easy to occur and the enthusiasm of DfE investment is discouraged, which leads to the inefficiency of the recovery treatment mode.
【学位授予单位】：浙江工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F426.6;X705

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